Robinson Helicopter R22 Beta, VH-HUZ, Calindary Station NSW, 6 October 2005

At about 1800 Central Standard Time on 6 October 2005, a
Robinson Helicopter Company model R22 Beta helicopter (R22),
registered VH-HUZ, departed Border Downs, NSW on a private flight
to the pilot's property at Yalda Downs, NSW with the pilot and one
passenger on board. The helicopter subsequently crashed near a
homestead at Calindary Station (Calindary), fatally injuring the
pilot and seriously injuring the passenger.

A hearing witness¹ at Border Downs
who was also a pilot and endorsed to fly the R22, had previously
flown the occurrence helicopter. He reported that the helicopter
'sounded completely normal' during the takeoff and departure from
Border Downs. He indicated that the normal time interval for the
flight to Yalda Downs was about 1 hour 15 minutes.

Witnesses at a number of properties along the route flown by the
pilot reported that, as the flight progressed, the pilot requested
by radio for each of them to illuminate their external homestead
lights. The reason given by the pilot for those requests included,
earlier in the flight, for the pilot to 'get his bearings' and, as
the helicopter approached Calindary, to assist the pilot to
identify two sets of power lines that crossed the main west to east
road about 1 and 3 kms west of the property respectively. In
response to the pilot's request, the property owners at Calindary
reported that they parked their vehicle on top of a sand embankment
that was about 100 m south of the main road. The vehicle's
spotlights, and a third hand-held spotlight, were illuminated in
the direction of the helicopter's anticipated approach.

The pilot advised the property owners by radio that he had
sighted their spotlights. The property owners reported that they
suggested to the pilot that he should land at Calindary and use one
of their vehicles to return to Yalda Downs by road. The pilot
declined that suggestion and indicated that, after picking up the
road from Calindary to Yalda Downs, he would continue with the
flight. The property owner estimated that the helicopter was below
30 ft above ground level (AGL) at that time, and described the
helicopter's 'powerful white lights' as being visible 'down amongst
the trees'. The survivor indicated that the pilot manoeuvred the
helicopter in order for the helicopter's landing lights to
criss-cross the road.

One of the witnesses at Calindary, with extensive experience
flying aeroplanes, stated that there was nothing abnormal about the
sound of the helicopter or its engine as it passed the vehicle's
position, or immediately prior to the ground impact.

The survivor stated that, shortly after passing Calindary, the
road appeared to merge with the surrounding bush and the pilot
turned the helicopter to visually reacquire the road. The property
owners at Calindary reported that the helicopter commenced a
climbing right U-turn, before returning in a westerly direction and
descending at an estimated angle to the horizon of 20 to 30
degrees. The survivor indicated that, during the turn and until the
impact with the ground:

• he heard no abnormal noises from the helicopter
• he did not observe the illumination of any warning lights in
  the cockpit
• there was no apparent apprehension or degree of panic displayed
  by the pilot.

At about 1921, the helicopter impacted a sand hill a number of
times and was destroyed by the impact forces and post-impact
fire.

The pilot held a private pilot (helicopter) licence, was
endorsed to fly the R22 and was reported to have about 9,000 hours
flying experience. The pilot did not hold a night Visual Flight
Rules (VFR) rating. The requirements of Civil Aviation Regulation
(CAR) 174C(1) included that the pilot was required to have held
that rating in order to conduct a flight at night under the
VFR.

The pilot last undertook a medical examination in order to renew
his Class 2 Medical Certificate in January 2002. There was no
evidence that:

• the pilot finalised the administrative requirements for the
  renewal of that certificate
• the pilot held a valid Class 2 Medical Certificate at the time
  of the occurrence
• the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) had given the pilot
  permission to continue flying without a current medical
  certificate.

CAR 5.04(1) required that:

Without the permission of CASA, the holder of a flight crew
license must not perform a duty authorised by the license if the
person does not hold a current medical certificate that is
appropriate to the license.

That meant that on the day of the accident, the pilot should not
have been performing the duties that were authorised by his
license.

The helicopter was first registered in Australia on 3 May 2005
and was reported to have flown about 130 to 140 hours since its
delivery flight to Yalda Downs on 1 August 2005. An examination of
the helicopter's maintenance records found that the helicopter was
certified for day VFR flight and equipped and maintained in
accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures. The
helicopter was not equipped for flight under the night VFR, nor was
it installed with an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT)².

The helicopter's weight and centre of gravity were estimated to
have been within the prescribed limits at the time of the
occurrence.

It was reported that the pilot would have refuelled the
helicopter to capacity from the aviation gasoline fuel source at
Yalda Downs prior to departing for Border Downs earlier that day. A
witness at Border Downs indicated that the pilot did not refuel the
helicopter at that location. It was estimated that at the time of
the accident, about 24 L of fuel remained on board the helicopter.
That would have been sufficient for the remainder of the planned
flight to Yalda Downs.

A Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) examination of the forecast
weather and meteorological observations from the Tibooburra
Automatic Weather Station³ indicated
that there was no significant weather, no low-level cloud, and no
reduction in visibility in the region of Tibooburra at the time of
the occurrence. The investigation determined that the times of
sunset, and of the end of civil twilight for the relevant locations
along the planned west to east route included:

The pilot was reported to have accessed a private weather source
via the internet prior to the departure from Border Downs. The
available information from that source included the observed
surface wind for a number of locations in the general vicinity of
the flight and the weather forecast and times of sunrise and sunset
for Broken Hill. Sunset for Broken Hill on the day of the
occurrence was published by that source as 1809.

A witness at Border Downs reported the weather as being 'good',
with a wind of about 10 to 15 kts from the west-south-west, and a
cloud base of above 1,500 ft AGL. The weather at the accident site
at the time of the accident was reported by witnesses to include: a
light north-westerly wind; a 50% overcast layer of thin cloud, with
a high base; good visibility; and no horizon. Witnesses reported
that it was 'pretty dark, as in black'.

Examination of the NSW Police and other photographic evidence
indicated a low angle of impact with the sand hill at a relatively
high speed, which compromised the integrity of the helicopter's
cockpit area. That was consistent with the reported 85 m wreckage
trail and witness reports of the helicopter's approach towards the
ground.

The damage to the helicopter's landing skids and engine mount
frame was consistent with a slightly nose-down, right angle of bank
at ground impact. One of the main rotor blades separated from the
main rotor head at its hinge bolt attachment point, consistent with
static overload as a result of the blade's impact with the ground.
The damage to that main rotor blade confirmed that the main rotor
was rotating at that time. The tail boom appeared to have failed in
overload and separated from the main wreckage following the initial
impact with the ground. The relatively minor torsional shear
indications evident on the tail rotor driveshaft, and the nature of
the damage to the tail rotor blades, indicated that the tail rotor
had ceased rotating prior to its impact with the ground.

Based on the available information, there was no evidence that
material failure or component malfunction had contributed to the
development of the occurrence.

At the time of writing this report, the pilot's post mortem
report was not available to the investigation team.

There was no report by the witnesses to the occurrence of an
in-flight fire. The source of the post-impact fire was from fuel
that had spilled from the ruptured helicopter fuel tanks. The
ignition source of the fire could not be confirmed, but was most
likely from the hot engine exhaust.

CAR 252A specified that a pilot in command of an aircraft that
was not an exempted aircraft⁴ may
only begin a flight if the aircraft either:

• was fitted with an approved and functioning ELT, or
• carried an approved and readily accessible portable ELT that
  was in working order.

The helicopter was not an exempted aircraft and it was reported
that the pilot normally carried a portable ELT during flight. The
survivor indicated that he had not observed a portable ELT in the
helicopter prior to or during the occurrence flight, and the item
was not identified by the NSW Police amongst the wreckage of the
helicopter, or at the site of the accident. AusSAR⁵ reported that an emergency signal was not
identified at or about the time of the accident.

The flight was within the central Australian mainland component
of the Designated Remote Area that was promulgated in Appendix III
to Civil Aviation Order 20.11. That required the carriage of
sufficient survival equipment for sustaining life appropriate to
the area being overflown, and either the submission of a
SARTIME⁶ flight notification to Air
Traffic Services (ATS) or for a pilot in command to leave a flight
note with a responsible person. It was reported that the pilot and
passenger carried sufficient clothing in case the decision was made
to remain overnight at Border Downs. ATS records indicated that a
SARTIME was not submitted to that agency, and a flight note was not
left at either Border Downs or Yalda Downs for the occurrence
flight. Witnesses at Yalda Downs indicated that the first
confirmation that the pilot intended to return that night was via a
radio call from the pilot at about 1900 to 1915, indicating that
'[he] would be late [arriving at Yalda Downs]'.

The Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) requires
that:

Unless the pilot in command holds a Command Instrument Rating or
night VFR (NGT VFR) rating and the aircraft is appropriately
equipped for flight at night, a VFR flight must not depart from an
aerodrome:

1. before first light or after last light; and
2. unless the ETA [Estimated Time of Arrival] is at least 10
   minutes before last light after allowing for any required
   holding.

Last light was interpreted by the AIP to equate to the end of
civil twilight ⁷. In addition, the
AIP alerted pilots to the potential for the presence of cloud cover
to the west of an aerodrome, and a number of other variables to
adversely affect a flight arriving at its destination near the end
of daylight. Sunset was highlighted as 'having no relevance when
calculating daylight operating times for the VFR pilot.'

The AIP also placed altitude restrictions on the operation of an
aircraft under the night VFR. That included that a pilot should not
operate an aircraft under those rules at a height lower than the
published lowest safe altitude (LSALT) for the route, or a height
that was calculated in accordance with the requirements of the AIP,
except under certain prescribed circumstances. Depending on the
calculation methodology applied by a pilot, the LSALT for the route
Border Downs to Yalda Downs was at least 2,020 ft above mean sea
level (equivalent to about 1,500 ft AGL at Calindary).

The Approved Flight Manual for the helicopter included a number
of Safety Notices that were relevant to the operation of the
helicopter at night. Those notices included that:

• Flying a helicopter in obscured visibility due to fog, snow,
  low ceiling, or even dark night can be fatal.
• Loss of the pilot's outside visual references, even for a
  moment, can result in disorientation, wrong control inputs, and an
  uncontrolled crash.
• …[the pilot] loses control of the helicopter when he attempts
  to turn to regain visibility but is unable to complete the turn
  without visual references.
• [pilots should] be sure you NEVER fly at night unless you have
  clear weather with unlimited or very high ceilings and plenty of
  celestial or ground lights for reference.

1. A witness who heard, but did not
   observe the takeoff.
2. Crash-activated radio beacon that
   transmits an emergency signal that includes the position of a
   crashed aircraft.
3. The closest station to the site of
   the accident, being about 49 NM north-north-west of that
   location.
4. Exempted aircraft means high
   capacity regular public transport or charter aircraft, single seat
   or turbo-jet powered aircraft, or balloons, airships or
   gliders.
5. Australian Search and Rescue - in
   general terms, AusSAR coordinates the response to aviation SAR
   incidents across Australia.
6. The time nominated by a pilot for
   the initiation of Search and Rescue action if a report has not been
   received by the nominated unit.
7. Period at sunset when the sun's
   centre is between 0°50' and 6° below the horizon.