On 14 April 2005 a crew member of a SAAB Aircraft AB SF-340B
suffered a minor injury as a result of coming into contact with the
sharp edges of the aircraft's hardened cockpit security door. A
similar injury was reported to have occurred previously in like
circumstances. More significantly, reports were received from a
number of aircraft operators regarding flight safety and
operational hazards associated with the installation of hardened
cockpit security doors in four different aircraft types.
The investigation determined that, to enhance security, regulation
4.68 of the Transport Security Regulations 2005 was
drafted to combine a unique hardened cockpit security door
requirement in aircraft having a passenger seating capacity of 30
to 59 seats, with the hardened cockpit door security requirements
of Section 13.2.2 of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention for
application in aircraft with a seating capacity of 60 or more
seats.
However, the development of regulation 4.68 did not take full
account of the operational and flight safety requirements of the US
Federal Aviation Regulations, or of other available international
policy guidance. The result was a number of unintentional
operational and flight safety hazards in affected aircraft, as
evidenced by this investigation report.
The apparent scope of the potential hazards associated with the
installation of hardened cockpit security doors, and their
potential effect, formed the basis for the conduct of this
investigation, which was formally commenced on 29 July 2005.
Post publication safety action
update
As a result of this investigation, the Office of Transport
Security (OTS) indicated that it would explore the establishment of
a formal consultation mechanism with the Civil Aviation Safety
Authority (CASA), and consult with CASA on relevant aviation
security measures that had the potential to impact on aviation
safety. The OTS also advised that it would, over time, consider the
amendment of the Aviation Transport Security Regulations
2005, including in response to the potential safety concerns
of the flight deck door requirements.
CASA indicated that it would seek a Memorandum of Understanding
with the OTS to ensure the consideration of any potential
operational and flight safety hazards that might result from the
development of national aviation security requirements.
Subsequently, in November 2009, CASA advised that it had
established quarterly meetings with the Department of
Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local
Government to discuss the interaction of security and aviation
safety regulatory requirements. On that basis, both organisations
agreed that a formal Memorandum of Understanding was not
required.