FACTUAL INFORMATION
On 17 January 2005, at 0633 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, a Saab
Aircraft Company AB SF-340B (Saab) departed Albury Airport on a
scheduled passenger service to Sydney, NSW. The aircraft was being
operated under the instrument flight rules (IFR). The crew had been
authorised by the Albury Tower aerodrome controller to track via
Yass on the 043 degree radial from the Albury very high frequency
omni-directional radio range (VOR) navigation aid and to climb to
flight level (FL) 170. At 0636, a de Havilland Canada DHC-8-102
(Dash 8) aircraft departed Albury Airport on a scheduled passenger
service to Sydney, also under the IFR. The crew of the Dash 8 were
issued with a clearance by the aerodrome controller to track via
the 055 degree radial from the Albury VOR and to climb to
FL200.
The Albury aerodrome controller was required to apply non-radar,
or procedural, control, in accordance with published procedures, to
aircraft operating within the Albury control zone (CTR) and control
area (CTA) up to 8,000 ft. Procedural control is achieved by the
use of information from sources other than radar. The aerodrome
controller later reported that he established a difference of 12
degrees between the tracks of the two aircraft to facilitate the
application of a visual separation standard. Visual separation at
Albury was achieved by the use of information from sources other
than radar. According to the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS)
4.5.2.2 (effective 10 Jun 2004):
Aerodrome controllers may also separate by the use of visual
observation of aircraft position and projected flight paths.
The airspace above the Albury CTR and CTA was the responsibility
of the Hume sector controller (Hume controller) operating in the
Melbourne Air Traffic Control Centre. The Hume controller was
required to provide a procedural air traffic control (ATC) service
to aircraft operating within the Hume sector until that controller
could establish a radar separation standard. The minimum horizontal
radar separation standard applicable in the Hume sector was 5
NM.
To ensure that a procedural separation standard was maintained
between the aircraft in the Hume sector, the Hume controller
instructed the Albury aerodrome controller to establish the two
aircraft in a step-climb procedure. MATS 4.3.1.8 stated that:
A step climb procedure may be used to simultaneously climb
aircraft to vertically separated levels provided that the lower
aircraft is progressively assigned levels which provide vertical
separation with the higher aircraft.
The Albury aerodrome controller later reported that a step-climb
was not practical, because there was insufficient vertical spacing
between the two aircraft when he requested altitude reports from
the crews. The Albury aerodrome controller did not notify the Hume
controller that he was unable to implement the step-climb procedure
or that he would provide visual separation until a radar standard
was established.
MATS 4.1.1.4 stated that:
Tactical Separation Assurance places greater emphasis on traffic
planning and conflict avoidance rather than conflict resolution.
This is achieved through:a. the proactive application of separation standards to avoid
rather than resolve conflicts;b. planning traffic to guarantee rather than achieve
separation;c. executing the plan so as to guarantee separation; and
d. monitoring the situation to ensure that plan and execution
are effective.