Airbus A330-341, PK-GPE

1. The driver of the catering vehicle became disorientated and
   entered runway 34L.

When the ADC issued the take-off clearance to the crew of the
Airbus, the catering vehicle was a significant distance from both
the Airbus and runway 34L. In the circumstances the ADC would have
had no indication that the vehicle was likely to enter the runway
and pose a potential collision threat to the Airbus.

There was little, if any, action that the ADC could have taken
to resolve the situation when it became apparent to him that the
vehicle would enter the runway because:

• The catering vehicle was not radio equipped;
• The Airbus crew was committed to the take-off, if not already
  airborne; and
• Any alert provided to the crew of the Airbus by the ADC may
  have exacerbated the problem, given the relative position of the
  aircraft to the vehicle at that time.

While a runway incursion by a vehicle driven by the holder of a
category 2 ADA may have been reasonably unforeseeable, this
occurrence has identified a significant risk to the safety of
operations at Sydney airport.

A means of detecting knowledge gaps and evaluating the ongoing
proficiency of qualified drivers may have identified a knowledge
deficiency in the area of taxiway and runway markings recognition
and in other areas of knowledge that may have contributed to this
incursion. Such quality assurance would enable SACL, as the
authority responsible for the management and control of surface
vehicles operating on, or in the vicinity of, the airside area of
the airport, to recognise and address systemic deficiencies in
driver competence on an ongoing basis. That would give SACL the
opportunity to mitigate any resultant risks.

The driver of the catering vehicle was properly licensed, and
had been driving on perimeter roads and apron areas of the airport
for two years. Despite her training, the driver may not have been
operationally familiar with taxiway and runway markings because she
had not operated on runways or taxiways since she obtained her
ADA.

None of the training programs included advice to drivers about
recommended actions they could take that might assist them should
they become lost or disorientated while driving airside. Such a
procedure may have reduced the risk of a collision with the
departing Airbus in these circumstances by:

• reducing the likelihood of a runway incursion in the first
  instance; and
• reducing the time the catering vehicle remained on the runway
  following the incursion.

Sequence of events

On 24 August 2003, at about 0935 Eastern Standard Time, a motor
vehicle involved in catering duties on the international apron area
at Sydney airport entered runway 34 left (34L) at taxiway Golf
without the driver having first received a clearance from air
traffic control to enter the runway. At that time, an Airbus
A330-341(Airbus) aircraft had just become airborne from runway 34L.
The aircraft passed directly over the vehicle while it was on the
runway. The runway incursion by the vehicle resulted in an
infringement of runway separation standards.

The driver of the vehicle was authorised to drive only on the
perimeter roads, airside roads and apron areas. The driver was not
aware that she had entered the runway and was not authorised, or
trained, to drive on taxiways or runways. The driver eventually
realised that she had entered an area of the airport with which she
was not familiar. She attempted to return to the apron and was
subsequently escorted from the movement area by an airport
operations officer.

Sydney Airport Corporation Limited (SACL)

SACL was the airport licence holder and operator of Sydney
airport at the time of the occurrence. In accordance with the
legislation current at the time of the occurrence, SACL was
ultimately responsible for the proficiency of drivers operating
airside at Sydney Airport.

Under the Airports (Control of On-Airports Activities)
Regulations 1997, part 4, division 4, s124, the airport operator
was required to publish an Airside Vehicle Control Handbook (AVCH)
for the airport over which it had control. The Sydney airport AVCH
contained particulars for the management and control of surface
vehicles operating on, or in the vicinity of, the airside area of
Sydney airport. The stated 'intent of the requirements for airside
operation of vehicles set out in the AVCH [was] to ensure the safe
and orderly movement of staff, passengers, aircraft and vehicular
traffic'.

SACL was responsible for issuing an authority to drive airside
(ADA) to a driver who had an employment requirement to operate a
vehicle airside. That responsibility could be delegated to an
'Approved Issuing Authority' (AIA).

'An Approved Issuing Authority is a company or organisation to
which SACL delegated the responsibility to carry out the training,
testing, and issuance of an ADA for the Airport' and was generally
delegated to those organisations that employed airside drivers.
SACL maintained overall responsibility for the training and testing
standards of Approved Issuing Authorities at Sydney airport. The
AVCH stated that AIAs 'must:

• Provide the SACL Manager Safety with reasonable access to its
  records and premises to enable the SACL Manager Safety to carry out
  audits to ensure that the AIA is maintaining satisfactory standards
  in the carrying out of its functions as an AIA; and
• Train and test its employees and employees of its Subsidiaries
  to drive Airside to the standard required by the SACL Manager
  Safety'.

Training

Training for a category 2 ADA included information on the
recognition of perimeter roadway markings, apron roadway markings,
live taxiway crossing markings, runway and taxiway markings. It did
not require the driver to be trained in the use of a radio. The
catering vehicle was not equipped, nor was it required to be
equipped, with a radio suitable for use on an airport to enable
two-way communication with air traffic control.

The driver of the vehicle held a current category 2 ADA, having
been trained about 2 years previously. A category 2 ADA authorised
the driver of an authorised vehicle to operate the vehicle on
perimeter roads, airside roads and apron areas of the airport in
accordance with the AVCH.

The AVCH specified the prerequisites for applying for the
category 2 ADA. They included a requirement for drivers to hold a
current State or Territory driver's licence and complete at least 4
hours of driving airside either as an observer or preferably as the
driver under the supervision of another driver with at least a
category 2 ADA.

Drivers were also required to demonstrate 12 practical and
theoretical competencies to an approved training officer.

Category 2 ADA training did not include recommended actions or
guidelines for drivers should they become lost or disorientated
while driving airside.

Driver reference materials

The airport operator, SACL, produced a pocketbook for use by
drivers with a category 2 ADA, and another for use by drivers with
either a category 3 or a category 4 ADA. Holders of a category 3
ADA were authorised to operate an authorised vehicle on all
movement areas excluding runway strips. Holders of a Category 4 ADA
were authorised to operate on all airside areas which included an
authorisation to enter a runway strip in accordance with airport
procedures. The pocketbooks were intended to be 'a quick reference
guide to explain the main rules which apply to all drivers
operating airside'. The driver involved in this runway incursion
had been provided with a copy of the category 2 driver's
pocketbook.

The Category 2 pocketbook did not include recommended actions or
guidelines for drivers should they become lost or disorientated
while driving airside.

Air traffic control (ATC)

Air Traffic Controllers provided an Air Traffic Service to
aircraft on that part of the Sydney aerodrome used for take-off,
landing and taxying, excluding the apron areas, for the purpose of
preventing collisions between aircraft and obstructions. The
aerodrome controller (ADC) was responsible for authorising
aircraft, personnel and vehicles to cross a runway or to operate on
a runway strip.

The Manual of Air Traffic Services required ADCs to visually
scan the length of the runway prior to issuing a take-off clearance
and immediately before the take-off is commenced to confirm that
the runway was free from obstacles including vehicles and other
aircraft. Vehicle operators and pilots were also required to obtain
a clearance from ATC prior to entering an active runway, and air
traffic controllers operating from the control tower maintained a
routine visual surveillance of the manoeuvring area of the
airport.

A review of the recorded radar data showed that, when the
controller issued a clearance to the crew of the Airbus to enter
the runway, the vehicle was in the vicinity of bay 59 on the
international apron. That was approximately 2.78 km from the Airbus
and approximately 0.83 km from the intersection of taxiway Golf and
runway 34L. When the Airbus commenced its take-off roll, the
vehicle was near the intersection of taxiway Golf and taxiway
Yankee. That was approximately 2.77 km from the Airbus and 0.5 km
from the intersection of taxiway Golf and runway 34L.