History of the flight
The pilot of the de Havilland Beaver floatplane registered
VH-BVA was conducting a charter positioning flight from Hamilton
Island Marina to Chance Bay, Whitsunday Island. He had landed at
Chance Bay seven times in the previous two days. Weather conditions
in the area were good. At 1700 Eastern Standard Time the Hamilton
Island automatic weather station recorded a 7 - 10 knot wind from
the northwest. Witnesses in Chance Bay said that the surface wind
in the bay was 2 - 5 knots. The water surface in Chance Bay was
smooth, but not glassy.
The pilot said that he commenced a straight-in approach to
Chance Bay but elected to go around due to the increased number of
vessels moored in the bay since the previous flight. He flew a left
circuit at 500 feet and assessed that the area for landing was
adequate. He said that on final approach, the flight path was
higher than he would have preferred. His intention was to touchdown
before passing abeam the vessels. He recalled that the floatplane
speed shortly before touchdown was about 80 knots, rather than the
target speed of 70 knots. He said that his response at this time
was consistent with flying a landplane in that he reduced the back
pressure on the control column and allowed the floatplane to
contact the water at a lower nose attitude, and at a higher speed,
than was ideal. Upon touchdown, the floatplane yawed sharply left
50 - 60 degrees and headed directly towards the anchored ketch
'Seark', about 300 m away. The pilot said that the water rudders
(at the rear of each float) were retracted, so all the yaw control
he had available was via the conventional aerodynamic rudder. As
the aircraft yawed, it felt as though the rudder was stuck at full
left deflection, but he thought that this was due to hydrodynamic
drag. When the floatplane was an estimated 100 m from the 'Seark',
it swung right so that it was heading slightly to the east side of
the 'Seark'. However, the outer portion of the floatplane's left
wing subsequently collided with the rear mast of the 'Seark'.
A video recording of the event showed that the floatplane
touched down with a lower nose attitude than was ideal. It also
showed that the left float touched the water first. The sharp left
yaw followed immediately. The aircraft became airborne momentarily,
shortly after initial touchdown.
The left wing of the floatplane and the rear mast of the ketch
were substantially damaged. There were no injuries to the pilot or
the three occupants of the ketch.
Landing area
Witnesses estimated that landing floatplanes (including this
accident floatplane prior to touchdown), were passing about 50 m
abeam the anchored yachts.
Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 92-1(1) 'Guidelines
for aeroplane landing areas' stated that "a minimum width water
channel of 60 m ... is recommended" for single-engine and
centre-line thrust floatplanes not exceeding 2,000 kg maximum
takeoff weight (MTOW). There were no diagrams or other guidance
material provided for floatplanes greater than 2,000 kg MTOW or for
multi-engine floatplanes. The MTOW for the accident floatplane was
2,313 kg. The Transport Operations (Marine Safety) Regulations
(Queensland) 1995 s95 (1)(a)(ii) required that vessels operating at
speeds greater than 6 knots must not approach within 30 m of a
moored vessel.
Float alignment
Another company floatplane pilot reported that the aircraft
required greater than normal right rudder input to maintain a
constant heading during flight. During an inspection after the
accident, maintenance personnel established that the floats were
aligned slightly left of the aircraft's longitudinal axis. The
aircraft manufacturer commented that the reported flying
characteristics were consistent with the float alignment. The
aircraft had been flown 23.8 hours since the last maintenance
inspection, including about 10 hours by the accident pilot. No
record had been made in the aircraft maintenance release regarding
the 'in-flight' or 'on-water' handling characteristics.
Floatplane stability on the water
The ideal landing attitude for a floatplane is nose high, so
that the rear portion of the float contacts the water first. If a
floatplane lands at too high a speed (lower nose attitude than
ideal), the point of contact of the floats with the water (that is,
the centre of rotation of the floatplane) is at a position on the
floats that is forward of the aircraft's centre of gravity and the
aircraft's directional stability is reduced. If the loss of
directional stability is not too severe, the pilot may be able to
regain control if nose-up elevator is applied very rapidly to move
the centre of rotation aft, behind the centre of gravity.
Pilot information
The pilot was the chief pilot of the company. Of his 11,256 hrs
total flight time, 34 hrs were in floatplane operations, and
included 79 water landings.
The pilot commenced floatplane endorsement training in October
2001. The endorsement was issued on 12 February 2002, after four
sessions of training in Cessna 206 floatplanes involving 4.1 hrs
and 16 water landings. Between 15 March and 25 July 2002, the pilot
conducted four sessions in command under supervision in de
Havilland Beaver floatplanes, involving 7.3 hrs and 23 water
landings. On 25 July 2002 the company floatplane training pilot
authorised the pilot to conduct solo commercial operations to
specific destinations but noted that he was to be closely monitored
in marginal conditions until he was more experienced.
The accident flight was the last flight of the day for the
pilot. He had completed five flights with a total of 3 hrs flight
time and 10 hrs duty time before the accident. The day before the
accident the pilot had completed 10.2 hrs duty, including 4.8 hrs
flight time during eight flights. The day prior to that was a
rostered day off. He reported that neither fatigue nor any other
personal issues had impaired his ability to safely operate an
aircraft on the day of the accident.
The pilot's work/rest history for the 14 days prior to the
accident was examined using a computerised fatigue algorithm
developed by the Centre for Sleep Research, University of South
Australia. The results indicated that the pilot was not
experiencing significant levels of fatigue in the week leading up
to, and on the day of, the accident.
Organisational information
At the time of the accident, the company employed an experienced
floatplane pilot who conducted all the accident pilot's floatplane
endorsement and in command under supervision training. The
authority, duties and responsibilities of this floatplane pilot
were not established or formalised in either the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority (CASA) issued instruments of approval for key
company personnel, or in the company operations manual.
The company operations manual stated that pilots with less than
250 water landings were subject to the direct supervision of the
chief pilot who was to take into account the wind strength, wind
direction, turbulence, tide and sea state at the origin and
destination of the flight before approving a flight. There was no
provision in the operations manual for when the chief pilot did not
have the minimum 250 water landings experience. (Other companies
required up to 300 water landings in command under supervision and
50 hours total floatplane flight time before solo commercial flight
operations were permitted.)
For VFR charter in single-engine aircraft, CASA required that a
pilot hold a commercial licence and the applicable aircraft special
design feature endorsement, for example float alighting gear. CASA
did not specify additional minimum experience requirements on the
aircraft type or the special design feature.
Chief pilot appointment
Civil Aviation Order 82.0 required that a chief pilot hold
licences, endorsements and ratings that permit command of all
company operations. CASA had approved the pilot's appointment as
chief pilot for the operator on 19 April 2002. At that time, he had
obtained a float alighting gear endorsement, but had not been
authorised by the company to conduct solo commercial floatplane
operations.