The pilot of a Cessna 206 (C206), departed from Badu Island, Qld
at about 1210 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on a positioning flight
to Horn Island, Qld in accordance with the visual flight rules
(VFR). The aircraft had an estimated fuel endurance of 270 minutes.
The pilot, who was the sole occupant, had been tasked to conduct a
charter flight from Horn Island at 1330 with passengers who were
reported as arriving on a scheduled flight from Cairns.
At about 1221 the pilot broadcast on the Torres Mandatory
Broadcast Zone (MBZ) frequency that he was over Wednesday Island
and tracking for a 3 NM final approach to runway 26 at Horn Island.
A short time later he broadcast that he was holding until the
weather over the runway cleared. At about 1238 the pilots of two
aircraft in the Bamaga area reported hearing a MAYDAY broadcast
from the pilot of the C206 on the MBZ frequency. The pilot did not
describe the nature of the emergency. Further efforts by the pilots
operating in the Bamaga area to contact the pilot of the C206 were
unsuccessful and they advised air traffic services of the MAYDAY
they had heard on the MBZ frequency.
An air and sea search was commenced. Later that day floating
debris, identified as belonging to the C206, was located. The
recovered items included the left main wheel and landing gear leg,
the nose wheel and part of the nose gear landing leg and a seat.
The following day divers located the aircraft approximately 3 NM
east of Horn Island in 7 m of water but the pilot was not
found.
The aircraft was recovered from the sea floor where it had been
submerged for just over two days. It had been extensively damaged
by impact forces. The nature of the recovery process resulted in
further disruption of the wreckage. The outer left wing, left
aileron and the engine cowls were not recovered. Salt-water
corrosion had affected many of the aircraft components. The flaps
were found in the retracted position and damage to the propeller
blades was consistent with low engine power at the time of impact.
Damage was consistent with the aircraft having struck the water at
a moderate to high speed in a nose-down, left wing low attitude.
The collision with the water was not survivable.
Examination of the damaged gyroscopic flight instruments did not
reveal any indication of pre-impact malfunction. The vacuum pump
was found in good condition and capable of normal operation.
Although the aircraft was equipped with appropriate instrumentation
for flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) it was
maintained to the VFR standard, as appropriate to the category of
operation. Maintenance requirements were certified as having been
performed and no evidence was found to indicate that the aircraft
was other than serviceable prior to the flight. Analysis of
recorded audio data determined that engine operation was normal
during the pilot's radio transmissions.
The pilot was reported to have obtained a forecast from
Airservices electronic briefing facility using the company computer
terminal at Badu Island. That forecast predicted north-westerly
stream weather characteristic of conditions normally experienced
during the wet season in the Torres Strait area between October and
April. The terminal area forecast for Horn Island, valid from 0600
to 1800, indicated light showers of rain and a visibility greater
than 10 km. Throughout the forecast period, a temporary
deterioration in conditions (up to 60 minutes) was forecast due to
thunderstorms, with visibility reduced to 2000 m in rain and a
cloud base of 800 ft. Approximately 40 minutes before he departed
Badu Island, the pilot received a telephone call from the senior
base pilot. The senior base pilot had flown from Badu Island to
Horn Island that morning and advised him of the actual weather
conditions he had encountered, including 20 minutes holding east of
Horn Island while awaiting a rain shower to move from over the
aerodrome.
Witnesses reported that the weather conditions at Horn Island
aerodrome between 1230 and 1245 were less than visual
meteorological conditions. Heavy rain had reduced visibility to
less than 100 m. One witness reported seeing lightning to the north
of the aerodrome. A Bureau of Meteorology assessment of weather
conditions for the area east of Horn Island at the time of the
occurrence indicated that the generally low overcast cloud
contained embedded thunderstorm cells, with associated heavy rain
and a cloud base less than 1,000 ft. The recorded rainfall
intensity was heaviest between 1230 and 1300. Weather conditions at
Horn Island at the time of the occurrence were described by
witnesses as being the most severe seen that season.
The pilot held a Commercial Pilot (Aeroplane) Licence and a
valid Class 1 medical certificate. He had obtained his commercial
pilot licence in September 2000 and qualified for a command
multi-engine instrument rating in April 2001. The pilot's logbook
was not found. A compilation of flight time records showed that at
the time of the occurrence the pilot had between 270 and 290 hours
total flying experience that included approximately 45 hours on
type. The company did not require the pilot to maintain IFR
currency there was no evidence that the pilot had met recency
requirements for instrument flight. The pilot was not reported to
be suffering from any physiological condition that may have
affected his capability as a pilot. He had been off duty for the
two days prior to commencing duty on the morning of the
accident.
In July 2001 the pilot moved to the Torres Strait area and
gained some occasional flying experience with another operator. In
November 2001 the pilot commenced employment with the operator he
was working for at the time of the accident as a VFR charter pilot
on C182 and C206 aircraft. On 19 November 2001, before commencing
operational duties, the pilot had flown a familiarisation flight
under supervision of the senior base pilot. On 27 November he had
demonstrated proficiency on the C182 in normal and emergency
procedures to an approved company check pilot. That flight of one
and a half hours also incorporated a short area familiarisation.
The pilot was then certified as competent to conduct company
charter flights. On 1 December 2001 he flew the C206 while acting
in-command under the supervision of the senior base pilot.
The flight was being conducted under the VFR, at an altitude
that required the aircraft to remain clear of cloud, and with a
minimum flight visibility of 5,000 m. The operator's operations
manual instructed pilots to consider uplifting additional fuel for
diverting or holding when the forecast indicated elements of
weather below the minimum required for the flight. The pilot had
departed with ample fuel reserves for holding or diverting. Company
pilots reported that diversions and holding, due to rain showers
and associated poor visibility, were not unusual during the wet
season. The pilot had broadcast his intention to hold until weather
conditions improved.
Although the pilot of the C206 had flown in IMC during his
training he did not have any instrument flight recency and had very
little exposure to tropical wet season weather conditions and its
characteristic heavy rain shower activity.
The circumstances of the occurrence were consistent with a loss
of control at low level and at an altitude from which recovery was
not considered possible. Due to the limited information available
to the investigation, the reason for the loss of control could not
be determined. However, the circumstances were consistent with VFR
flight into IMC.
