Burkhart Grob Flugzeugbau G-115C2, VH-BGQ

Local safety action

As a result of the investigation, the operator conducted a
review of night training operations together with an assessment of
their aerodrome emergency plan. As a result of these reviews, the
following actions were completed:

The purchase of portable runway lighting;
The purchase of additional emergency equipment;
The review of the aerodrome emergency plan;
The construction of an observation deck for instructors to
monitor solo flying operations;
The review and amendment of the training syllabus to include an
introduction to night flying, scheduling students to complete
instrument flying training (including night synthetic training)
before introducing the night flying component;
The discontinuation of the practice where night flying is
scheduled concurrently with other training sequences;
The introduction of a requirement for instructors to more
closely monitor student duty times; and
The introduction of human factors training (night flying),
prior to the commencement of night flying training.

The circumstances of the accident were consistent with the
student becoming disorientated after take-off, possibly associated
with the change in aircraft configuration during completion of the
after take-off checklist.

The student was in the early phase of his night flying training
and, although he reported that an unserviceable attitude indicator
had contributed to his disorientation, he had only limited
instrument flying experience. He had not completed the training
required in the operator's syllabus prior to commencing night
flying and, most probably, had not developed his instrument flying
skills to the standard normally required for this stage of
training.

The dual check immediately before the accident flight had been
conducted only a short time after last light and possibly, when
there was still some external visual reference available.

Although the student received a short rest break before
commencing the accident flight, he had been in attendance at the
aerodrome for most of the day and recently had returned from an
extended navigation exercise. Accordingly, it is possible that
fatigue had also affected the student's performance and his ability
to maintain control of the aircraft with reference to the flight
instruments.

The student pilot of a Grob 115 C aircraft was authorised by his
instructor to conduct solo night circuits at Merredin, WA. Shortly
after take-off from runway 28, and as the student commenced his
after take-off checks (at about 300 ft AGL, including flap
retraction and engine power reduction), he noticed that the
aircraft was becoming difficult to control. As he scanned the
aircraft's flight instruments he decided that the attitude
indicator was unreliable and noted the directional indicator
turning quickly to the left. Control inputs applied to reduce the
rate of turn were unsuccessful. The student recalled that the
airspeed indicator was indicating 140 kts.

The student reported that despite applying back-pressure to the
control column and maintaining the pitch attitude for a climb, the
aircraft continued to descend and impacted the ground beyond the
aerodrome boundary. Immediately following the ground impact, the
aircraft became airborne and the student recalled applying full
power and commencing a climb. An instructor on the ground
established radio communication and provided instructions to assist
the student. The student stated that the attitude indicator
remained unreliable for the entire circuit but, with the
instructor's assistance, he was able to complete a normal approach
and landing. As the nose was lowered to the runway during the
landing roll, the propeller struck the runway and stopped. The
accident occurred at approximately 2000 Western Standard Time. The
student was not injured and vacated the aircraft without
assistance.

Examination of the aircraft indicated that the nose wheel and
oleo had been damaged during the initial impact with the ground and
had detached from the aircraft prior to landing. The nose oleo was
subsequently recovered from a paddock in the vicinity of a left
base position for runway 28.

Last light at Merredin on the night of the accident was 1802. It
was reported to be a dark night, with no discernible natural
horizon. During the initial climb from runway 28, the student had
no significant external visual reference available and was using
the flight instruments to maintain control of the aircraft.

Following the accident, the operator contracted an independent
maintenance organisation to examine the aircraft flight
instruments, engine driven vacuum pump, and other associated
systems. No pre-accident defect was detected.

The flying roster for the day indicated that the student was
scheduled to complete two separate exercises, a navigation phase
check during the afternoon, followed by solo night circuits. The
student had arrived at the aerodrome at 1000 to prepare for his
phase check.

A delay in departure time for the phase check meant the aircraft
arrived back at Merredin after last light. Prior to concluding the
phase check, the instructor completed three circuits with the
student for the purpose of authorising his solo night flying. The
total flight time for the phase check was recorded as 3.3 hours, of
which 0.2 hours was logged at night. By 1845, all tasks associated
with the phase check were completed and the student took a short
meal break before recommencing duty for the night circuits.

The operator had a detailed flying training syllabus for the
conduct of training. It was reported that a gap in the flying
program had permitted some students to progress through their
training at an accelerated rate, which introduced night flying at
an earlier stage of training than was usual. The student had been
previously assessed proficient in the required syllabus items for
solo night circuit operations and had attained this standard in
less than the minimum flight time contained in the operator's
flying training syllabus.

At the time of the accident, the student's flying training
included 3.6 hours dual night instruction, 2.5 hours night
pilot-in-command, 4.4 hours instrument flying and 2.7 hours in a
synthetic trainer. The syllabus indicated that a student required
at least 9 hours in a synthetic trainer prior to commencing his
night training, including a requirement for 5 hours of night
simulation in the synthetic trainer. There was no provision for an
exemption against those operations manual requirements.