The crew of a BAe 146, VH-NJU, did not intercept the localiser
while conducting the Brisbane runway 19 Jacobs Well 5 standard
arrival route. The resultant track of the aircraft placed it in
conflict with an Airbus A320, VH-HYC, which was tracking via the
Brisbane runway 19 SMOKA 4 standard arrival route. Vertical
separation was reduced to approximately 500 ft and horizontal
separation was reduced to 2 NM.
Examination of air traffic control radar plots and the flight
path derived from NJU's flight data recorder (FDR) revealed that it
had passed through the localiser while maintaining a heading of
approximately 280 degrees. Approximately 0.5 NM before NJU passed
through the localiser, the air traffic controller asked the crew of
NJU to confirm that they were turning onto the localiser. The crew
confirmed to the controller that they were turning onto the
localiser; however, NJU maintained the original track until it was
approximately 1.5 NM beyond the localiser centreline. The FDR
revealed that a localiser deviation of 5 dots would have been
displayed on the flight navigation instruments at that point. The
aircraft then commenced a left turn onto a heading of approximately
170 degrees. The new heading was maintained for approximately 25
seconds, at which stage the controller directed the crew to
continue the left turn onto heading 140 degrees to intercept the
localiser.
The pilot in command of NJU reported that the aircraft
experienced tailwinds and was flying through rain during the
intermediate part of the approach. The co-pilot was the handling
pilot for the sector, and the pilot in command's attention was
diverted to the airborne weather radar, which was indicating
returns in the vicinity of the aircraft's flight path during the
intermediate approach. The aircraft overshot the intercept of the
localiser when the co-pilot did not initiate the inbound turn in a
timely manner. The overshoot resulted in a full-scale deflection of
the course deviation bar on the navigation instruments. After the
co-pilot initiated a left turn onto a southerly heading in an
attempt to re-intercept the localiser, the pilot in command
realised that the heading would not result in the aircraft
intercepting the localiser and informed the co-pilot that the
revised heading was inadequate. At about the same time, the
controller instructed the crew of NJU to turn further left onto a
heading of 140 degrees to expedite the intercept.
The pilot in command of NJU reported that he noticed the lights
of HYC on the other side of the localiser prior to NJU's overshoot
of the localiser. The pilot in command of HYC reported that they
had been cleared for a runway 19 SMOKA 4 STAR and that after
passing DAYBO, they had proceeded on a heading of 093 degrees to
WISPA in accordance with the standard arrival route. As HYC was
descending from 7,000 ft to 3,000 ft, the crew observed a traffic
alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) target on the cockpit
navigation displays and the controller confirmed that they were to
follow NJU. Shortly after, the controller advised the crew of HYC
to turn left 30 degrees due to NJU overshooting the localiser, and
as the crew of HYC commenced the left turn they received a TCAS
alert.
In accordance with the Aeronautical Information Publication
Enroute Section 1.1-2 paragraph 3.8, crews may request vectors or
position advice from air traffic control to assist them in
complying with standard arrival routes, particularly in tailwind
conditions. The investigation was unable to determine why the crew
of NJU did not request radar vectors to assist in the timely
establishment of the aircraft onto the localiser in the weather
conditions that were encountered at the time. The investigation
identified crew coordination and flight management deficiencies,
which included the pilot in command's reduced awareness and
monitoring of the co-pilot's handling of the aircraft and its
flight path.