REPCON number
RR2023-00022
Date reported
Published date
Mode
Affected operation/industry
Concern subject type
Reporter's deidentified concern

The reporter has raised the following safety concerns in relation to the acceptance of trains post maintenance:

  • The reporter states drivers are routinely pressured by management to accept trains as fit for service, despite brake faults identified through the continuity test when released from maintenance.
  • Pressure is placed on the drivers to accept trains that do not pass continuity tests during preparation for service in order to maintain the schedule.
  • Trains leaving maintenance are often returning with the same fault a week later.
Named party's response

The concerns raised were very general. For this reason, some assumptions may have been made in the following responses.

  • The reporter states drivers are routinely pressured by management to accept trains as fit for service, despite brake faults identified through the continuity test when released from maintenance.
    ◦ [Operator] has procedures in place to ensure that trains meet minimum standards when entering service. These include our [procedures], crew preparation and minimum operating standards. If crew are concerned with the condition of a train prior to taking that train into service, they are required to report the fault(s) to our maintenance team.
    ◦ The brake continuity test is outlined in fleet specific train preparation procedures. The brake pipe (BP) continuity testing is generally clear cut and there is little ambiguity. It is highly unlikely that the crew would be pressured to take a train into service with a BP continuity fault, they might however be expected to fix the fault. Crew routinely conduct the amalgamation and division activities and the BP continuity is done to establish that BP end cocks are open on all middle cars and are closed at terminal ends and that there is only one driver's brake valve feeding the BP. Points of contention are typically with faults that are not specifically excluded by the minimum standards that may have been discovered incidentally during the course of train preparation activities.
  • Pressure is placed on the drivers to accept trains that do not pass continuity tests during preparation for service in order to maintain the schedule.
    ◦ In some cases, interpretation of the minimum operating standards or whether a test has passed or not may vary. If a crew member was concerned with the standard of a set prior to taking that set into service, they would raise that concern with the [position title] at the maintenance centre or at the [Location]. If they were not able to resolve their concern, they would escalate the concern with their supervisor. From this REPCON it was not clear whether pressure was placed by fleet maintenance or crewing. In any event the concern would need to be raised directly with the appropriate line management to be resolved.
  • Trains leaving maintenance are often returning with the same fault a week later.
    ◦ The fleet maintenance procedure [procedure no's] outline the response requirements to train faults. Open faults on trains due to return to service must be reviewed against the minimum operating standards before releasing the train into service. Where a fault results in the train not meeting minimum operating standards, the train will not enter service until the fault is resolved [procedure]. The following defect repair codes from our procedure illustrates the requirements around different fault priorities and this means that trains are able to operate with certain faults for periods of time. [Priority code and required action table, and other maintenance documentation provided to the ATSB and ONRSR].
Regulator's response

ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and the operator’s response. The information provided has been considered in the scope of a regulatory activity to be conducted on the operator as part of the 2023-2024 National Work Program.