The reporter has raised the following safety concerns in relation to flight crew being discouraged from removing themselves from duty due to fatigue.
The reporter states that [Operator] implemented a credit based rostering system in [year]. This system has a minimum credit guarantee of [number] hours that flight crew are guaranteed to be paid unless they take sick leave or remove themselves from duty due to fatigue. Any credits over this minimum can be considered overtime for working greater than rostered or for standby call outs, etc.
[Operator] is currently undergoing a trial overseen by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to ascertain if a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) can be reinstated under Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 48.1 appendix 7.
The reporter believes one of the underlying principles of a FRMS is to ensure there are no penalties for an employee to remove themselves from duty due to fatigue, particularly in safety critical roles. [Operator] has effectively introduced a financial penalty for any pilot that removes themself from duty due to fatigue.
The reporter queries how [Operator] intends to accurately monitor fatigue when many flight crew may choose to a) call in sick or b) continue duty while fatigued to ensure they are not financially penalised.
[Operator] encourages all forms of reporting across the business including active monitoring of fatigue related events. These are not isolated to flight operations, and the organisation actively seeks employee feedback on any introduced processes and procedures as part of our policies and culture which includes positive support for any fatigue related events. All our crew are provided ongoing training and education amongst other measures such as working groups and teams dedicated to monitoring and investigating fatigue related events when received.
[Operator] collects and analyses fatigue data through our fatigue reporting system and individual alert measurements via the use of the [program] to identify crew fatigue levels at sign on, mid-duty and at sign off along with duty length to quantify alertness fluctuations observed during duty patterns. This data along with bio-mathematical modelling utilising [program] is fed into our roster build process to ensure accurate and effective rostering that considers fatigue on a sector level as well as across the entire roster.
Outputs from all hazard identification techniques are presented to the fatigue safety group which in turn advises management and the internal labour supply chain of fatigue risks and presents mitigation options.
As with any rostering system including FRMS, there is a joint responsibility with both the employee and employer to manage fatigue before, during and after rostered duties. Our teams ensure that rosters are produced with the most accurate data at hand, aligned with fatigue mitigating principles and are compliant with our approved FRMS.
As identified by the reporter, [Operator] was issued an FRMS trial approval as part of the transition to CAO 48.1 (2019). Section 16 of CAO 48.1 places a condition on flight crew licences that a pilot must not carry out any task for a flight if they are unfit, or likely to become unfit, to perform the task due to fatigue. [Operator] must manage flight crew fatigue in compliance with the requirements of CAO 48.1 Appendix 7 section 5 (Safety Assurance Procedures). Both operators and flight crew have a shared responsibility for the effective implementation of the FRMS (Appendix 7 sub-clause 2.3).
Provided these risk management components operate in accordance with the intent of the regulations, safety concerns should not arise.
CASA is monitoring the FRMS trial to meet with regulatory requirements.
The ATSB queried with the regulator how the operator intends to accurately monitor fatigue when flight crew are discouraged (due to potential financial penalties) from removing themselves from duty based on fatigue. The regulator provided the following response.
There is an important distinction to be made between the 'roster system' and the FRMS trial. It is the FRMS under trial at the moment, not the roster system which is a component only of the risk management system. The ‘Enterprise Agreement’ (EA) sets out the credit system and is a negotiated agreement between the operator and the pilot group. The credit system referred to is an EA matter and is not relevant or considered when assessing a FRMS.
CASA encourages the reporter to raise their concerns with the operator and pilot group for changes to the EA.
As stated in CASA’s previous response, from a regulatory position, it is an offence under CASR 91.520 & CAO 48.1 section 16 for a crew member to commence a flight duty if they are, or likely to become, unfit for duty due to fatigue. The operator and CASA rely on flight crew regulatory compliance when commencing a flight duty. If a crew member knowingly commences a duty in an unfit state and does not inform the operator, this would render the operator unable to monitor fatigue risk and represents regulatory noncompliance.
The ATSB notes that neither the operator nor the regulator specifically addressed the discouragement of fatigue reporting by flight crew due to potential financial penalty. The ATSB would welcome the opportunity to receive a summary of the post-implementation review following the trial period to ascertain if there has been a decrease in fatigue reporting.