The reporter has raised the following safety concern regarding newly qualified drivers operating in the [Location 1] [commodity] yard.
The reporter states that a newly trained and signed-off driver was recently sent into the [Location 1] [commodity] yard without any route qualifications. The driver was being directed by a shunter and proceeded to go beyond the ground lights which the driver was not aware of, resulting in a signal passed at danger (SPAD). The [area] controller attempted to contact the driver of the locomotive via radio however as [Operator] trains use analogue radios, instead of digital as used by the [area] controller, contact was not able to be made.
The reporter further states that aside from a few [commodity] drivers, no [Location 2] drivers have been provided training to operate into the [Location 1] [commodity] yard. Walk through familiarisation training for drivers has been suggested in the past however rejected by [Operator] management.
The operation overall was to transfer a locomotive from the [State] [commodity] network to the [area] and then south into [Location 3].
There were two [Operator] [commodity] drivers delivering a locomotive from the [commodity] network so it could be attached to intermodal train [number] for the final leg of the transfer. The [commodity] drivers delivered the locomotive to the south of the [Location 1] yard, the intermodal train [number] entered the yard from the north and was transiting the yard to complete the manoeuvre.
The intermodal driver was not familiar with the [Location 1] yard; the [commodity] drivers are. There is no specific route knowledge qualification for the [Location 1] yard nor any other yard autonomously as this yard is not deemed an intermodal route competency.
The movement through the [Location 1] yard was under the direction of a senior [commodity] driver via mobile phone communications to the intermodal driver. The intermodal driver did not acknowledge the ground signal, [number], nor did the senior [commodity] driver leading the movement identify the specific signal to the intermodal driver. The senior [commodity] driver leading the movement did not have line of sight of that signal.
The senior [commodity] driver on the ground was in possession of a handheld radio capable of direct communication with the Network Controller [station number], however that radio was set to the wayside channel.
As stated in the REPCON, the intermodal driver was qualified and in charge of the train heading south.
Note: [Operator's] learning and development team is finalising a familiarisation package with the assistance of operational subject matter experts which will be communicated to all [Operator] [Location 1] yard stakeholders upon completion.
ONRSR confirms it received ATSB REPCON report RR2023-00028, dated 11 September 2023 regarding new driver familiarisation and communication issues at a rail transport operator’s yard. ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and operator’s response. ONRSR has liaised with the operator at regular stakeholder meetings and has received additional information and status updates on the operator’s familiarisation package. ONRSR is satisfied with the operator’s response and actions being undertaken.