A passenger train sustained minor damage after colliding with a metal awning from a modified shipping container that was being transported by a freight train, which had opened in transit before striking a bridge and falling onto the track.
The 20 foot container, modified with a large side opening awning for use as a canteen, was travelling on Pacific National train 7WB3 from Newcastle to Brisbane on 17 June 2018. As the container passed over Wilson River Bridge, near Telegraph Point in NSW, the open awning struck the bridge superstructure and fell onto the track.
The ATSB investigation into the incident established that the awning had opened twice previously during transit. On both those occasions the crew re-secured the awning, but they were unaware of the third opening before the awning struck the bridge.
Train 7WB3 then continued north and stopped in the Telegraph Point passing loop to allow southbound passenger train NT32 to pass on the mainline. As NT32 crossed south over the Wilson River Bridge, it struck the awning and sustained minor damage to brake equipment on the train’s leading bogie.
The ATSB found that the awning was only held closed by spring-loaded bolts accessed from the inside of the container. This was not compliant with Pacific National’s Freight Loading Manual (FLM), which required a system that could be locked and was externally visible to assure that openings remained secure and enable examination by inspection staff. Further, inspections conducted by Pacific National terminal operators at the departure location did not identify the modified container or the absence of locks.
Any item on a container that can open into the rail corridor represents a potential risk as, should they come open, they may strike infrastructure, opposing trains or bystanders.
“The absence of externally visible locks meant there was no way of knowing whether the modified container’s awning was adequately secured,” ATSB Transport Safety Director Dr Stuart Godley said.
“Should any opening come open during operation, they may strike infrastructure, opposing trains or bystanders.”
The ATSB also noted that, while Pacific National made the FLM available to customers, they did not actively advise them when they had a responsibility identified by the manual and did not have a process for ensuring customers complied with the manual’s requirements. Therefore, in this case, the customer did not notify Pacific National that the container was modified as they were not aware of a requirement to do so. Additionally, the training and checking processes for terminal operators who carried out inspections did not include the FLM requirements for modified containers. This removed an opportunity for the requirements to be reinforced and practiced during training and regular checking of inspection staff.
“This incident highlights the importance of having processes in place to advise customers of the requirements for the safe transport of modified containers and to ensure compliance,” Dr Godley said
Since the incident, Pacific National has implemented a range of processes to ensure customers are aware of, and are compliant with their FLM requirements. This has included the development of an online course and an auditing program to monitor compliance and performance.
In addition, Pacific National have also introduced a number of training and checking measures for inspection staff.