Aviation Safety Investigation Report 199302582

Airbus Airbus

18 August 1993

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Investigations commenced on or before 30 June 2003, including the publication of reports as a result of those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920.

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number: 199302582 Occurrence Type: Incident

Location: 30km E Melbourne

State: VIC Inv Category: 4

Date: Wednesday 18 August 1993

Time: 1231 hours **Time Zone** EST

Highest Injury Level: None

Aircraft Airbus

Manufacturer:

Aircraft Model: A300

Aircraft Registration: Serial Number:

Type of Operation: Air Transport High Capacity International Passenger

Scheduled

Damage to Aircraft: Nil

Departure Point: Sydney NSW

Departure Time:

Destination: Melbourne VIC

Approved for Release: Tuesday, August 1, 1995

The aircraft was cleared via Kinglake and Epping for a landing on runway 27 at Melbourne. The aircraft proceeded south of the cleared track and did not comply with heading change instructions from Melbourne Tower to get the aircraft back on track. The aircraft was transferred back to approach control where it was vectored and descended for a landing on runway 34. There was no breakdown in separation.

Investigation determined that on the approach to Melbourne there was confusion in the cockpit between the two crew members. En route the captain had asked the first officer to request runway 34. This had not been done. From some distance out the captain was planning to land on runway 34 but the first officer was basing his actions on a landing on runway 27. It was established that the ILS selectors were tuned to 109.3 which is the runway 27 ILS frequency but it was not established exactly how communication between the captain and the first officer broke down to the extent that they both thought they were going to land on different runways.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

There was confusion between the captain and the first officer as to which runway they were going to land on.