Aviation Safety Investigation Report 199503110

Boeing Co B747

20 September 1995

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number:	199503110	Occurrence Type:	Incident	
Location:	Melbourne			
State:	VIC	Inv Category:	4	
Date:	Wednesday 20 September 1995			
Time:	1410 hours	Time Zone	EST	
Highest Injury Level: None				

Aircraft Manufacturer:	Boeing Co	
Aircraft Model:	747-438	
Aircraft Registration:	VH-OJI	Serial Number: 24887
Type of Operation:	Air Transport International Passenge	er
Damage to Aircraft:	Nil	
Departure Point:	Melbourne VIC	
Departure Time:	1409 EST	
Destination:	Sydney NSW	

Approved for Release: Saturday, March 16, 1996

The crew was issued with a runway 27 Dosel 2 standard instrument departure (SID) clearance which was acknowledged correctly. This clearance required that the aircraft maintain a track of 263 degrees after takeoff and at 5 NM turn right onto 330 degrees.

After becoming airborne the aircraft initially tracked 263 degrees before turning right at 2 NM. An instruction was then issued by air traffic control to turn right onto 330 degrees and to cancel the SID. There was no loss of separation.

The investigation revealed that the crew inadvertently entered the Dosel 1 SID into the flight management computer and then followed that procedure. The Dosel 1 SID had the same initial track as the Dosel 2 SID but at 2 NM required a right turn onto 010 degrees.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The Dosel 1 and Dosel 2 SIDs had similar sounding names.

2. The crew selected the wrong SID.

Safety Action

There have been a number of occurrences where pilots have mistakenly flown the incorrect SID, with the same name but different numbers. The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation issued interim recommendation, IR950203, to Airservices Australia on 21 September 1995 which stated in part "It is also recommended that the number and naming of departure procedures should be reviewed to ensure that any likelihood of flight crew selecting the wrong procedure is reduced."

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has advised that the problems associated with the 'Dosel' SID have been recognised and addressed.

Effective from 7 December 1995, the two 'Dosel' SIDs have been combined and renamed into one procedure.