

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report  
199501174**

**Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de  
Aeronautica  
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BAe 146**

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As the crew of the trailing aircraft had visual contact with the preceding aircraft throughout their takeoff and initial climb, there was no risk of collision.

Analysis.

Under the circumstances, the Departures Controller's operational technique did not provide separation assurance. His assumption that the ADC would apply separation was the more significant factor in the breakdown of separation.

Safety Result.

Following the incident Local Operating Instructions were amended to define more clearly the responsibilities of both the ADC and Departure Controller in relation to initial departures.

