Aviation Safety Investigation Report 199601853

Boeing Co B747 Lockheed Georgia Co Hercules

09 June 1996

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Aviation Safety Investigation Report

199601853

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number: 199601853 Occurrence Type: Incident

Location: 20km WNW Sydney, Aerodrome

State: **NSW Inv Category:** 4

Date: Sunday 09 June 1996

0920 hours Time Zone **EST** Time:

Highest Injury Level: None

Aircraft Boeing Co

Manufacturer:

Aircraft Model: 747

Aircraft Registration: N204AE Serial

Number:

Type of Operation: Air Transport High Capacity International Passenger

Scheduled

Damage to Aircraft: Nil

Departure Point: Melbourne, Vic **Departure Time:** 0830 EST

Destination: Sydney, NSW

Aircraft Lockheed Georgia Co

Manufacturer:

Aircraft Model: C - 130

Aircraft Serial Number: **Registration:**

Type of Air Transport High Capacity International Passenger Scheduled

High Capacity International Passenger Scheduled **Operation:**

Damage to Nil

Aircraft:

Departure Point: Richmond, NSW **Departure Time:** 0920 EST

Destination: Canberra, ACT

Approved for Release: Friday, November 8, 1996

A military Hercules (C130) aircraft had departed Richmond, NSW for Canberra, ACT and was initially assigned climb to 6,000 ft by Departures South control (DepS). The intention of the controller was to climb the C130 to be at a level above that required for arriving aircraft to have vacated on descent, by the crossing point of the tracks. Such a climb would have required the C130 to reach 9,000 ft before the respective tracks came into conflict.

A Boeing 747 (B747) was inbound to Sydney, NSW on a flight from Melbourne, Vic. and had been assigned descent to 6,000 ft, via an appropriate standard arrival route, by Approach South control (AppS).

As the two controllers radar vectored their respective aircraft, the Departures North controller (DepN) observed that the aircraft were coming into conflict and alerted both the AppS and DepS controllers. Radar vectors and traffic information were given to the crews of both aircraft and they passed within 2 NM of each other at the same height. The separation standard is 3 NM in this situation and, therefore, a breakdown of separation occurred.

Sydney airspace is divided into various areas of jurisdiction and, in this case, AppS had descended the B747 in accordance with this airspace management agreement. However, the controller did not notice that the C130 was at an innapropriate altitude and in his area of responsibility.

The DepS controller had a choice of methods that he could use to separate the C130 from arriving traffic. He could have instructed the C130 to maintain 5,000 ft, ie 1,000 ft beneath the allocated arrival altitude, or, as he chose in this case, he could have directed the C130 to climb to an altitude above that required by the arrival procedure.

The workload and complexity of the traffic situation for the DepS controller was high, and although his plan of action was sound, he forgot to instruct the C130 to climb.

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

- 1. The workload and complexity of the task of the DepS controller were high.
- 2. The DepS controller forgot to take the action which would have guaranteed the separation between the B747 and the C130.
- 3. The AppS controller did not notice that the C130 was at an inappropriate altitude for its track.