

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199800444**

**Boeing Co
B767**

09 February 1998

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 199800444 **Occurrence Type:** Incident
Location: 6km SE Sydney, Aerodrome
State: NSW **Inv Category:** 4
Date: Monday 09 February 1998
Time: 1144 hours **Time Zone** ESuT
Highest Injury Level: None

Aircraft Boeing Co
Manufacturer:
Aircraft Model: 767
Aircraft Registration: JA8970 **Serial Number:**

Type of Operation: Air Transport High Capacity International Passenger
Scheduled
Damage to Aircraft: Nil
Departure Point: Sydney NSW
Departure Time: 1143 ESuT
Destination: Kansai Japan

Approved for Release: Tuesday, July 21, 1998

The Boeing 767 had departed from runway 16R at Sydney, NSW and the crew were tracking via a GUEST 2 standard instrument departure (SID) with an initial altitude restriction of 5,000 ft. The SID required the aircraft to track via the 163 radial of the Sydney very high frequency omni-directional radio range beacon (VOR) for 10NM before turning right to track for Glenfield.

On first radio contact with Departures Control, the crew were instructed to climb to flight level (FL) 280 but, incorrectly, read back "to heading 280" and commenced a turn to the right when approximately 2 NM south of the runway.

The air traffic controller did not realise that the crew had read back heading 280 and replied using the word "affirm". He also re-iterated the instruction to climb to FL280, which the crew correctly read back.

This situation resulted in the crew believing that they had been cleared to climb to FL280 and to turn right to Glenfield, while the controller believed that the crew were climbing to FL280 via the SID track.

The turn was observed on radar and, although there were several other aircraft in the general area, radar vectors by air traffic control ensured that no breakdown of separation standards occurred.