

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199903426**

**Cessna Aircraft Company
Citation**

11 July 1999

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 199903426 **Occurrence Type:** Incident
Location: 56km S Canberra, VOR
State: ACT **Inv Category:** 4
Date: Sunday 11 July 1999
Time: 1025 hours **Time Zone** EST
Highest Injury Level: None

Aircraft Manufacturer: Cessna Aircraft Company
Aircraft Model: 500
Aircraft Registration: VH-SOU **Serial Number:** 500-0333
Type of Operation: Non-commercial Unknown
Damage to Aircraft: Nil
Departure Point: Cooma NSW
Departure Time: 1013 EST
Destination: Bankstown NSW

Approved for Release: Wednesday, August 18, 1999

The identification and planned level (FL290) of the aircraft was coordinated with the Melbourne Sector 12 controller. The aircraft was observed on radar to maintain FL250. The amended level was not coordinated with sector 12. There was no infringement of separation standards.

An investigation by Airservices Australia found:

1. that the sector did not have specific procedures to ensure that controllers on adjacent sectors were notified when sector 12 opened/closed,
2. the Hume sector controller did not coordinate the change of level with the sector 12 controller,
3. a console display notifying active sectors had not been updated, and
4. that the display did not provide an indication of combined sectors.

Consequently, there had been some confusion in relation to the required coordination between sectors.

The investigation is continuing.

