

**Departmental investigation
into the grounding of the Danish flag ship
SVENDBORG GUARDIAN
south of Murdering Point,
Queensland on 24 June 1995**



Report No. 82



Australia
Department of Workplace Relations
and Small Business

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Navigation Act 1912

Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations

investigation into the grounding of the Danish flag ship

SVENDBORG GUARDIAN

south of Murdering Point, Queensland on 24 June 1995

Published: December 1995

ISBN 0 642 19967 1

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Summary

The Danish owned vessel Svendborg Guardian sailed from Townsville at about 2000 on 23 June 1995, on its regular service between Townsville and the port of Kiunga, on the Fly River, Papua New Guinea.

The ship had been engaged on this service since 1988 and habitually followed a route inside the Great Barrier Reef between Townsville and Cairns, and then by the Grafton Passage, through the Coral Sea to the Fly River.

At about 0400 on 24 June, the ship failed to make a course alteration off Brook Islands and maintained a straight course to run aground south of Murdering Point, Queensland at about 0600.

Immediate attempts to refloat the vessel were unsuccessful as the tide started to fall. The ship was towed off the ground by the tug Otto Tasman at about 1830 on 24 June. The vessel was subsequently towed to Cairns for inspection.

No significant damage was found and the ship resumed its voyage to Kiunga on the afternoon of 26 June.

Information sources

Master and crew of Svendborg Guardian

Ok Tedi Mining Limited

Svendborg Enterprises A/S of Denmark

The Safety Research Section of the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation

Portion of chart Aus 828 reproduced by permission of the Hydrographic Office, RAN.

Note:

Times, unless otherwise stated, are given in Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST).

Narrative

General

The Danish owned cargo ship Svendborg Guardian was built at Danyard, Aalborg, Denmark in 1987. It is 77.74 m in length, with a moulded breadth of 13.40 m and a summer deadweight of 1712 tonnes at a draught of 3.754 m. It has a capacity to carry 84 containers in the single hold and 76 on the deck and hatch covers. It is powered by a six cylinder Krupp MaK diesel engine developing 1323 kW, with a single shaft and controllable pitch propeller, giving a service speed of 12.5 knots.

Svendborg Guardian is owned and operated by Svendborg Enterprises A/S and has been on charter to Ok Tedi Mining Limited since 1988. It provides a regular service between Townsville and the mining town of Kiunga on the Fly River.

The ship's passage in either direction consists of two elements: three days on passage in the Fly River and, under average weather conditions, three days passage in the Coral Sea. The ship passes outside the Great Barrier Reef and enters or leaves the inner route at the Grafton Passage (off Cairns). Port time, both at Kiunga and Townsville, is governed by the cargo to be discharged and loaded; but Townsville port time is generally 24 hours.



Projected and actual courses followed

The ship has a complement of a Danish Master and Chief Engineer, a Mate, Second Mate and four ratings from Papua New Guinea, and a cook from the Philippines. The common language is English, which the officers, cook and at least one rating all spoke to a high standard. The Master and Chief Engineer are employed by the ship's owners and the mates and ratings are employed through Western Tug and Barge Co Pty Ltd of Papua New Guinea.

Bridge watchkeeping at sea is based on a 'four-hours-on, eight-hours-off' routine with the Master keeping the 8 to 12 watch morning and evening, the Mate the 4 to 8 and the Second Mate the 12 to 4. In port, the Mate and Second Mate work a six-hours-on, six-hours-off routine.

Svendborg Guardian is a 'dry' ship and carries no alcoholic beverages on board.

The incident

The vessel left Kiunga at 1450 on 16 June 1995 and cleared the Fly River at about 0900 on 18 June. As on the previous south-bound passage the vessel experienced south-east winds of, initially force 6 to 8, reducing on the subsequent days to force 6. A heavy swell was experienced throughout the passage, with the vessel pitching and rolling heavily. The passage to Townsville took four days 21 hours— instead of the normal three days.

Svendborg Guardian arrived at the pilot boarding ground off Townsville at 0555 on 23 June and berthed at about 0700. A new Master, who was to assume command, boarded at about 0900 and spent the day with the other Master in hand-over procedures. The Master had arrived in Townsville at noon on 21 June after a flight from Copenhagen without a stopover. He had two days in which to recuperate before boarding the vessel.

The Second Mate, who had kept his 2400 to 0400 watch, was called at about 0530 for arrival at Townsville. After the ship had berthed and he had breakfasted, he went ashore to run some shipboard errands and to do some shopping. He returned to the ship and took over the watch from 1200 until 1800, by which time the ship was preparing to sail.

The Mate, who had been on duty since 0400, kept the first cargo watch to 1200, before spending the afternoon ashore shopping and enjoying a few drinks before resuming duty at 1800.

The Chief Engineer spent the day on engine maintenance.

The cargo load was light, with no deck cargo, except for a few pallets of oil in drums. The ship carried no hazardous cargo (except a limited quantity of paint and a very small amount of swimming pool chlorine). Svendborg Guardian sailed from Townsville with 113,475 litres of light marine diesel oil (gas oil), 70,000 litres of which were in no. 2 centre double-bottom tank, and the remainder in no. 4 centre double-bottom, the settling and daily service tanks.

Before sailing the Master instructed the Mate that he required look-outs on the bridge at night — a practice not followed by the previous Master. The Mate went to the mess room and told the seamen that each of the four deck ratings would be keeping a three-hour watch on the bridge throughout the night.

The Pilot boarded at 2000 and the vessel sailed at a draught of 2.5 m forward and 3.4 m aft. The Pilot disembarked at 2100, and the Mate and Second Mate went off duty. Both the officers went to the mess room where they joined the other PNG crew members watching the rugby league test between Australia and New Zealand, a program that finished at about 2245. The Master stood the remainder of the 8 to 12 watch, on the bridge with him was a seaman rating as look-out.

The Master fixed the position of the ship using radar distances and bearings at regular intervals. A little before midnight he instructed the look-out to go below and call the 12 to 4 watch. However, as the look-out was going down the stairs from the bridge he met the Second Mate on his way to take over the watch. The 8 to 12 look-out followed the Second Mate back to the bridge. The Second Mate was apparently alert and there was no indication that he was unfit to take over the watch.

At 2400, the Master fixed the ship's position with Albino Rock bearing 196° by 3.35' on a course of 328°T and a speed of 11 knots. The look-out left the bridge. The Master handed over the watch to the Second Mate, telling him the course and showing him the ship's position. The Master wished the Second Mate a nice watch and left the bridge, no relief look-out had arrived at this time. The weather was clear with a

following south-east wind and sea.

The Mate went to the bridge at about 0015, shortly after the Master had left. He found the Second Mate sitting in the bridge chair and he inquired whether the Second Mate was feeling all right. The Second Mate confirmed that he was. The Mate left the bridge to go to bed, expecting to be called a little before 0400.

The Second Mate fixed the ship's position by radar at 0015 and at 0030. The distance covered between 2400 and 0030 was 5.8 miles, giving a speed of 11.6 knots. The next position marked on the chart was marked as 0200.

The Second Mate stated that about this time he was feeling cold and had left his cigarettes in his cabin. He went down two flights of stairs to his cabin, to get a coat and his cigarettes. With his coat across his legs he sat down in his cabin chair and leant forward to search for his cigarettes in a drawer near the floor. This is the last he remembered until waking suddenly some time later.

The ship, on automatic pilot, continued with nobody on the bridge. The chart was clearly marked with an alteration of course position off Brook Islands, at 18° 05'S 146° 18'E, a position it was anticipated should have been reached at about 0400. With nobody on the bridge, the ship maintained a steady course until it grounded at about 0600.

The Master was woken by the ship vibrating heavily. He immediately lifted his window blind and could see shore lights close by. He went to the bridge and could see the ship stopped in the water. There was nobody on the bridge, either officer of the watch or look-out.

He was followed to the bridge by the Chief Engineer, who was woken some minutes before by a change in the sound of the engines, which he normally associated with a change in course and immediately assumed the ship was altering course for some reason. This change in sound roused him again so he looked out of his cabin window and saw shore lights ahead. Knowing the shaft generator was running and was sensitive to change in propeller pitch, he quickly went to the bridge to warn the officer of the watch not to change pitch too quickly before another generator had been started. The Chief Engineer, arriving on the bridge, found only the Master present.

The Master reduced propeller pitch to zero and then applied astern pitch to try and free the vessel. The tide was still rising and the ship moved a little way astern, before coming to a halt. The Mate came to the bridge having been woken by the ship's cook at some time after 0600, alerting him that the vessel might be aground. The Mate established the ship's position. A little later the Second Mate awoke and returned to the bridge.

The Master ordered the Mate to take soundings of the ship's tanks and to check the depth of water around the ship. The Mate established that there was no ingress of water. The Second Mate, assisted by crew members, established the depth of water around the ship.

At 0600, the predicted height of tide at Clump Point, 3.5 miles to the south of the grounding position, was about 2.4 m, with high water at 0722 with a predicted height of 2.52 m. At 0715, when it was obvious the vessel could not be refloated, the Master contacted the shore authorities by VHF radio and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre at 0815.

A little before 0900 the Cairns Harbour Master arrived at the ship by helicopter and made an initial assessment of the situation. Salvors were contacted and boarded in the afternoon.

At 1705 the tug Otto Tasman arrived at the vessel and a line was passed from the tug to the ship and secured at 1725. At 1830, with the tide flooding and the height of water about 2.75 m above datum, the ship was refloated with the aid of the tug.

The ship was towed to an anchorage for further examination. The vessel's Chief Engineer was not in a position to check the alignment of the crank shaft main bearings, which could have been affected by the grounding and it was decided to tow the vessel to Cairns to ensure the vessel was fit, in all respects, to continue the voyage to Kiunga. The tow started at 0156 on 25 June and arrived in Cairns at 1410.

After safety inspections and checks of the machinery by the class society and an inspection by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, the vessel resumed its voyage to Kiunga at about 1600 on 26 June.

Comment and Analysis

General

The evidence is that the ship's machinery, including steering gear, automatic pilot and navigational equipment were fully operational and functioning correctly at all times. The radars were accurate, the GPS was accurate to within 180 m and the gyro compass was accurate $\pm 1^\circ$.

No mechanical or equipment failure is implicated in the grounding.

The Inspector boarded the vessel when it arrived at Cairns and immediately checked for possible evidence of alcoholic beverages on board. None could be found. The Inspector is satisfied that no evidence of illicit alcohol was found on board, and neither drugs, medication nor alcohol played a part in the grounding.

The deck officers

The Master was an experienced seaman with almost 40 years sea-going experience world-wide. He qualified as a Master in 1962 and had been continually in command since 1977. Between 1977 and 1995 he had worked for only one company. In 1995 he joined Svendborg Enterprise A/S and in June was appointed to take command of Svendborg Guardian, his first ship with the company, for the voyage from Townsville to Kiunga. He stated that although he had flown from Denmark, to Australia, arriving at noon on 21 June without a stopover (with five stops en route) he had two days and two full nights of rest before he joined Svendborg Guardian at 0900 on 23 June.

The Mate had 12 years experience at sea and held a Master Class 3 certificate. He gained his first certificate as a coxswain in 1984 and after passing further examinations gained a certificate as a Master Class 3 in March 1992. He had experience as master and mate.

The Second Mate first went to sea in 1987 as a deck hand. He gained his coxswain's certificate in 1989 and later a Master Class 5 certificate. He gained a certificate as Master Class 4 late in 1994 and served for

five months as a second mate on ships carrying copper ore down the Fly River. He joined Svendborg Guardian on 1 June at Kiunga and had been on the ship just over three weeks at the time of the grounding.

Operational and human factors

Before 23 June, the practice had developed on the ship for the officer of the watch to be the sole person on the bridge at night and for no dedicated look-out to be posted. The ship was not equipped with a 'dead man' watchkeeping alarm or other equipment that might alert the Master or crew in the event of incapacitation of the officer of the watch.

The new Master had not sailed on the ship before and did not know his officers and crew and, therefore, had not assessed their ability. Before sailing, he changed the ship's routine by requiring the bridge to have a look-out during the hours of darkness. The Master's requirement was passed by the Mate to the four ratings who were instructed to keep four three hour watches throughout the night. The instruction was not confirmed in writing, nor was a note of this change in practice left for the attention of the watch officer.

The Master was on the bridge from the time the Pilot boarded at 2000 to the end of his normal watch period at 2400 on 23 June. During this time he had a seaman look-out with him at all times. As far as he was concerned, his orders that a look-out should be on watch had been acted on.

It is important that any person taking over the watch is fit for duty and the watchkeeper being relieved should not hand over the watch unless he/she is satisfied that this is the case. This is a requirement of the International Convention on the Standard of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978. The Second Mate had not been drinking alcohol and his manner seemed normal. When he arrived on the bridge at midnight, it was dark and the Master would not have been able to see any signs of fatigue, if indeed there were any obvious signs, nor did he realise that the Second Mate had not been to bed after the departure of the Pilot. The Second Mate, in turn, was young and was anxious to be thought competent and effective by the new Master.

The evidence is that when the Second Mate took over the watch at 2400 he appeared fit for duty, he had

taken no alcohol or drugs and there were no other indications that he might be unfit. The Master did not detect any reason for not relinquishing the watch to the Second Mate. The Mate, who went to the bridge at about 0015, stated that the Second Mate was seated at the bridge front and seemed alert.

On June 24, the Mate had slept between about 2200 (23 June) to 0345 – about 5¾ hours. Between 0345 and 2100, when the Pilot left, he had either been on duty or ashore. From about 2100 he was with the Second Mate and other crew members watching the rugby league test. The broadcast finished at about 2245. He stated that his brief visit to the bridge at about 0015 was to see the Second Mate and, in view of the new Master, to satisfy himself that the Second Mate was alert and sure of his duties. He did not look to see if there was a look-out, giving it no particular attention.

It seems there may have been some misunderstanding in the mind of the off-going watchkeeping rating. He had sailed with the previous Master, who did not require a look-out on the bridge at night, and he stated that he understood, from something the Master said, that he was not required to call a relief. Whether or not this is so, the Master intended and expected the ratings to keep a look-out, but no rating was called at midnight, and the Second Mate did not call one. The Master did not leave any written night orders or written instructions regarding his requirement for a rating to maintain a dedicated look-out. Neither the Master, nor the Mate (at 0015) realised that the look-out had not been relieved.

The Second Mate fixed the ship's position accurately at 0015 and 0030 on 24 June, however, the timing of the position marked 0200 was obviously inaccurate. The distance between the 0030 and 0200 positions was 6.8 miles. It seems probable that the position was put on the chart a little after 0100.

The Second Mate must have been very fatigued. In the previous 48 hours he had had about eight hours sleep, with about one hour in the last 24 hours. It is also relevant that since clearing the mouth of the Fly River at about 0900 on 18 June, on the south-bound voyage, the ship had experienced relatively strong winds with a significant swell on the starboard bow, causing the ship to pitch and roll heavily on the passage to Townsville. Svendborg Guardian is a relatively small ship and was lightly loaded. In the prevailing sea conditions it rolled and pitched for the five days, making it hard to sleep and significantly reducing the quality of rest of those on board, contributing to a level of chronic fatigue.

When Svendborg Guardian arrived in Townsville on 23 June, the Second Mate had had about five hours sleep in the preceding 24 hours, about four hours the previous evening and not more than one hour after he came off watch. He then went ashore in the morning, kept a cargo watch in the afternoon, was involved with the sailing of the vessel that night and then elected to watch the rugby league.

Normal practice and the STCW Convention requires that any officer taking a watch after leaving port should be rested. However, neither the Master nor the two mates can be considered to have been properly rested.

The Master had flown direct from Denmark and arrived in Townsville on 21 June. Although he had about two days rest, expert opinion from aviation behavioural specialists is that the Master would still have been suffering from the long aircraft journey with his biological clock some days away from adjusting to Australian time. Although fit to keep his watch, given 'jet lag' and the fact that he had been active on the ship since 0900 that morning, it is almost certain his performance level (level of arousal or attentiveness) would still be affected by the time differences he had experienced. It is reasonable to suppose that he was more than ready to be relieved at midnight and go to bed. This could explain why he did not notice there was no rating look-out on the bridge.

The Mate was also sleep deprived, having been subjected to the rough weather from 18 to 23 June and having had no sleep between 0345 on 21 June and the time he went to bed in the early hours of 24 June.

Both the Mate and Second Mate had had an opportunity to try and rest in their off watch periods in Townsville 23 June. This must be viewed against the disturbance that is inevitable in port, particularly on a small ship, and a desire to get away from the environment of the ship, at least for a short period.

On such a small ship there seems to be no reason why one of the two watchkeeping mates could not have been sent below as soon as the ship sailed, to maximise the period of rest. However, in these particular circumstances it is probable that if either officer had been relieved early, he would still have elected to watch the television broadcast of the match.

The Master, new to the ship and recently arrived from Europe, would have no understanding of the passion that rugby league football engenders in Papua New Guinea and, not knowing his officers or crew, could not

have anticipated that the Second Mate would have stayed awake to watch the match.

Indeed, as a watchkeeping officer, it was the Second Mate's responsibility to ensure he was rested before he went on watch. Although the need to get off the ship for a brief period in Townsville is understandable, notwithstanding any level of interest in sport, his only duty was to ensure he was fit to take over the watch and that he was rested to the maximum extent possible. His decision to watch the match with the rest of the crew was irresponsible and underlines his lack of experience in such a responsible position.

From examination of the charts in use and the writing and position marking on the chart at positions marked 2415 and 2430 it was clear that the Second Mate had carefully fixed the ship's position using the radar, which was remote from the bridge chair. The distance of 6.8 miles between the 0030 position and that marked 0200, together with the uninterrupted passage of the ship through the night, clearly indicates that the position was taken at about 0105, rather than 0200. It is, therefore, probable that after plotting the 0030 position, the Second Mate relaxed in the chair at the command position and dozed, until shortly after 0100 when he again fixed the ship's position, mistakenly marking it as '0200'. Soon after this he left the bridge and fell asleep sitting in his cabin chair.

The ship was left without anybody on the bridge and no means of detecting such an absence, either with a rating realising the officer of the watch was not present, or some mechanical means of ensuring the bridge was manned.

It had evidently been policy on board the ship to dispense with a rating as look-out, despite the fact the ship was not equipped for one-man bridge operation.

One-man bridge operation

The International Maritime Organization has made provision for trials for one-man bridge operation on selected ships, nominated by administrations wishing to trial the concept.

States objecting to such trials in their waters may register an objection through IMO, which notifies the administrations of the objections. IMO requires any administration to respect the views of a State objecting to the trials in its territorial waters. Australia lodged such an objection which was published as an IMO circular dated 15 September 1993.

Also, on 2 September 1993, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority wrote to the Danish Maritime Authority requesting the Authority to instruct its owners that Danish ships were not to engage in one-man bridge operation trials during the hours of darkness. On 14 October 1993, the Danish Maritime Authority replied confirming the instruction had been passed to Danish ships permitted to conduct such trials.

During 1993 and 1994, Denmark notified IMO of 25 ships, flying the Danish flag, that had been authorised to conduct one-man bridge operation at night, Svendborg Guardian was not included in that list.

In the absence of the ship being approved for a one-man bridge operation trial by the flag State and the acquiescence of the coastal State, Svendborg Guardian should have been operating under the provisions of the STCW Convention requirements of Regulation II/1.9. This section (Attachment 1) requires a dedicated look-out, in addition to the officer of the watch during the hours of darkness.

The ship's owner, in its standard instructions to its masters, require that they were "to place a look-out at any time they deemed necessary". The Inspector considers such an instruction to be ambiguous, when there is an absolute requirement for a dedicated look-out to be kept during the hours of darkness, and could suggest the instructions recognised that keeping a look-out was not normal practice.

Whatever the interpretation of the standard instruction, it is apparent the practice had developed of not having a dedicated seaman look-out at night.

It is hard to believe this practice would not have been detected by those responsible for operating the ship. There was no record in the log book of a look-out being maintained and it seems beyond credibility that those responsible had not detected the practice if the log books were checked at regular intervals.

Without a look-out, or some other method to detect if the officer of the watch is impaired in some way there was no redundancy in the system and the ship was vulnerable to an accident of this nature.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the accident and should not be read as apportioning liability or blame to any particular organisation or individual.

Svendborg Guardian grounded as a result of a number of factors which combined to contribute to the grounding:

1. There was nobody on the bridge for a period of almost five hours with the ship effectively out of control.
2. The bridge was unmanned because the Second Mate left the bridge at shortly after 0105 and failed to return because he fell asleep.
3. The Second Mate was suffering from extreme fatigue as a result of poor quality sleep from 18 June to 23 June and his decision not to sleep after the ship left Townsville. This decision, prompted by his desire to watch a rugby league match rather than ensure he was as fit as possible to take his watch, displayed inexperience and irresponsibility.
4. There was no look-out stationed on the bridge, and the ship was not equipped with any other system to alert the Master and crew in the event of the officer of the watch being incapacitated or otherwise not able to perform his/her duties.
5. The absence of a look-out made the accident inevitable once the Second Mate had fallen and remained asleep, because there was nobody to rouse the Second Mate, call the Mate or summon the Master.
7. The Master, Mate and Second Mate were all fatigued to a significant degree.

8. The Master in command on 24 June had ordered that a seaman should act as look-out during the hours of darkness. This instruction was not complied with possibly due to a misunderstanding and a lack of effective communications in the form of written notification, and because of the entrenched practice for the officers to keep a watch alone during the night.
9. The Owner's standard instructions did not give clear direction to the ship's masters to comply with the STCW Convention requirements.
10. The habitual practice of not posting a look-out should have been detected by the ship operators and rectified.

Submissions

Under the provisions of sub-regulation 16(3) of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations, if a report relates to a person's affairs to a material extent, the Inspector must, if it is reasonable to do so, give the person a copy of the report. Sub-regulation 16(4) provides that such a person may provide written comments or information relating to the report.

The report was sent to the Master, the Mate, the Second Mate and the ship owners, Svendborg Enterprises S/S, of Denmark.

No response was received from the three officers.

Svendborg Enterprises submitted the following.

Conclusion 1-2-3 and 5-6 are very much in accordance with, what we consider correct and in accordance with what actually happened. However we fail to find conclusion no.4. Please find.

no.7: Masters fatigue can not be considered part of the reason for the grounding. From our findings we can asses that the master had been on duty for 12 hours ie from about 12:00 hrs till 24:00 hrs on the 23rd.

Furthermore the new Master was assisted by the former until 20:30 hrs. A 2 day rehabilitation after a flight from Europe to Australia should be sufficient to ensure safe/well rested embarkation of the new Master.

As to the Mate and 2nd Mate we fully support your view set forward in conclusion no.3 apart from your failure to mention the fact that both Mates against Company policy had been ashore (not for shipboard errands) but consuming alcoholic beverages. Same is strictly against Company policy and being reason for both mates not employed with us any longer.

no.8: The master did order look-out. This order was complied with as the Mate virtually set up a 4x3 hour look-out team. We can therefore not agree, that such instruction was not complied with due to confusion.

Nor do we find proof of compliance if this had been given as written notification. Fact is that the order has not been complied with after 24:00 hrs which again is a result of 2nd Mates extreme fatigue.

no.9: Whether or not the Operator, by which we assume you mean SVENDBORG ENTERPRISE A/S, should have detected the habitual practice of not posting a look-out is questionable. Whether this should have been part of the Owners standard instructions too.

After all the Danish laws on the subject ie “Danske S/fartslove” in accordance with the STCW convention, since 1978 mentions, that “the officer in charge of the watch may be the sole look-out in daylight provide that...”.

We must assume that the Danish Masters including the Masters, who have previously been onboard are aware of this and naturally we have now made sure by instructing all vessels accordingly.

However, we do not feel obliged to repeat the whole contents of “Danske S/fartslove” - STCW convention - SOLAS in “Owners Standard Instruction”.

The new Masters order to post look-out proves that he did know of this requirement and adhered to it.

The remaining question is how we, as Owner/Operators should possibly detect such practice.

Of course, it is regrettable that we had to find out in this way. However, we have now pointed out, to all vessels operated from this office, the requirements of STCW/ “Danske S/fartslove” with regards to the night look-out requirement, by separate Owners Standard Instruction.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON STANDARDS OF TRAINING, CERTIFICATION AND WATCHKEEPING FOR SEAFARERS, 1978

Regulation II/1.9

Look-out

In addition to maintaining a proper look-out for the purpose of fully appraising the situation and the risk of collision, stranding and other dangers to navigation, the duties of a look-out shall include the detection of ships or aircraft in distress, shipwrecked persons, wrecks and debris. In maintaining a look-out the following shall be observed:

- (a) the look-out must be able to give full attention to the keeping of a proper look-out and no other duties shall be undertaken or assigned which could interfere with that task;
- (b) the duties of a look-out and helmsman are separate and the helmsman shall not be considered to be a look-out while steering, except in small ships where an unobstructed all-round view is provided at the steering position and there is no impairment of night vision or other impediment to the keeping of a proper look-out. The officer in charge of the watch may be the sole look-out in daylight provided that on each occasion:
 - (i) the situation has been carefully assessed and it has been established without doubt it is safe to do so;
 - (ii) full account has been taken of all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
 - state of weather
 - visibility
 - traffic density
 - proximity of dangers to navigation
 - the attention necessary when navigating in or near traffic separation schemes:
 - (iii) assistance is immediately available to be summoned to the bridge when any change in the situation so requires.