ATSB Annual Report

2023–24

Australian Government

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

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ATSB investigators examine the engine of a light aircraft following a collision with terrain accident at Tumut in April 2024 (AO-2024-010).

Letter of Transmittal

Australian Government
Australian Transport Safety Bureau

ATSB

Chief Commissioner

Ref: 2024-036

14 October 2024

The Hon Catherine King MP
Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Minister

I am pleased to present the Annual Report of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), reporting on our operations for the year ended 30 June 2024.

This annual report has been prepared in accordance with the requirements for non-corporate Commonwealth entities under section 46 of the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act) and summarises the ATSB's performance for the year.

The report includes the ATSB's financial statements as required by section 42 of the PGPA Act and an audit report on those statements in accordance with section 43 of the same Act.

In addition to fulfilling the requirements of the PGPA Act, the report satisfies section 63A of the *Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003* (TSI Act).

I also certify that I am satisfied that the ATSB has prepared risk assessment and fraud control plans and has in place appropriate fraud prevention, detection, investigation, reporting and data collection procedures and processes that meet the specific needs of the ATSB and comply with the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework.

Yours sincerely,

Angus Mitchell
Chief Commissioner / Chief Executive Officer

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Other Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) publications, as well as information about the ATSB, are available on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

If you have any enquiries about any aspect of the report, please contact:

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Section 1 – Chief Commissioner's Review 2023–24

Chief Commissioner's Review 2023–24

I am privileged to present the ATSB annual report for 2023–24, a year in which the agency took significant steps to drive greater efficiencies in our operating model, while delivering an increase in our measured effectiveness in improving transport safety for all Australians.

Central to our ability to undertake this important work has been the ATSB's relatively small staff base. Since becoming Chief Commissioner and CEO in September 2021, ensuring our staff are supported, enabled and valued for their work in improving transport safety has been a key priority. Continuing to enhance our efficiency and effectiveness relies on attracting, developing and retaining experienced staff that are empowered to perform at their best.

Pleasingly, that focus on our staff has been reflected in our results for the 2024 Australian Public Service (APS) annual employee census. The survey showed that overwhelmingly our staff believe strongly in the purpose and objectives of the agency, are proud to work here and are prepared to go the extra mile to meet the demands. I want to acknowledge the considerable work that has been undertaken over the past 12 months to focus on staff wellbeing, organisational culture and leadership.

During 2023–24, the ATSB completed and published 61 industry-significant investigation reports into transport accidents and incidents. Among the higher profile investigations concluded during the year were:

- The collision with terrain of an EC130 helicopter at Mount Disappointment, north of Melbourne on 31 March 2022. The helicopter was operating a charter flight and inadvertently entered instrument meteorological conditions when the helicopter was not equipped and the pilot was not qualified to fly in those conditions. Tragically, all 5 on board lost their lives.
- A fire in the engine room of the MPV Everest, a multi-purpose vessel chartered by the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD), while 1,560 miles from mainland Australia in the South Ocean, on 5 April 2021. On board were 37 crew and 72 AAD staff.
- A fatal level crossing accident at Wynnum West, in Brisbane's East, on 26 February 2021. A motorist was fatally injured when their car was struck by a passenger train upon entering the crossing after very likely following run line markings on the road, past the end of the lowered boom barrier, which was not long enough to meet the Australian Standard.

In all, the investigations we published in 2023–24 identified no fewer than 70 systemic safety issues – factors that if unaddressed have the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations.

Some 81% of the systemic safety issues we identified have already been addressed through an effective mitigating safety action. The risk of a repeat occurrence has been reduced in these instances. And where identified systemic safety issues were not being effectively mitigated, the ATSB had cause to make 3 formal safety recommendations to the owners of those safety issues. We will continue to monitor the responses of the risk owners with the objective of influencing them to take further effective safety action.

Broader safety concerns were also raised through the release of 5 Safety Advisory Notices (SANs) to industry. Our shorter form investigations that we release do not scope systemic safety issues. However, they all identified factors that increased overall risk to everyday operations. The safety messaging from these SANs forms a crucial part of our role in improving safety to a broad transport industry.

In addition to occurrence investigations, we also published a longitudinal safety study that considered the risks associated with level crossing collisions, particularly those involving heavy road vehicles. This study was released ahead of a national rail level crossing safety roundtable in March 2024. Several findings from the study have now been shared with the Australian and international rail industries that will allow a better understanding of the risks involved in level crossings and potential effective mitigations to reduce the likelihood of future fatalities in both rail and heavy vehicle drivers.

During the year, we launched a new interactive National Aviation Wildlife Strike Dashboard on our website. This new interactive tool allows pilots, aerodrome and aircraft operators, and members of the public to review figures on wildlife strikes with aircraft across Australia. Knowing the risks and when they are likely to present allows for a more effective planning process.

Finally, we took part in a significant number of coronial inquests across the country, where ATSB reports were crucial in establishing the facts and circumstances surrounding a fatal incident. All inquests concluded with similar findings to the ATSB, with the Coroner reports being another important vehicle in increasing the reach of our safety messaging.

To ensure that we can continue to do more of this valuable work and meet the safety investigation needs in aviation, rail and marine into the future, the ATSB launched a renewed Strategic Plan in 2023. This plan has been our roadmap in response to the Minister's Statement of Expectations for the 2023 to 2025 period, and details our goals to:

- influence positive transport safety outcomes through independently identifying and sharing safety concerns and fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action
- position the ATSB to be Australia's national transport safety investigator, maximising safety outcomes across transport sectors through growth and innovation
- be an enduring and adaptable organisation that delivers on its mission across changing environments by investing in its people, systems and partnerships.

Some of the actions taken to date in pursuit of these goals include:

- prioritising the release of factual information through the investigation process through the publication of preliminary and interim reports, and regular updates to investigation pages on the ATSB website
- developing new ATSB stakeholder engagement strategies
- actively engaging in the Australian Transport Safety and Investigations Bodies Financial Sustainability Review, focusing on the efficiency of our processes for some of our investigations
- developing partnerships with educational institutions to provide a centre of excellence for transport safety investigations
- strengthening regular collaboration with other countries to improve accident investigation capability and compliance with international protocols.

In closing the review of our year, I would like to acknowledge the service of Catherine Scott, whose term as an ATSB Commissioner concluded on 7 September 2023. During her 3 years on the ATSB Commission, Ms Scott contributed her considerable industry expertise and knowledge to help shape ATSB rail investigation reports, and helped guide the ATSB during a time of significant uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

On 9 October 2023, we welcomed Ms Julie Bullas to the ATSB Commission. Ms Bullas has brought extensive rail industry experience and pedigree to the ATSB, having served for 10 years as Executive Director, Policy, Reform and Stakeholder Engagement at the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR).

Ms Bullas, along with Commissioners Gary Prosser (marine) and Peter Wilson (aviation) are a strong team with significant expertise working with me to oversee ATSB investigations.

Outlook

Through the continued implementation of our Strategic Plan and our continual focus on efficiency and effectiveness, we are working to ensure the ATSB is best positioned to meet the challenges and opportunities of the future.

One of those opportunities is our participation in and support of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's Transport Safety in the Pacific Program, where we are working to bolster the aviation accident investigation capabilities across the region. Already we are supporting Tonga and Vanuatu with aircraft accident investigations in those countries.

Meanwhile, we continue to work with the Commonwealth and state governments and industry stakeholders to ensure expectations around the ATSB remit, role and resourcing are well defined.

In particular, we remain focused on addressing the ATSB's role as the national safety investigator for rail accidents and incidents, and we stand ready to address outcomes relevant to the ATSB from the Australian Transport Safety and Investigation Bodies Financial Sustainability Review.

I look forward to continuing to work with the government to ensure we are responsive to its expectations, and that we are best positioned to effect safety improvements well into the future.

Angus Mitchell

Chief Commissioner and CEO

Section 2 –
Agency Overview

Agency Overview

Vision

Transport without accidents.

Mission

We improve transport safety for the greatest public benefit through our independent investigations and influencing safety action.

Purpose

The ATSB is an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. It is governed by a Commission and is entirely separate from transport regulators, policymakers and service providers. The ATSB's function is to improve transport safety in aviation, rail and shipping. Consistent with our mission, we do this through:

- the independent investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences
- safety data recording, analysis and research
- influencing safety action.

In accordance with the *Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003* (TSI Act), the ATSB cannot apportion blame, assist in determining liability or, as a general rule, assist in court proceedings. Its sole focus is the prevention of future accidents and the improvement of transport safety. The ATSB is also required to be independent, in the interests of avoiding conflicts of interest and external interference in its role.

We are focused on improving transport safety for the greatest public benefit in the aviation, rail and marine modes of transport.

In prioritising the public benefit:

- We focus on the safety of passengers and crew on an aircraft, train or ship to help prevent deaths and serious injuries.
- We focus on the significant financial costs that can result from an accident, particularly where there is significant damage to public infrastructure or an impact on the national economy.

Our independent investigations seek to establish the safety factors that contributed to an accident or incident and to identify safety issues – ongoing risk to safety – for action by organisations with responsibility for managing that risk. By identifying safety issues, which are a characteristic or an organisation or a system rather than a specific individual, we target safety improvements for the greatest public benefit. Directing our resources to investigations with the potential to uncover safety issues ensures we have the broadest safety effect on transport systems.

The ATSB does not have powers to force operators, manufacturers or regulators to take action. Instead, the ATSB relies on its ability to influence the actions and decisions of others through its authority, knowledge, position and relationship. We continually build relationships with others to support safety action, and we have stakeholders willing to advocate for our safety messaging. Where we are concerned that not enough is being done to address safety issues we have identified, we will campaign for action to prevent future accidents.

The ATSB is part of the Australian Government's Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts portfolio. Within the portfolio are other important transport agencies, with roles focused on delivering an efficient, sustainable, competitive, safe and secure transport system for all transport users, through regulation, service delivery, policy development and safety investigations. These include:

- Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts
- Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)
- Airservices Australia
- Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
- National Transport Commission.

The ATSB engages with the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR), established under state and territory laws, the Office of Transport Safety Investigation (OTSI) in New South Wales, and the Office of the Chief Investigator in Victoria, about rail transport safety responsibilities.

Cooperation with the transport industry

The ATSB works cooperatively with the aviation, rail and marine industries, as well as with transport regulators and governments at state, national and international levels, to improve transport safety standards for all Australians.

The ATSB relies on its ability to build trust and cooperate with the transport industry and the community. The TSI Act requires the ATSB to cooperate with government agencies, private organisations and individuals with transport safety functions and responsibilities, or that may be affected by ATSB transport safety activities. The ATSB also cooperates with equivalent national bodies in other countries and international organisations with responsibilities for worldwide transport safety standards.

The ATSB actively targets communications to ensure that transport industry stakeholders understand the importance of no-blame investigations. In order to cultivate a strong reporting culture within the transport industry, the ATSB promotes an appropriate level of confidentiality and protection for sensitive safety information provided during the course of an investigation.

Mandatory occurrence reporting

The TSI Act requires any responsible person who has knowledge of any accident or serious incident (or any immediately reportable matter) to report it as soon as it is reasonably practicable. Immediately reportable matters also require a written notification within 72 hours, as do safety incidents (or routine reportable matters).

While the terms of this requirement may seem broad, the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2021 (TSI Regulations) provide a list of persons who, by the nature of their qualifications, experience or professional association, would be likely to have knowledge of an immediate or routine reportable matter for their mode of transport.

In addition, responsible persons are not required to report a transport safety matter if they believe, on reasonable grounds, that another responsible person has already reported, or is in the process of reporting, that matter.

The ATSB maintains a 24-hour service to receive notifications, including a toll-free telephone number (for immediately reportable matters in all modes). In aviation, a secure online form for written notifications is available on the ATSB website. In rail, all immediately notifiable matters are reported to the ONRSR, which then report to the ATSB. The written notifications are provided to

the ATSB via reporting to ONRSR. In marine, both immediately reportable and routine reportable matters are reported to the ATSB via AMSA.

Generally, the ATSB safety reporting team receives more than 15,000 notifications of safety occurrences per year. These are spread over aviation, marine and rail. Inevitably, there are duplicate notifications and some of the notifications submitted are about matters not required to be reported under the TSI Act. Nevertheless, each one is reviewed and recorded.

While not all reported occurrences are investigated, the details of each occurrence are retained within the national aviation occurrence database maintained by the ATSB. These records are a valuable resource, providing a detailed portrait of transport safety in Australia. The searchable public version of the aviation occurrence database is available on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au and contains data from July 2003 onwards. The online database is used by industry, academics, the media and regulators to search and research past events.

Aviation

The ATSB investigates accidents and incidents involving Australian civil-registered aircraft and foreign aircraft that occur in Australia. It does so in a manner consistent with the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention 1944) Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (Annex 13). The ATSB also assists with overseas agency investigations involving Australian-registered, operated or manufactured aircraft, and may assist with foreign aircraft if an overseas investigation authority seeks assistance and the ATSB has suitable resources available. The ATSB may also have observer status in important overseas investigations. This provides valuable opportunities to learn from overseas organisations and to benchmark knowledge and procedures against counterpart organisations.

The ATSB cooperates with organisations that are best placed to improve safety, such as CASA, Airservices Australia and the Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB), as well as aircraft manufacturers and operators. The ATSB also works collaboratively with the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts and other safety agencies to assist the Australian Government in implementing transport safety initiatives.

ATSB investigators examine the engine of a light aircraft near Tumut Airport, NSW

Marine

The ATSB investigates accidents and incidents involving Australian-registered ships anywhere in the world, and foreign ships in Australian waters or en route to Australian ports.

The ATSB works cooperatively with international regulatory authorities, AMSA and other transport safety investigation agencies, as well as ship owners and operators.

Marine investigations are conducted in a manner consistent with the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Casualty Investigation Code.

The ATSB publishes and distributes a range of marine transport safety reports and safety educational material to the international maritime community, the IMO, educational institutions, and maritime administrators in Australia and overseas.

From 1 July 2018, AMSA's role as a regulator extended to include service delivery for all domestic commercial vessels (DCVs) as part of the Council of Australian Governments' 2011 national maritime reforms. The national reforms did not include funding for the ATSB to conduct DCV investigations, so the ATSB marine jurisdiction continues to be limited to interstate and overseas shipping.

ATSB investigators photograph the damaged containers on board the cargo vessel APL England

Rail

Subject to funding and resource sharing arrangements with the states and territories, the ATSB is the national rail safety investigator for all states and territories in Australia.

This role includes collecting occurrence information, and investigating rail transport safety matters on the metropolitan, regional and freight networks.

The ATSB works cooperatively with organisations such as ONRSR and rail operators – all of whom share a responsibility to improve safety. The ATSB also has collaboration agreements with OTSI and Victorian Office of the Chief Investigator, Transport Safety state safety investigation organisations.

In 2023–24, the ATSB only had a funding agreement with Queensland for rail safety investigations.

ATSB investigators inspecting 2 sets of trains

Specialist investigation capabilities

Material failure analysis

The ATSB maintains in-house capabilities for examining any physical evidence relating to transport safety investigations. The group of engineering specialists comprises experts across multidisciplinary engineering fields to conduct forensic analysis of components and structures from aviation, rail and marine occurrences at the ATSB engineering facility in Canberra. The experts collaborate with other ATSB investigators, external stakeholders and subject matter experts from similar agencies around the world to provide detailed insight into the often complex set of technical factors that contribute to transport safety occurrences.

Data recovery and performance

The ATSB maintains a centre of excellence for aviation, marine and rail 'black box' data recovery and analysis. Flight data recorders, cockpit voice recorders, quick access recorders, ground proximity warning systems, voyage data loggers and train data loggers can all be downloaded and analysed at the ATSB.

The data from other electronics installed in aircraft, such as GPS, mobile phones and digital cameras, can also be recovered using in-house chip recovery expertise.

Human factors

The ATSB has investigators with qualifications and specialist expertise in the capabilities and limitations of human performance in relation to the design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of products and systems. Human factors are a core component of every ATSB safety investigation, and this area includes the examination of elements such as decision-making, focus of attention, the role of workload and fatigue management.

Licensed aircraft maintenance engineers

The ATSB employs a number of investigators with a background as licensed aircraft maintenance engineers to undertake the technical work necessary for investigations into aviation accidents and incidents. These investigators apply their extensive industry knowledge of systems of maintenance, airworthiness control, maintenance, repair and overhaul of aircraft structures and systems to identify any airworthiness-related factors that contributed to an occurrence or are a safety issue.

Other transport specialists

ATSB investigators come from a variety of backgrounds and have a range of specialist skills, which are combined to ensure investigations are considered from multiple angles. In addition to those mentioned above, specialists on staff at the ATSB include:

- pilots
- aeronautical, mechanical and civil engineers
- ship captains and officers
- ship engineers
- train drivers
- rail signal and system experts
- researchers and safety analysts.

Where specific subject matter expertise does not exist in-house, the ATSB may contract specialist resources. This includes, for example, medical experts in the aviation, rail and marine transport modes.

Site survey

The strength of the ATSB investigation analysis, and its findings, rests on the ability to collect as much data as possible about and from an accident. In addition to the expertise of its investigators, the ATSB incorporates technology to collect and process information about accident sites. This technology includes laser scanning and remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) combined with high accuracy differential GPS data to produce a range of outputs, including high accuracy accident site maps, 3D models of accident sites and vehicles, and videos to support both the investigation team and safety messaging and stakeholder engagement material.

Since 2010, the ATSB has used 3D laser scanning equipment to capture 3D views of accident sites and vehicles in detail. This has allowed the ATSB to accurately model accident sites and develop more complete vehicle models to assist investigators in visualising and assessing vehicle damage and collision sequences. Since 2017, the ATSB RPAS program has complemented laser scanning, allowing the capture of larger areas and angles that would not otherwise have been possible without a helicopter. The ATSB has continued to support investigations across all 3 modes under the agency's remotely piloted aircraft operator's certificate (ReOC), issued by CASA. The agency continues to expand its capability with a more diverse RPAS fleet allowing live streaming from accident sites, thermal imagery and operations in more populated locations.

To support both RPAS and laser scanning technologies, the ATSB makes use of a highly accurate differential GPS data unit, allowing personnel to record the location and dimensions of wreckage, ground scars and key points on the accident site more precisely. This data can also more accurately position images and models captured on an accident site.

As new technologies, software and equipment become available, the ATSB seeks to embrace their use to provide investigators with the best available tools.

Range of investigation and other products

The ATSB produces a final report for all its investigations. Reports communicate important safety issues, safety actions and information, and provide transparency into the ATSB investigation process.

The main products are occurrence investigations, occurrence briefs, safety studies, and statistical and educational reports. The ATSB also produces an up-to-date online searchable aviation occurrence database and summaries of concerns raised via the REPCON (confidential reporting) system and their resulting safety actions.

Occurrence investigations

Occurrence investigations typically examine a single accident or incident in detail. The sequence of events and factual background information are documented, and findings are presented along with a safety analysis to explain those findings. These investigations may identify safety issues – ongoing systemic risks to safety – and the safety actions taken by organisations to address these safety issues. The ATSB may also issue formal safety recommendations.

Safety studies

Safety studies typically investigate multiple occurrences of a similar nature, or a potential or emerging safety issue. Conducted as an investigation under the TSI Act, they aim to uncover safety issues through the analysis of occurrence and other data.

Occurrence briefs

Occurrence briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification, and any follow-up enquiries. They provide an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation. Occurrence briefs are not conducted under the TSI Act.

Investigation levels

The ATSB response to reported safety matters is classified by the depth of the investigation into contributing safety factors. This generally also reflects the level of resources and/or time they require, as well as their complexity. The following safety investigation levels were used by the ATSB for occurrence investigations and safety studies in 2023–24. Each level presented below (in order) builds on the previous level.

Short investigations

Short investigations are limited-scope, and can be office-based or field-based investigations conducted under the TSI Act. Investigation activities generally include sourcing photos and documentation of any transport vehicle damage and/or the accident site, interviews with involved parties, the collection of documents such as procedures, and internal investigations by manufacturers and operators. Occurrences investigated are normally simple and usually for common accidents and incidents. A short summary report of up to 8 pages will be produced, which includes a description of the sequence of events, generally limited to contextual factual information, a short analysis and findings.

Findings include safety factors (events and conditions that increase risk), which are generally limited to those relating to the occurrence. Any proactive safety actions taken by industry will also be reported. Short investigations usually require only one ATSB staff member.

Defined investigations

Defined investigations may involve in-the-field activity or may be conducted as an office-based investigation. They require numerous ATSB resources and result in an agreed-scope product with a limited set of findings and a defined-size report. Evidence collected for defined investigations can also include recorded information, multiple interviews, analysis of similar occurrences, and a review of procedures and other risk controls related to the occurrence or set of occurrences. Occurrences investigated are generally less complex accidents and incidents.

Investigation reports are typically about 20 pages, with an expanded analysis to support the broader set of findings that may also include safety factors not directly contributing to the occurrence. Defined investigations may also identify safety issues (safety factors with an ongoing risk) relating to ineffective or missing risk controls. Identified safety issues are documented in the investigation report, along with proactive safety action taken by industry and ATSB safety recommendations.

Systemic investigations

Systemic investigations generally involve in-the-field activity, and a range of ATSB and possibly external resources. They are less confined in scope and will involve a significant effort collecting evidence across many areas. The breadth of the investigation will often cover multiple organisations. Occurrences and sets of occurrences investigated normally involve very complex systems and processes. In addition to investigating failed and missing risk controls, systemic investigations also investigate the organisational processes, systems, cultures and other factors that relate to those risk controls, including from the operator, regulator, and certifying and standards authorities. Systemic investigations result in substantial reports, often with several safety issues identified.

Major investigations

Major investigations are reserved for very significant accidents and are likely to involve significant ATSB and external resources and additional one-off government funding. They result in a comprehensive report.

Confidential reporting

The ATSB operates the voluntary and confidential reporting scheme (REPCON) for the aviation, rail and marine industries. Any person within these industries, or member of the travelling public, may submit a REPCON report of a reportable safety concern. The scheme is designed to capture safety concerns, including unsafe practices, procedures and risk controls within an organisation or affected part of the industry.

Each reported safety concern is assessed and de-identified by the ATSB by removing all personal details concerning the reporter and any individual named in the report. This de-identified text is passed back to the reporter, who must authorise the content before the REPCON can proceed. The de-identified text is then forwarded to the relevant organisation that is best placed to address the safety concern. The organisation's response will then be forwarded to the relevant regulator for further action, as deemed necessary.

The aim of the REPCON scheme is to encourage safety action to address the reported safety concerns. This can include variations to standards, orders, practices and procedures, or an education campaign. The ATSB may use the de-identified version of the reported safety concern to issue an information brief or alert bulletin to whichever organisation is best placed to take safety action in response to the safety concern. The ATSB publishes the outcome of each REPCON on its website.

International cooperation

The ATSB is committed to close engagement with its international counterpart agencies and relevant multilateral organisations. In line with Australian Government policy, the ATSB places a specific emphasis on engagement with countries in the Asia Pacific region, particularly with Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (PNG). In 2023–24, the ATSB became more closely engaged with island nations in the South Pacific, including providing in-country support to Tonga for an investigation.

The ATSB is actively involved in the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), specifically the ICAO Accident Investigation Panel (AIGP) and the Asia Pacific (APAC) Accident Investigation Group (AIG). The ATSB is also actively involved in the IMO Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments and International Technical Co-operation Programme. The ATSB is an active member of the multi-modal International Transportation Safety Association (ITSA) for state investigation agencies.

The ATSB continues to make its expertise and resources widely available in support of transport safety. Every year, the ATSB cooperates with international aviation investigation agencies, in accordance with clause 5.18 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, by appointing accredited representatives to their investigations that involve an Australian-registered aircraft, an Australian operator or an Australian manufacturer.

Organisational Structure



Figure 1: Organisational structure

Commission and Executive Management Team

Chief Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer

Mr Angus Mitchell

Angus Mitchell has extensive experience in organisational leadership and management, maritime operations and safety investigation.

He joined the ATSB from Maritime Safety Queensland, where as General Manager he oversaw the safe and efficient movement of vessels into and out of Queensland's 21 ports, and was responsible for compliance activities and safety investigations for Australia's largest recreational maritime fleet.

During his tenure, Maritime Safety Queensland was recognised with an Australian Industry and Shipping Award for its role in managing international shipping throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and supporting the welfare and safety of international seafarers.

Prior to leading Maritime Safety Queensland, Mr Mitchell was the Executive Director of NSW Maritime, where he oversaw Australia's largest state's primary maritime regulatory, investigative and compliance agency. He has also served as Deputy Harbour Master – Operations for Sydney Ports, where he was responsible for managing day-to-day port operations for both Sydney Harbour and Port Botany.

Angus is a former officer of the Royal Australian Navy having seen service in operational, policy and international roles. He is an Indonesian linguist and commenced his 5-year term as ATSB Chief Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer on 2 September 2021.

Commissioner

Mr Gary Prosser

Gary Prosser has over 40 years' experience in the maritime industry, coming from a seagoing career and serving on a wide variety of Australian ships in both the international and domestic trades. He was part of the inaugural intake to the Australian Maritime College (AMC) in 1980 and went on to lecture at the college.

For a number of years, Mr Prosser managed offshore supply vessel operations in Bass Strait prior to moving to Tasmania where he headed the Polar Division of P&O Australia managing Antarctic and Marine Science Vessels for the AAD and the CSIRO.

Initially joining AMSA in 1997, Mr Prosser had a variety of senior management roles with the authority and was appointed Deputy Chief Executive Officer in 2007.

In 2009, Mr Prosser was elected as Secretary General of IALA, headquartered in Paris, prior to returning to AMSA in 2015 and retiring in 2019.

In addition to his maritime qualifications, Mr Prosser has a Bachelor of Education degree and is a member of the Australian Institute of Company Directors.

Mr Prosser was appointed as an ATSB Commissioner in October 2019.

Commissioner

Mr Peter Wilson

Peter Wilson commenced his professional piloting career with Qantas in 1985. Over the following 20 years, Mr Wilson held a number of key senior management appointments, including Senior Check Captain Boeing 767, General Manager of Boeing 767 Operations and General Manager of Airbus A330 Operations.

Mr Wilson also held the senior executive appointments as Qantas' Chief Pilot and Chief Operating Officer.

Since retiring from Qantas, Mr Wilson has worked as a professional consultant, served as the interim CEO and Chief Operating Officer of Tigerair and held other senior executive appointments more broadly.

Mr Wilson was appointed an ATSB Commissioner in August 2023.

Commissioner

Ms Julie Bullas

Julie Bullas has significant operational experience and achievements in rail safety and rail regulation at the state and national level.

Before joining the ATSB Commission, Ms Bullas served for 10 years as Executive Director, Policy, Reform and Stakeholder Engagement at the ONRSR; before which she was project director for the National Rail Safety Regulator Project.

Prior to working with the national rail regulator, Ms Bullas was the road/rail interface specialist for Queensland Rail and the Director of Rail Safety for Queensland Transport.

Ms Bullas was appointed an ATSB Commissioner in October 2023.

Commissioner

Ms Catherine Scott

Ms Bullas' predecessor, Ms Catherine Scott, was appointed as an ATSB Commissioner in September 2020 and finished her tenure on 7 September 2023.

Chief Operating Officer

Mr Colin McNamara

Colin McNamara joined the Australian Public Service in 2004. Prior to this, he served as a General Service Officer in the Australian Army and was awarded the Australian Active Service Medal in 1999.

Prior to his appointment as the ATSB Chief Operating Officer, Mr McNamara managed a range of corporate functional areas, including human resources, governance, finance, communications, ICT business services, international and major projects. Mr McNamara continues to play a critical role in contributing to the strategic direction of the ATSB, and in achieving relevant objectives of the Australian Government.

Mr McNamara holds several professional qualifications in personnel management and a graduate qualification in Transport Safety Investigation through RMIT University.

Outcome and program structure

Outcome

The ATSB has one outcome – Improved transport safety in Australia, including through:

- independent 'no blame' investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences
- safety data recording, analysis and research
- influencing safety action.

Program 1.1 objective

The ATSB will work actively with the aviation, marine and rail industries, transport regulators and governments at a local, state, national and international level to improve transport safety standards for the greatest public benefit. Investigations and related activities seek to raise awareness of identified safety issues and to encourage stakeholders to implement actions to improve future safety.

There are 3 core objectives which arise from the ATSB functions under the TSI Act:

1. Independent 'no-blame' investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences

Independent investigations that are selective and systemic, and which focus on future safety rather than on blame, increase stakeholder awareness and action on safety issues, and foster industry and public confidence in the transport system.

2. Safety data recording, analysis and research

Timely receipt and assessment of transport accident and other safety occurrence notifications allows the ATSB to identify and refer safety issues at the earliest opportunity. The maintenance and analysis of a body of safety information (including transport safety data, safety study and occurrence investigation reports) enables stakeholders and researchers to gain a better understanding of safety trends and safety issues.

3. Influencing safety action

Awareness and understanding of transport safety issues is increased through a range of activities, including consultation, education, and the dissemination of occurrence investigation and safety study findings and recommendations. These contribute to the national and international body of safety knowledge and foster action for the improvement of safety systems and operations.

How the ATSB reports

Section 63A of the TSI Act requires that:

The annual report prepared by the Chief Executive Officer and given to the Minister under section 46 of the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act) for a period must include the following:

- prescribed particulars of transport safety matters investigated by the ATSB during the period
- a description of investigations conducted by the ATSB during the period that the Chief Commissioner considers raise significant issues in transport safety.

The ATSB observes and complies with Resource Management Guide No 135—*Annual report for non-corporate Commonwealth entities* issued by the Department of Finance.

This annual report details ATSB performance against the program objectives, deliverables and key performance indicators (KPIs) published in the *Infrastructure, Regional Development and Communications Portfolio Budget Statements 2023–24*. The ATSB annual report also includes audited financial statements in accordance with the PGPA Act.

Priorities for investigation

The ATSB focuses on transport safety as the highest priority. In 2023–24, the ATSB gave priority to transport safety investigations that had the potential to deliver the best safety outcomes for the travelling public. A Statement of Expectations from the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Local Government, provided to the ATSB, set the direction for the ATSB to give priority to transport safety investigations with the highest potential to deliver the greatest public benefit through improvements to transport safety. The evolution in the ATSB mission from focusing on the travelling public to driving safety that is for the greatest public benefit is necessary to reflect the contribution the ATSB makes to preventing loss of life, as well as avoiding significant local, state and national economic costs that can be associated with an accident. The ATSB is not resourced to investigate every single accident or incident that is reported but allocates priorities within the transport modes to ensure that investigation effort achieves the best outcomes for safety improvement. The ATSB recognises that there is often more to be learned from serious incidents and patterns of incidents, and gives focus to these investigations, as well as specific accident investigations.

Three ways to action

The TSI Act requires specified people and organisations to report to the ATSB on a range of safety occurrences (called ‘reportable matters’). Reportable matters are defined in the TSI Regulations. In principle, the ATSB can investigate any of these reportable matters, or any ‘transport safety matter’ as defined in section 23 of the TSI Act. In practice, they are actioned in one of 3 ways to contribute to ATSB functions:

1. A reported occurrence that suggests a safety issue may exist will be investigated (occurrence investigation), and may involve an on-site component. A transport safety matter identified across a number of occurrences in ATSB data or through investigative analysis that suggests a safety issue may exist can also be investigated as a safety study. Investigations may lead to the identification/confirmation of the safety issue and will set out the case for safety action to be taken in response.

2. A reported occurrence with significant consequences or risk where there is no suggestion of a systemic underlying safety issue may benefit from a short investigation or a factual occurrence brief report for safety education and promotion, and enable a richer dataset for future safety analysis, to identify safety issues or trends (such as inclusion in a safety study).

3. Basic details of an occurrence, based primarily on the details provided in the initial occurrence notification, will be recorded in the ATSB occurrence database to be used in future safety analysis to identify safety issues and trends (including safety studies), and in aviation, will be available in the online searchable occurrence database.

Aviation broad hierarchy

The ATSB allocates its investigation resources to be consistent with the following broad hierarchy of aviation operation types:

1. Passenger transport operations and medical transport operations (including positioning flights):
    - » air transport operations (scheduled or non-scheduled), balloon transport operations, mining fly-in-fly-out operations, scenic flights/joy flights, parachuting operations, future advanced air mobility passenger carrying operations, and aerial work operations that carry passengers who are not crew members
    - » flights formerly known as air ambulance operations, Royal Flying Doctor Service flights and patient transport/transfer services using aircraft operated by state and territory ambulance services.
2. Non-passenger commercial aircraft operations (including positioning flights):
    - » aerial work operations such as surveying, spotting, surveillance, agricultural operations, aerial photography; search and rescue operations; flying training activities
    - » cargo transport operation
    - » large (greater than 150 kg) or medium (25–150 kg) RPAS or RPAS which is type certificated.
3. Recreational flying, ‘private’ general aviation, and flights where the pilot shares equally in costs with passengers (cost sharing).
4. Higher-risk personal recreation/sports aviation/experimental aircraft operations.
5. Small and very small RPAS, uncrewed balloons.

The ATSB endeavours to investigate all fatal accidents involving VH-registered powered aircraft subject to the potential transport safety learnings and resource availability.

Marine broad hierarchy

The ATSB allocates its investigative resources to be consistent with the following broad hierarchy of marine operation types:

1. Passenger operations.
2. Freight and other commercial operations.
3. Non-commercial operations.

Rail broad hierarchy

The ATSB allocates its investigative resources to be consistent with the following hierarchy of rail operation types:

1. Mainline operations that impact on passenger services.
2. Freight and other commercial operations.
3. Non-commercial operations.

Decisions will take into account whether the necessary funding from state and territory governments has been made available.

Level of response

The level of investigative response is determined by resource availability and factors such as those detailed below. These factors (expressed in no particular order) may vary in the degree to which they influence ATSB decisions to investigate and respond. Factors include:

- the anticipated safety value of an investigation, including the likelihood of furthering the understanding of the scope and impact of any safety system failures
- the likelihood of safety action arising from the investigation, particularly of national or global significance
- the existence and extent of fatalities/serious injuries and/or structural damage to transport vehicles or other infrastructure
- the unique value an ATSB investigation will provide over any other investigation by industry, regulators or police
- funding from state and territory governments in rail
- the obligations or recommendations under international conventions and codes
- the nature and extent of public interest – in particular, the potential impact on public confidence in the safety of the transport system
- the existence of supporting evidence, or requirements, to conduct a special investigation based on trends
- the relevance to identified and targeted safety programs
- the extent of resources available, and projected to be available, in the event of conflicting priorities
- the risks associated with not investigating – including consideration of whether, in the absence of an ATSB investigation, a credible safety investigation by another party is likely
- the timeliness of notification
- the training benefit for ATSB investigators.

Section 3 –
Report on Performance

Report on Performance

This section reviews ATSB results against the performance criteria set out in the Portfolio Budget Statements 2023–24 and the ATSB Corporate Plan 2023–24. Its effectiveness in achieving planned outcomes during 2023–24 is also reviewed here.

Annual performance statement

I, as the accountable authority of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, present the annual performance statement of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau for the year ended 30 June 2024, as required under paragraph 39(1)(a) of the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act). In my opinion, this annual performance statement is based on properly maintained records, accurately reflects the performance of the entity, and complies with subsection 39(2) of the PGPA Act.

Angus Mitchell

Chief Executive Officer / Chief Executive Officer

14 October 2024

Results against key performance criteria

Table 1: Results against key performance criteria

Purpose			
As set out in the Portfolio Budget Statements 2023–24, the ATSB purpose is defined by its mission statement: *Improve transport safety for the greatest public benefit through our independent investigations and influencing safety action.*			
In reference to the public benefit, the ATSB focuses on the public interest: » where the safety of passengers and workers on an aircraft, train or ship is concerned » when it comes to the significant costs that can result from an accident, particularly where there is significant damage to public infrastructure or an impact on the national economy.			
Performance Criterion	**Target for 2023–24**	**Result**	**Table**
Number of safety issues that are addressed through safety action.	65% of safety issues addressed in the last financial year	**81% of safety issues identified in 2023–24 adequately addressed through safety action**	2
	85% of safety issues addressed in the previous financial year	**72% of safety issues identified in 2022–23 adequately addressed through safety action**	2
Number of systemic, defined, and safety study investigations completed by ATSB that identify safety issues.	65% of investigations identify a safety issue	**82% of systemic, defined, and safety study investigations completed in 2023–24 identified safety issues**	2
Percentage of all investigations that identify at least one safety issue not already identified by others.	Percentage of all investigations identify at least one safety issue not identified by others	**82% of systemic, defined, and safety study investigations completed in 2023–24 had safety issues not identified by others**	2
On an average annual basis, the ATSB will conduct around twice the number of investigations as it has available investigators.	Projecting 90 active investigations	**An average of 90 active investigations**	2
Median time to complete investigations.	Short: 6 months	**8.9 months**	2
	Defined: 12 months	**15.4 months**	2
	Systemic: 18 months	**29.3 months**	2
Number of changes to ATSB published investigation findings over the previous financial year.	Zero	**Zero**	2

Performance at a glance

The ATSB commenced 53 new occurrence investigations and 2 safety studies during 2023–24, while continuing to improve safety through the completion of 61 occurrence investigations and one safety study. The high-profile investigations commenced during the year included:

- Collision with terrain involving Gulfstream 695A JetProp Commander, VH-HPY, 30 NM south-east of Cloncurry, Queensland, on 4 November 2023.
- Level crossing collision between freight train 7SP5 and a truck at the Barrier Highway level crossing near Cutana, South Australia, on 31 December 2023.
- Runway excursions on take-off involving Airbus A330, 9M-MTL and Boeing 787, VN-A819 at Melbourne Airport, Victoria, on 7 and 18 September 2023.

A number of systemic investigations into large accidents were completed in 2023–24, including:

- Fuel exhaustion and collision with terrain involving Robinson R44 II, VH-IDW, King River, Northern Territory, on 28 February 2022.
- Collision between freight trains 7MP5 and 2K66, at Jumperkine, Western Australia, on 24 December 2019.
- Engine room fire on board MPV Everest, Southern Ocean, on 5 April 2021.
- VFR into IMC, loss of control and collision with terrain involving Airbus Helicopters EC130 T2, VH-XWD, near Mount Disappointment, Victoria, on 31 March 2022.
- Close proximity involving Boeing 737, VH-VZO, and Airbus A330, VH-EBJ, at Sydney Airport, New South Wales, on 5 August 2019.
- Loss of control and near collision with terrain involving Leonardo Helicopters AW139, VH-TJH, near Katoomba, New South Wales, on 26 March 2021.

The ATSB also completed a significant safety study:

- Review of level crossing collisions involving trains and heavy road vehicles in Australia.

The ATSB continued efforts to progress a number of other higher profile large accident investigations during the year. These investigations included:

- Mid-air collision involving Eurocopter EC130B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130B4, VH-XKQ, near Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023.
- Collision with terrain involving Boeing Company 737-3H4, N619SW, Fitzgerald River National Park, Western Australia, on 6 February 2023.
- Collision between light engine LET0 and empty coal train EE16, Westwood, Queensland, on 18 June 2021.

The investigations above drew heavily on ATSB resources over 2023–24. Some legacy investigations, completed this year, drew heavily on resources in previous financial years. The effort expended, which was an investment in the quality of the outcomes, has affected timeliness targets. The 2022–23 and 2023–24 Portfolio Budget Statements announced one-off funding increases to provide for approximately 15 Average Staffing Level (ASL) and improvements to the ATSB investigation management system. Over time, the additional resources and capital investment will enhance ATSB operational capability and efficiency, improving performance outcomes.

The ATSB continues to enhance the efficiency of its processes. During the financial year, we undertook a review of our short investigation processes using an external provider engaged in the Review of Operations and Financial Sustainability of Australia's Transport Safety and Investigatory Bodies. Overall, the investigation processes were found to be highly efficient. During the year, the ATSB created an additional investigation team focusing on short investigations. This structure with specific short investigation teams aligns with our approach to scoping investigations, which generally requires that investigations are commenced as a short investigation. If a subsequent review identifies the need for a broader scope, they may be upgraded to a defined or systemic investigation.

Key results

Table 2 summarises ATSB performance against key indicators published in the Portfolio Budget Statements 2023–24.

Table 2: ATSB performance against KPIs

Outcome			
Improve transport safety for the greatest public benefit through independent investigations and influencing safety action.			
Performance Criterion			
Number of safety issues that are addressed through safety action.			
Target	**Result**		**Achieved**
65% of safety issues addressed in the last financial year	**81% of safety issues identified in 2023–24 adequately addressed through safety action**		✔
85% of safety issues addressed in the previous financial year	**72% of safety issues identified in 2022–23 adequately addressed through safety action**		**X**
Detail			
Year	**Number identified[1]**	**Number addressed**	**Percentage addressed**
2023–24	68	55.0	81%
2022–23	58	42.0	72%
2021–22	55	46.5	85%
2020–21	59	45.5	77%
Analysis			
To be effective against the ATSB purpose, safety action needs to be taken once safety issues are identified by ATSB investigations. This performance criterion measures the effectiveness of the ATSB to influence entities to address identified safety issues and therefore improve transport safety. Safety issues: » can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations » are characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operational environment at a specific point in time. Some safety issues will take time to be actioned by stakeholders. We expect that some safety issues not actioned in the year they are identified will be addressed over the ensuing year or years. It is likely the percentage of addressed safety issues for 2022–23 will continue tracking towards the 85% target throughout next year as some larger safety actions take time for stakeholders to complete. There also needs to be some tolerance for a minority of safety issues identified not being actioned. The ATSB does not have powers to force operators, manufacturers and regulators to take action – the ATSB relies on its ability to influence. Further details of the safety issues identified and actioned in **Section 5 – Formal safety issues and actions**.			
Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.			
Methodology: Includes safety issues published in the financial year from occurrence and safety study investigations by the ATSB, and rail occurrence investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and OCI Victoria. The figures do not include safety issues which have been closed (no longer relevant). The number of safety issues addressed calculation includes safety issues that have been adequately addressed (count of 1), and partially addressed (count of 0.5). Previous annual reports did not include the half count of partially addressed safety issues, so numbers quoted here will be slightly higher than previously published.			
Reference: 2023–24 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 246; 2023–24 Corporate Plan, page 15.			

Outcome				
Identify safety issues additional to those identified by industry and government safety agencies for the greatest public benefit through ATSB occurrence investigations and safety studies.				
Performance Criterion				
Number of systemic and defined investigations completed by ATSB that identify safety issues.				
Target	**Result**			**Achieved**
65% of investigations identify a safety issue	**82% of systemic and defined investigations completed in 2023–24 identified safety issues**			✔
Detail				
Investigation type	**Year**	**Number completed**	**Number with safety issues**	**Percentage with safety issues**
Defined investigations				
All modes	2023–24	15	11	73%
	2022–23	19	15	79%
	2021–22	24	10	42%
	2020–21	32	16	50%
Systemic investigations				
All modes	2023–24	7	7	100%
	2022–23	6	6	100%
	2021–22	8	8	100%
	2020–21	7	7	100%

Analysis

To be effective against the ATSB purpose, the ATSB needs to demonstrate value through the identification of safety issues. This performance criterion measures the effectiveness of the ATSB in identifying safety issues so that others can act and therefore improve transport safety.

Safety issues can be identified in both occurrence investigations and safety studies when they are conducted at a defined or systemic level. Short investigations have a limited scope that do not include the investigation of safety issues. Defined investigations are likely to include safety issues, and systemic investigation will very likely identify several safety issues.

Improvements to investigation management processes in 2020–21 resulted in a significant increase in the proportion of defined and systemic investigations which identify a safety issue compared with the level achieved prior to the improvements.

Investigations published in 2023–24 with identified safety issues are summarised in **Section 4 – Significant safety investigations.**

Further details of all the safety issues identified in 2023–24 are included in **Section 5 – Formal safety issues and safety actions.**

Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.

Methodology: Includes occurrence and safety study* investigations conducted by ATSB at the defined and systemic levels. The figures do not include rail investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and OCI Victoria, nor assistance to investigations conducted by an external party. Note, previous ATSB annual reports reported 'complex investigations' to refer to the combination of 'defined' and 'systemic' investigations.

* safety study investigations were previously referred to as research investigations conducted under the TSI Act.

Reference: 2023–24 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 246; 2023–24 Corporate Plan, page 15.

Outcome
Identify safety issues additional to those identified by industry and government safety agencies for the greatest public benefit through ATSB occurrence investigations and safety studies.

Performance Criterion		
Percentage of defined and systemic investigations that identify at least one safety issue not already identified by others.		
Target	**Result**	**Achieved**
Percentage of all investigations that identify at least one safety issue not identified by others	**82% of systemic and defined investigations completed in 2023–24 identified safety issues not identified by others**	✔

Detail		
Investigation type	**Year**	**Percentage with identified safety issues not identified by others**
All modes	2023–24	82%
	2022–23	72%
	2021–22	53%

Analysis

To be effective against the ATSB purpose, the ATSB needs to demonstrate value and relevance through the identification of safety issues not already identified by others. As an independent agency, the ATSB can investigate where others cannot. This performance criterion measures the effectiveness of the ATSB in identifying systemic safety issues across transport systems so that others can act and therefore improve transport safety.

As described above, 18 of the 22 defined and systemic investigations completed in 2023–24 identified at least one safety issue. Of those 18 investigations, 18 had at least one safety issue that was identified by the ATSB before the safety issue owner. This demonstrates that ATSB investigations finding safety issues are adding value to transport safety beyond what others in the industry can do for themselves.

This measure has steadily increased over the last 3 financial years.

Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.

Methodology: Includes occurrence and safety study* investigations conducted by ATSB at the defined and systemic levels. The figures do not include rail investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and OCI Victoria, nor assistance to investigations conducted by an external party. Analysis of investigations counts those containing at least one safety issue that was confirmed as being identified first by the ATSB.

* safety study investigations were previously referred to as research investigations conducted under the TSI Act.

Reference: 2023–24 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 246; 2023–24 Corporate Plan, page 15.

Outcome
Efficiently use resources to conduct investigations through selective investigation processes and project management discipline.

Performance Criterion		
On an average annual basis, the ATSB will conduct around twice the number of investigations as it has available investigators.		
Target	**Result**	**Achieved**
Projecting 90 active investigations	**An average of 90 active investigations**	✔

Detail

Analysis

To be efficient against the ATSB purpose, the ATSB needs to ensure that limited resources are prioritised to investigations with the broadest safety effect on transport systems. This performance criterion measures the efficiency of the ATSB in balancing investigation demand (the number of investigations commenced each year) and capacity (resources available to complete investigations).

The target is consistent with resourcing and investigation output expectations for similar investigation agencies internationally.

Across 2023–24, the ATSB averaged around 89.7 active investigations, or 2 investigations per investigator. This is within the expected results for this KPI. The ATSB expects this average to continue considering the availability of investigative resources and the number of investigations taken on by the ATSB.

Data source: The ATSB investigation management system and workforce planning records.

Methodology: Includes ATSB occurrence and safety study investigations. Excludes all investigations that are assistance to an investigation conducted by an external party. Also excludes educational, data, occurrence briefs and other published projects done by investigators. The number of active investigations is calculated for each day of the year and then averaged across the financial year. This is divided by the number of available ATSB investigators, calculated per month. Investigators may be unavailable due to extended leave, training or diversion to enabling projects.

Reference: 2023–24 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 246; 2023–24 Corporate Plan, page 16.

Outcome			
ATSB safety-related information is shared in a timely manner for the benefit of those needing awareness of relevant hazards, risks and trends or taking safety action, through publishing information in accordance with committed timeframes.			
Performance Criterion			
Median time to complete ATSB investigations.			
Target		**Result**	**Achieved**
Short investigations	6 months	8.9 months	X
Defined investigations	12 months	15.4 months	X
Systemic investigations	18 months	29.3 months	X
Detail			
Investigation type	**Year**	**ATSB investigations completed**	**Median time to complete investigations (in months)**
Short investigations			
All modes	2023–24	40	8.9
	2022–23	34	10.4
	2021–22	28	8.2
	2020–21	23	11.4
Defined investigations			
All modes	2023–24	15	15.4
	2022–23	19	15.9
	2021–22	23	19.9
	2020–21	32	20.7
Systemic investigations			
All modes	2023–24	6	29.3
	2022–23	5	33.1
	2021–22	8	38.3
	2020–21	7	36.9

Analysis
This performance criterion focuses on the timeliness of the final ATSB investigation products. Where there is relevant confirmed information available earlier than the final report, the ATSB also strives to publish preliminary and interim investigation reports (not measured in this KPI). Timely sharing of safety information is important for our stakeholders with responsibility for managing risk. Across all investigation levels, the ATSB has seen a downward trend of lower median investigation age at time of publishing over the past 4 or more years. While published targets have not been met this financial year, various efficiency improvements that have been implemented can be seen to be effective and are likely to continue to improve timeliness of completing investigations into future years. The median time taken to complete defined investigations has steadily decreased over the last 4 reporting periods and is approaching the new reduced target of 12 months. Of the larger investigations, defined levels reflect the majority of investigations completed by the ATSB each year. The median time taken for short investigations reduced significantly from the previous financial year (by 1.5 months), and continues the generally downward trend toward the 6-month target, but was still above target. As the median time for short investigations has been consistently above target since the removal of the dedicated short investigation team, the ATSB introduced a team focused on short investigations in February 2023. This has influenced an improvement in timeliness despite a greater number of investigations in this category. During the financial year, a review of our short investigation processes was undertaken using an external provider engaged in the Review of Operations and Financial Sustainability of Australia's Transport Safety and Investigatory Bodies. Overall, the investigation processes were found to be highly efficient. Systemic investigations have continued to have a reduced median time, with the quickest median for the past 4 years recorded in 2023–24, although still above target. Very large investigations take many resources and prolonged effort that affects the timeliness of all investigations. The ATSB will continue to commit to focusing investigators on high-profile investigations and restricting active investigations to 2 per investigator available on average to help manage timeliness, but has also instigated tighter control over the allocation of investigator resources to systemic investigations to ensure timeliness is improved in future years.
Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.
Methodology: Includes occurrence investigations conducted by ATSB. The figures do not include rail investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and Chief Investigator Transport Safety (CITS) Victoria, nor assistance to investigations conducted by an external party. Calculation of median time (from decision to investigate to publication).
Reference: 2023–24 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 246; 2023–24 Corporate Plan, page 16.

Outcome			
Investigations of transport occurrences and safety studies are defendable, to ensure industry and government confidence in ATSB work, through the use of evidence-based and systemic investigation processes.			
Performance Criterion			
Number of changes to ATSB published investigation findings over the previous financial year.			
Target		**Result**	**Achieved**
Zero		Zero	✔
Detail			
Investigation type	**Year**	**TSI Act investigations completed**	**Number of changes to published findings**
Short investigations			
All modes	2023–24	40	0
	2022–23	43	0
	2021–22	30	0
	2020–21	25	0
Defined investigations			
All modes	2023–24	16	0
	2022–23	21	0
	2021–22	26	0
	2020–21	38	0
Systemic investigations			
All modes	2023–24	8	0
	2022–23	8	0
	2021–22	10	0
	2020–21	9	0
Analysis			
The ATSB is committed to ensuring that all published investigations are factually accurate, defendable and evidence-based, with the accuracy of the public record for all investigation findings continuing to be maintained. Accuracy of investigation findings remains integral to ensuring industry and government confidence in ATSB safety information in order to take action to improve transport safety.			
Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.			
Methodology: Includes occurrence and safety study* investigations conducted by ATSB and rail investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and the Office of the Chief Investigator (OCI) Victoria. Analysis includes the review of any changes to findings after the final investigation report was published during the previous financial years. * safety study investigations were previously referred to as research investigations conducted under the TSI Act.			
Reference: 2023–24 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 246; 2023–24 Corporate Plan, page 14.			

Independent ‘no-blame’ investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences

This section describes ATSB performance relating to its role as the independent ‘no-blame’ transport safety investigator, as published on page 8 of the Corporate Plan 2023–24.

Aviation investigations

In 2023–24, the ATSB initiated 49 occurrence investigations, 2 safety studies and 7 occurrence briefs. In addition, 13 accredited representative investigations and 8 external investigations were commenced.

During this reporting period, the ATSB completed 55 aviation occurrence investigations: 4 systemic, 12 defined and 39 short investigations. In addition, the ATSB completed 8 occurrence briefs, 6 accredited representative investigations, 2 external investigations and one data and statistics report.

Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell, pictured left, with 2 Senior Transport Safety Investigators, inspect the accident site of a Cirrus SR22 4-seat light aircraft that collided with terrain at Gundaroo, New South Wales, on 6 October 2023

Marine investigations

In 2023–24, the ATSB commenced no marine occurrence investigations. However, OCI initiated one marine investigation.

During this reporting period, the ATSB completed one systemic and one defined occurrence investigation. In addition, the ATSB also completed one occurrence brief.

Rail investigations

In 2023–24, the ATSB commenced 4 rail occurrence investigations. In addition, OCI initiated 2 investigations, and OTSI initiated one investigation.

During this reporting period, the ATSB completed one systemic, 2 defined, one short occurrence investigation and one systemic safety study. OCI completed one systemic investigation, and OTSI completed one defined occurrence investigation.

The ATSB began an investigation into this collision involving a heavy vehicle and a freight train at an active level crossing near Cutana, South Australia, on 31 December 2023 (Source: 9News)

Preparedness for a major accident

Being prepared to respond quickly and effectively to a major aviation, rail or marine accident is a key function of the ATSB. To maintain preparedness, the ATSB participates in exercises to test the effectiveness of those response arrangements, this includes airport and airline exercises. The ATSB also maintains a *Major Investigation Preparedness Plan* (MIPP) that includes a comprehensive suite of procedures and information. The MIPP and preparedness activities ensure that the ATSB is ready to respond effectively to a major transport accident.

Safety data recording, analysis and research

This section describes ATSB performance relating to its role in safety data recording, analysis and research, as published on page 9 of the Corporate Plan 2023–24.

Safety analysis and research

In February 2023, the ATSB established a safety analysis and research team. The team brought together skills and expertise from across the ATSB to provide focused attention to safety research.

In 2023–24, the ATSB completed one systemic safety study: Review of level crossing collisions involving trains and heavy road vehicles in Australia (RS-2021-001).

The ATSB also completed 2 data and statistics products in 2023–24. These were:

- Downwash incidents at hospital helicopter landing sites (AD-2022-001).
- Australian aviation wildlife dashboard.

One large ongoing safety study was also managed:

- Review of aviation safety aspects of aerial firefighting in Australia (AS-2021-015).

The ATSB continued a data analysis capability expansion program in 2023–24 by:

- providing data to the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics for a shared multi-agency aviation data platform
- providing bulk birdstrike data to ICAO
- rebuilding external data reports for industry based on the new ATSB Investigation Management System (AIMS)
- building and enhancing Power BI reports into AIMS to allow easy access to data by all ATSB staff
- maintaining the aviation occurrence searchable database on the ATSB website.

Throughout 2023–24, the safety analysis and research team completed over 24 data requests for external stakeholders.

Occurrence data held by the ATSB continued to support active aviation occurrence investigations. During 2023–24, data analysis helped to inform investigation decision-making, determine the investigation scope, inform investigation conclusions and safety issue risk assessments, and document past occurrences of similar incidents. The team completed over 30 data analysis requests for internal use to support investigations and governance functions.

Online aviation database

The ATSB National Aviation Occurrence Database contains de-identified information on aviation accidents and incidents in a searchable format. The database has been designed to be flexible to allow searches for most information, including date range, aircraft and operation type, injury level, occurrence category and type, location, and airspace type and class. Users can search aviation occurrence statistics from the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au/avdata.

In 2023–24, the National Aviation Occurrence Database had 16,976 page views.

Data recovery and performance

The ATSB data recovery and vehicle performance specialists maintain support and readiness for the recovery, download and analysis of recorded data from a variety of damaged and undamaged sources across the aviation, rail and marine transport modes.

During this reporting period, the ATSB continued to support external agencies by providing assistance to:

- Recreational Aviation Australia to download GPS devices from multiple accidents
- Gliding Australia to conduct video analysis
- the Transport Accident Investigation Commission New Zealand to recover and analyse data from cockpit voice recorders (CVR) and flight data recorders (FDR) for multiple incidents
- the PNG Accident Investigation Commission to decompress recovered flight data
- the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee to recover data from damaged GPS unit
- the Tonga Civil Aviation Division (TCAD) to recover and analyse data from a CVR and review the FDR system
- the Defence Flight Safety Bureau in support of MRH-90 Taipan helicopter accident
- the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee with analysis of recorded marine and aviation data.

In addition, data recovery and performance specialists provided technical input across a variety of investigations. A selection of tasks included:

- Recovery, download and analysis of the salt-water-immersed onboard video camera and other recording devices, along with helicopter performance analysis for the ongoing investigation into the loss of control and in-flight break-up involving Robinson R66, VH-KFT, near Hawks Nest, New South Wales (AO-2023-051).
- Radio shielding and interference testing and analysis in relation to the near collision involving Piper PA-28 and Bombardier DHC-8 (AO-2023-025) and the ongoing investigation into the runway incursion involving Lancair, and Bombardier DHC-8 (AO-2023-050), at Mildura Airport, Victoria.
- Successful recovery of data through re-building a corrupted database file for the ongoing investigation into propulsion failure of Portland Bay, off Port Kembla, New South Wales (MO-2022-006).
- Download and analysis of a Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) and portable pilot units in relation to ongoing investigation into the steering failure and contact with navigational beacon involving CMA CGM Puccini, Port Melbourne, Victoria (MO-2023-002).
- Data and video analysis in relation to ongoing investigation of level crossing collision between freight train and a truck at the Barrier Highway level crossing, near Cutana, South Australia (RO-2023-009).



Examining audio spectra in the ATSB audio facility

Material failure analysis

The ATSB has expertise and specialised facilities to enable the detailed examination of physical evidence, allowing for significant insights into the causes of factors of transport safety occurrences. During 2023–24, transport safety investigators with engineering specialist backgrounds provided technical input and analysis across a variety of investigations. A selection of tasks included:

- Analysis of the engine and related systems and airframe components from the investigation into the collision with terrain involving a Mooney M20J, near Luskintyre Airfield, New South Wales (AO-2022-049).
- Examination of the control unit from the recirculation fan from the in-flight fire involving SAAB 340A, near Cobar, New South Wales on 23 April 2023 (AO-2023-020).
- Examination and analysis of the landing gear components from the ongoing investigation into the wheels-up landing involving a B200 King Air, near Williamtown Airport, New South Wales (AO-2024-031).
- Technical assistance to CASA in the examination of a Bell 206 blade bolt nut (AE-2023-004).
- Technical assistance to the NSW Police in the examination of components from amateur-built Gyrocopter G-2468, collision with terrain near Allworth, New South Wales, on 12 August 2023 (AE-2023-005).



Evidence examination using the ATSB scanning electron microscope in the investigations engineering facility, Canberra

Mandatory occurrence reporting

The ATSB safety reporting team received 13,354 aviation notifications, 1,063 marine notifications and 831 rail notifications in the form of telephone calls, emails and website contact, relating to events in 2023–24.

The ATSB target for assessing, classifying and publishing summaries of accidents and incidents is:

- one day for occurrences being investigated (all modes)
- 10 days for summaries of other incidents (aviation).

In 2023–24, 46% of aviation occurrence notifications were processed and ready for publication within 10 working days.

In 2023–24, the ATSB completed 9 occurrence briefs (8 aviation and one marine). None of the briefs were completed within one month.

Confidential voluntary reporting

In 2023–24, the ATSB confidential reporting scheme (REPCON) received 180 notifications (of which 61 were classified as REPCONs). Of these 180 notifications, 130 concerned aviation (36 REPCONs), 39 concerned rail (23 REPCONs) and 11 concerned marine (2 REPCONs).

Of the 33 REPCON reports completed in 2023–24, 23 (70%) resulted in safety action by stakeholders.

De-identified REPCONS, including responses from named parties and regulators and safety actions, are published at atsb.gov.au/repcon.

In December 2023, the ATSB launched a promotional campaign to generate awareness about REPCON. A short video was published to further encourage anyone who doesn't feel comfortable in reporting an aviation, marine or rail safety concern to their employer, an operator or a service provider to report it to the ATSB via REPCON.

The video, which was promoted across our social media channels and has been viewed more than 2,000 times, resulted in a noticeable increase of REPCON reporting.

A screen grab from the REPCON safety promotional video on YouTube

Influencing safety action

This section describes ATSB performance relating to its role in influencing safety action, as published on page 8 of the Corporate Plan 2023–24.

Industry engagement and events

The ATSB works to build awareness of its functions and enhance its reputation through its communication and stakeholder engagement activities. This is vital to ensure the industry is receptive to safety messaging and that the ATSB meets its aim of fostering public awareness of transport safety. The ATSB continues its strong record of engagement with industry through:

- participation in consultative forums with industry and other safety agencies
- representation at conferences and events
- bilateral engagement with operators, associations and other stakeholders
- active involvement in safety education forums.

The ATSB regularly participates in national and international conferences and industry events where doing so presents an opportunity to share safety messages and engage with relevant stakeholders.

Rotortech 2024

The ATSB engaged with the helicopter industry at the Rotortech 2024 Helicopter and Uncrewed Flight Exposition on the Gold Coast, Queensland, in early June 2024.

The ATSB gave a valuable presentation to industry delegates in attendance on the SAN issued as part of the ongoing investigation into the loss of control and in-flight break-up involving Robinson R66, VH-KFT, near Hawks Nest, New South Wales, on 26 October 2023 (AO-2023-051). The presentation highlighted the need for all operators of Robinson helicopters to be aware of the possibility of mechanical turbulence and avoid it whenever possible, and if avoidance is not possible, then to reduce airspeed prior to encountering turbulence.

Through a small exhibition stand over the 3-day event, investigators and safety promotion staff engaged with a wide cross-section from industry on safety issues and learnings from recent helicopter investigations.

The ATSB exhibition and engagement stand at Rotortech 2024

CASA AvSafety forums and videos

The ATSB continued to work collaboratively with CASA as a regular participant at its aviation safety forums held around the country.

In joining with Airservices Australia, Bureau of Meteorology, and Department of Defence, the ATSB presented to a wide range of aviation industry participants at CASA AvSafety seminars held in 2023–24. During these events, the ATSB continued its focus on encouraging fitment and use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) transmitting, receiving and display devices in all general and recreational aviation aircraft, while also referencing the Australian Government's ADS-B rebate scheme.

The ATSB also continued to assist CASA in the production of its AvSafety investigation video series. The ATSB appeared in another 2 educational videos to promote better fuel management and understanding weather forecasts to prevent pilots from inadvertently flying into deteriorating weather.



ATSB Senior Transport Safety Investigator (far left), speaks during the recording of a CASA AvSafety investigation video on weather forecasting

Rail safety conferences

The ATSB continued to influence rail safety in 2023–24 through its attendance and presentations at 17 stakeholder and industry events.

Key external engagements with the rail industry included ATSB presentations at the:

- International Rail Safety Council Annual Meeting
- Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board (RISSB) Rail Safety Conference
- Heavy Haul Rail 2024 conference
- National Level Crossing Safety Round Table
- Australasian Railways Association (ARA) AusRail Plus Conference.

AusRail Plus

Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell presented at the AusRail Plus Conference on the ATSB safety study that reviewed level crossing collisions involving trains and heavy road vehicles in Australia (RS-2021-001).

The ATSB rail investigation team also attended the 2-day conference held in Sydney in November 2023 as a great opportunity to engage with the region's leading rail experts and broader industry.

ATSB Chief Commissioner, Angus Mitchell, giving a presentation at the AusRail Plus Conference in November 2023

National Level Crossing Round Table

In March 2024, the Chief Commissioner actively participated in the National Level Crossing Safety Round Table in Brisbane to discuss level crossing incidents with heavy vehicles.

The roundtable discussed prioritising opportunities to harness innovation and new technology to upgrade level crossings to improve safety, as well as the need for a consistent national approach to increasing awareness and education.

Our level crossing safety study was widely referenced by numerous participants, representing a strong endorsement of the value the ATSB can inject into this industry.

RISSB Rail Safety Conference

The ATSB continued its participation at the annual RISSB Rail Safety Conference in late April 2024 in Melbourne, where it shared its level crossing safety study with industry.

Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell presented the findings of the study to an engaged audience, focusing on the safety messages of influence for the broader industry.

ATSB Chief Commissioner, Angus Mitchell, presents at the RISSB Rail Safety Conference in April 2024

Marine safety conferences

The ATSB continued to influence marine safety in 2023–24 through its attendance and presentations at 9 stakeholder and industry events.

Key external engagements with the marine industry included ATSB presentations at the:

- Marine Accident Investigators Forum in Asia (MAIFA)
- Australasian Marine Pilots Institute – Ports and Pilotage Conference 2023
- Maritime Industry Australia Limited's Blueprint for a Maritime Nation Conference.

Other industry engagement

The ATSB continued to harness video conferencing and other digital technology to continue its engagement with industry at conferences and forums, where practicable.

In 2023–24, the ATSB participated in 65 external industry engagement events, including (in addition to those already mentioned):

- Australian Association for Unmanned Systems' RPAS in Australian Skies Conference
- Australian Aviation Wildlife Hazard Group Workshop
- Australian and New Zealand Societies of Air Safety Investigators Regional Air Safety Seminar
- Australasia Marine Pilots Institute Annual Conference
- Civil Aviation Safety Authority Weather to Fly Seminar
- Flight Safety Foundation International Air Safety Summit
- International Transportation Safety Association Annual Conference
- International Confidential Reporting Forum
- International Level Crossing Awareness Day
- LifeFlight Engineering Safety Day
- Ports Australia Working Group
- Ports Australia Risk and Resilience Conference
- Qantas Safety Group Conference
- Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) Safety Day
- Sports Aircraft Association of Australia AusFly Conference.

The ATSB also hosted a number of industry visitors to its head office in Canberra throughout the year, providing an opportunity for representatives from the aviation, marine and rail sectors to meet key staff, and tour the technical facilities and multimedia studio.

Senior Transport Safety Investigator presented at the Sports Aircraft Association of Australia's AusFly conference in March 2024

SafetyWatch

The ATSB SafetyWatch initiative, relaunched during 2022–23, highlights the broad safety concerns that come from ATSB investigation findings and occurrence data reported by industry.

The ATSB encourages the transport industry to give heightened attention to the following priority areas (where more can be done to improve safety):

- improving the management of fatigue
- reducing the collision risk around non-towered airports
- reducing passenger injuries in commercial ballooning operations
- improving risk management associated with change
- encouraging the use of available technology to enhance safety
- reducing the severity of injuries in accidents involving small aircraft.

The SafetyWatch priorities are profiled on the ATSB website (atsb.gov.au/safetywatch) and are highlighted by investigation reports as appropriate.

SafetyWatch
ATSB SAFETY CONCERNS

SafetyWatch logo is used in investigation reports with safety messages relevant to the watch list

Social media

The ATSB continued to make effective use of its social media platforms to engage with the transport industry, the media and the travelling public during 2023–24. The ATSB measured and analysed the overall number of engagements with its published content, with a significant focus on producing and publishing video content.

As of 30 June 2024, ATSB social media followers included:

- Facebook: 33,167 (an increase of 24% on 2022–23)
- LinkedIn: 21,637 (an increase of 11% on 2022–23)
- Instagram: 2,716 (an increase of 16% on 2022–23)
- X (formerly Twitter): 9,509 (an increase of 0.3% on 2022–23)
- YouTube: 2,726 (an increase of 14% on 2022–23).

In 2023–24, the ATSB launched a Threads social media account. As of 30 June 2024, this account had more than 460 followers.

Media and communications

Media engagement is central to the ATSB's ability to influence safety improvements, and to communicate the ATSB role in transport safety.

Most transport accidents, especially those involving serious injuries and fatalities, attract considerable media attention, often nationally and internationally. The ATSB proactively engages with media to ensure that the ATSB role in accident investigation is understood, to provide assurance to the general public that the appropriate government agency has been engaged to uncover the contributing factors to an accident, and to share safety messages and learnings from our investigations.

The ATSB media strategy includes making our Chief Commissioner and senior executives available for media interviews and appearances, holding media stand-ups on-site at major accident scenes, and hosting press conferences in support of significant investigation report releases.

A significant example was a media conference and background briefing held in Darwin in November 2023 to support the public release of the ATSB final report from its investigation into a Robinson R22 helicopter accident while being used for crocodile egg collection. This accident attracted strong national media attention.

To ensure the media coverage was accurate, fair and focused on the investigation's safety messaging, the ATSB invited Darwin media to a background briefing, where the investigation team briefed journalists on the nature of the accident, the ATSB investigation, including its processes and methodologies, and contextualised the investigation report's findings.

This was followed by an on-camera stand-up with the Chief Commissioner, where journalists were able to ask better informed questions about the investigation.

Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell addresses media in Darwin

Other media highlights for the ATSB during 2023–24 included:

- A media briefing and conference in Melbourne to support the release of the Wallan XPT train derailment investigation final report.
- The release of an interim report from the ongoing investigation into the 2 January 2023 mid-air collision between 2 helicopters at the Gold Coast's Broadwater.
- Significant media interest in and media interviews in support of the 10th anniversary of the disappearance of the Malaysia Airlines flight MH370.

The ATSB recognises that mainstream and trade media coverage is a means of reaching key audiences, from industry stakeholders and safety professionals to the travelling public.

As such, each ATSB investigation report release is supported by a press release, social media posts and a subscriber email to the ATSB email mailing list. The ATSB may also proactively organise or reactively facilitate media interviews for outlets that have appropriate audiences for an ATSB investigation report's safety messaging.

Education

As Australia's national transport safety investigator, the ATSB is committed to influencing safety with valuable lessons from its investigation findings, research activities and occurrence reports, which can help improve transport safety and, ultimately, save lives.

In 2023–24, the ATSB continued to embrace the use of digital content to highlight its safety messaging for the benefit of industry and the travelling public. The ATSB produced 9 new educational and promotional videos during the reporting period, which were published on its YouTube and other social media channels.

The most viewed new video highlighted the primary findings from the mid-air collision involving 2 SIAI-Marchetti S-211 jet aircraft over Port Phillip Bay, Victoria, in December 2023. The video, titled 'Mid-air collision involving SIAI Marchetti S-211s, VH-DZJ and VH-DQJ' has been viewed more than 12,000 times on YouTube alone. This particular video largely contributed to the significant increase in followers of our YouTube channel.

A screen capture showing the animation of the S-211 mid-air collision from the supporting video

In March 2023, a safety promotional video produced to support the final report's release into our investigation of the VFR into IMC, loss of control and collision with terrain accident involving Airbus Helicopters EC130 T2, registered VH-XWD, near Mount Disappointment, north of Melbourne on 31 March 2022, reminded all VFR pilots about the need to develop the knowledge and skills required to manage the risk of inadvertent flight into IMC. The video used 3D animations with great effect to detail how the collision occurred, while highlighting the key safety messaging from the report. The video has been viewed more than 10,000 times across all our social media platforms.

A screen capture showing part of the animation from the Mount Disappointment safety promotional video

The ATSB continued to promote the benefits of fitting and using ADS-B transmitting, receiving and display devices in all general and recreational aviation aircraft during 2023–24, including the promotion of the government's rebate program to encourage voluntary fitment of the technology.

In conjunction with the AMSA, the ATSB produced a video, titled 'See and be seen with ADS-B', to promote the ADS-B rebate program. The video also highlighted the benefits of improved search and rescue by AMSA's Joint Rescue Coordination Centre for aircraft in distress, as well as improved pilot situational awareness when using ADS-B IN with aural and visual alerts.

The ATSB, in conjunction with AMSA, promoted the government's ADS-B rebate program to encourage fitment of the technology in general and recreational aircraft

In May 2024, the ATSB participated in the production of a new episode of the popular television show *Air Crash Investigations*. Members from the team who investigated the collision with terrain of a Lockheed EC130Q Hercules near Peak View, New South Wales, on 23 January 2020, spoke to the show's producers about the challenges of the investigation and focused on the key safety messaging.

The episode, which will go to air as part of season 25, will be screened in more than 170 countries and translated into 40 languages.

ATSB Senior Transport Safety Investigator is filmed for a new episode of Air Crash Investigations *television show*

The ATSB was again involved in supporting the TrackSAFE Foundation's Rail Safety Week campaign in August 2023, which focused on educating all road users and pedestrians of their responsibilities when approaching and using a level crossing. The ATSB published a news story on its website and via its social media channels to echo the 'Expect the unexpected – watch out for trains' theme of Rail Safety Week 2023.

Website

The atsb.gov.au website continues to be the principal communication channel for the ATSB. In 2023–24, the ATSB website supported 2,114,724 page views and 806,341 user sessions.

The website's most-viewed page in 2023–24 was the news story published to support the final report release into the investigation of the engine failure involving a Boeing Company 737-838, VH-XZB, en route from Auckland, New Zealand to Sydney, New South Wales, on 18 January 2023. The news story was viewed 179,819 times, with the investigation report's page viewed 8,450 times.

The ATSB continually evolves its website to meet audience needs and to accommodate for new and emerging technologies. As a central element of the ATSB response to the Australian Government 'digital first' agenda, in September 2023 the ATSB successfully completed an enhancement project to its GovCMS website to further improve navigation and searching on the website, while improving the phone and tablet device user experience.

Partnership with the RMIT University

The ATSB has been partnering with RMIT University since 2019. Through this partnership the ATSB has sponsored training in transport accident investigation being provided to industry bodies in Australia and throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Both Australian and international students have completed the graduate certificate this year, including staff from the ATSB.

In 2023, after experiencing some delays due to the pandemic, the ATSB turned its attention to creating a pathway to higher education by drafting a diploma in transport safety investigation. The pilot program will be ready for delivery in 2025.

Regional cooperation

The ATSB has a program of regional engagement, underpinned by the ATSB reputation as a world-leading transport safety investigation agency. This content addresses the deliverable to produce a report on the transport safety contribution of this engagement.

In support of the Australian Government transport safety agenda in the Asia-Pacific region, the ATSB takes a leading role in the ICAO Asia Pacific AIG and the Marine Accident Investigators Forum in Asia. Australia continued in its role as the Chair of the ICAO Asia Pacific AIG.

The ATSB places a specific emphasis on engagement with Indonesia, through the ongoing involvement in the Australian Government Indonesia Transport Safety Assistance Package (ITSAP), and with PNG consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Transport Sector.

Indonesia

Under the ITSAP program, funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the ATSB aims to provide capability development to the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), the Indonesian agency responsible for the investigation of aviation, rail, marine and land transport accidents and incidents.

During 2023–24, the ATSB delivered the following capability development activities with the NTSC:

- Provision of NTSC investigator training (including training on the download of aviation and marine recording devices), critical incident stress management, and sharing of underwater recovery techniques.
- Professional development, including sponsoring NTSC investigators to complete the Graduate Certificate in Transport Safety Investigation at RMIT as well as a placement at the ATSB Canberra office.

ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell (centre) with NTSC and PNG Accident Investigation Commission investigators

Papua New Guinea

The ATSB and the PNG Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) continued to cooperate on matters listed within the Transport Safety Investigation Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Transport Sector between the Government of Australia and the Government of Papua New Guinea. During 2023–24, the ATSB sponsored 2 PNG AIC investigators to complete the Graduate Certificate in Transport Safety Investigation at RMIT as well as placements at the ATSB Canberra office.

International Civil Aviation Organization

In 2023–24, ATSB staff continued to be involved in ICAO meetings and working groups. This included membership of the Accident Investigation Panel, which meets at the ICAO office in Montreal each year to advance the contents of Annex 13 and associated guidance material for the benefit of all ICAO member states.

During 2023, the ATSB contributed to the audit activities completed by ICAO, which saw Australia participate in a focused aviation safety audit and a State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment. The final reports following these audit activities confirmed that Australia has an effective aviation safety oversight system and mature safety system.

The ATSB contributed to the ICAO Asia Pacific Region Accident Investigation Group, where an ATSB Director of Transport Safety is the current Chair. At the annual meeting, held in Singapore in 2023, the ATSB ran educational workshops for regional state investigation authorities in the areas of investigating human factors and cognitive interviewing.

ATSB audit team with ICAO Auditor

ATSB Director Transport Safety in role as Chair of the Asia Pacific Accident Investigation Group, Singapore, August 2023

International Maritime Organization

The ATSB actively engaged with the IMO, and in August 2023, the ATSB participated in the meeting of the IMO Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III 9) as well as the IMO's International Technical Co-operation Programme (ITCP) in London.

ATSB representatives attending the IMO Sub-Committee meeting (III 9)

International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems

The International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems (ICASS) Group promotes confidential reporting systems as an effective method of enhancing flight safety in commercial air transport and general aviation operations.

The ATSB Coordinator of Confidential Reporting attended the ICASS meeting in October 2023 in Madrid, Spain, with approximately 40 participants registered from 16 administrations and 12 international organisations. The purpose of the ICASS meeting was to familiarise and update states on individual confidential reporting system remits and processes, and discuss areas of concern. Discussions at the 2023 conference included the promotion of confidential reporting systems, safeguarding reporters, and future developments and new technologies in reporting.

ICASS participants at the meeting

Financial performance update

This section should be read in conjunction with the ATSB audited financial statements for 2023–24 that appear in Section 6 of this report.

The ATSB operates as a separate non-corporate Commonwealth entity, having been established on 1 July 2009.

The ATSB recorded a deficit after income tax on continuing operations of $1.29 million (2022–23: $2.84 million) as reported within the Statement of Comprehensive Income. The operating surplus was $0.44 million (2022–23: $1.42 million) as reported within Note 3.2 Net Cash Appropriation Arrangements of the financial statements. This includes adjustments for depreciation, amortisation, principal repayments for leased assets and changes in the asset revaluation reserve. The ATSB new capital requirements are detailed in its Departmental Capital Budget published in the 2023–24 Portfolio Budget Statements. Over time, ATSB estimated capital injections fall short of the deficits associated with the non-funding of depreciation and amortisation. Without adequate capital injections by the government, this presents a challenge to the ATSB in maintaining its underlying equity and asset capability going forward.

A comparatively small amount of our funding is for rail. Under an intergovernmental framework for rail safety, the majority of the ATSB's resourcing is meant to be provided by state/territory governments. Queensland is the only active participant in this model that currently provides an appropriation. New South Wales and Victoria maintain their own independent accident investigators. The other states and territories are not actively financing rail safety investigations under the envisaged model. As the ATSB seeks to manage its resourcing under the limitations of this model there are rails accidents and serious incidents that are not able to be investigated by the ATSB. The ATSB is working with governments to provide greater certainty around its role in the future.

As part of the 2023–24 Budget, the ATSB received a one-off additional appropriation compromising $3.8 million in operating and $0.8 million in capital funds to increase the average staffing level to 110, to meet the legislative and international obligations of the organisation, and to make improvements to the core enterprise safety investigation management system (AIMS).

The ATSB also receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for technical assistance and capacity building in transport safety investigation in Indonesia. In 2023–24, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade allocated funding for the ATSB to provide support to an investigation in Tonga.

Table 3: Summary of financial performance and position

	2023–24 $M	2022–23 $M
Revenue from government	25.3	20.7
Own-source income	4.7	4.0
Total income	**30.0**	**24.7**
Employee expenses	18.7	16.8
Supplier expenses	9.7	8.1
Depreciation and amortisation	2.8	2.5
Finance costs	0.1	0.1
Total expenses	**31.3**	**27.5**

		2023–24 $M	2022–23 $M
Operating surplus/(deficit)		(1.3)	(2.8)
Financial assets	A	14.1	8.2
Non-financial assets	B	11.8	14.0
Liabilities	C	18.0	14.5
Net Assets – A + B – C		**7.9**	**7.7**

Section 4 – Significant Safety Investigations

Significant Safety Investigations

The following is a summary of some of the significant safety investigations that were completed and published during 2023–24 across aviation, marine and rail.

Aviation

VFR into IMC, loss of control and collision with terrain involving Airbus Helicopters EC130 T2, VH-XWD, near Mount Disappointment, Victoria, on 31 March 2022 (AO-2022-016)

On the morning of 31 March 2022, 2 Airbus EC130 helicopters departed Melbourne for the town of Ulupna, Victoria as a non-scheduled passenger operation. The helicopters encountered IMC over Mount Disappointment. While the lead helicopter managed to conduct a U-turn to avoid entering cloud, the second helicopter entered cloud while attempting to conduct a U-turn, developed a high rate of descent, and collided with terrain. The helicopter was destroyed and the 5 occupants were fatally injured.

On board footage of weather conditions from the accident helicopter, 22 seconds before the collision with terrain

The ATSB found that, while visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the departure point, the pilots of the helicopters planned and commenced a route for which IMC was forecast. The pilots continued the flight as conditions deteriorated below VMC until a rapid change of course was required to avoid entering cloud. The accident pilot did not maintain adequate control of the pitch attitude during the attempted U-turn and a high rate of descent developed resulting in a collision with terrain. This pilot had no instrument flying experience, and the helicopter was not equipped with any form of artificial stabilisation, nor was either required by the regulations.

The operator had not mandated several of the risk controls available to them for their day VFR pilots, which included inadvertent IMC recovery training and basic instrument flying competency checks during operator proficiency checks, nor were they required to by the regulations.

The operator had also not introduced an inadvertent IMC recovery procedure for their air transport operations or a pre-flight risk assessment to trigger an escalation process for marginal weather conditions identified at the preflight planning stage.

The operator had identified poor weather conditions as a risk. However, their management of that risk was limited to the regulatory requirements and did not consider an inadvertent IMC event. The Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) Part 133 for rotorcraft air transport only required the risk of a VFR inadvertent IMC event to be managed through avoidance. While important, avoidance of inadvertent IMC has and will fail on occasion, but Part 133 did not address the risk of recovery from such an event.

The ATSB identified 4 safety issues for the operator that were addressed or partly addressed. The final report also contained a safety recommendation to CASA to take further safety action to address the risk to rotorcraft air transport (Part 133) passenger safety from a visual flight rules inadvertent IMC event. CASA has stated that it intends to address the risk of VFR into IMC through the CASR Part 133 exposition requirements for operators to address inadvertent instrument meteorological avoidance procedures together with a risk assessment and task rejection process, supported by additional exposition content direction to the CASA Surveillance Branch.

Fuel exhaustion and collision with terrain involving Robinson R44 II, VH-IDW, King River, Northern Territory, on 28 February 2022 (AO-2022-009)

On 28 February 2022, a pilot and an egg collector were commencing crocodile egg collection activities near King River, Northern Territory, using a Robinson R44 Raven II helicopter. The activity was conducted under a CASA instrument authorising the pilot to carry a sling person (egg collector) on a 100 ft line attached to the helicopter. Later that morning, the crew of another helicopter collecting crocodile eggs nearby became concerned that they had not heard any communications and returned to the area where the helicopter was last seen. The search pilot found the fatally injured egg collector on the ground, wearing their harness and attached to the sling line, which was disconnected from the helicopter. The helicopter had collided with terrain 44 m beyond the sling person, and the pilot lay beside the helicopter having sustained serious injuries.

Accident site (source: Careflight)

The ATSB found that the helicopter was likely not refuelled at the en route fuel depot, which was about three quarters of the way between the departure location on the outskirts of Darwin and a clearing near King River where the helicopter and crew were to commence crocodile egg collecting. The pilot did not identify the reducing fuel state before the helicopter's engine stopped in flight due to fuel exhaustion. During the subsequent autorotation, the pilot released the egg collector above a likelysurvivable height, fatally injuring them. The pilot then completed the autorotation to the ground, but there was insufficient main rotor energy to cushion the landing. This resulted in serious injuries to the pilot and substantial damage to the helicopter.

The ATSB found that the operator's CASA-approved safety management system was not being used to systematically identify and manage operational hazards. As a result, the risks inherent in conducting human sling operations, such as carriage of the egg collector above a survivable fall height, were not adequately addressed.

The ATSB also found that CASA did not have an effective process for assuring an authorisation would be unlikely to adversely affect safety. As a result, CASA delegates did not use the available structured risk management process to:

- identify and assess risks
- ensure suitable mitigations were included as conditions of the instrument
- assess the effects of changes on the overall risk.

This resulted in removal of instrument conditions limiting the height, speed and exposure for the sling person, which permitted carriage of the egg collector at a nonsurvivable fall height.

As a result of the accident and ATSB investigation, CASA implemented significant changes to its internal processes to ensure that the assessment and management of safety risks of new aviation activities (and associated approvals) were standardised in accordance with the CASA Risk Management Manual and that decision-making was appropriately documented. Additionally, CASA developed an 'exemption protocol suite' of documents, which detailed the principles, protocols and work instructions for CASA's regulatory exemption process. CASA also completed and provided exemplar bowtie and aviation safety risk assessments using the structured process.

Aircraft preparation and foreign object damage event involving Saab 340B, VH-VEQ, at Canberra Airport, Australian Capital Territory, on 10 November 2022 (AO-2022-055)

On 10 November 2022, a Saab 340B aircraft was being prepared for a scheduled commercial air transport passenger from Canberra, Australian Capital Territory. Once passengers had boarded and during the final inspection, the first officer inadvertently did not remove the propeller strap – used to prevent propeller windmilling – from the left engine.

The dispatcher did not conduct another walk-around or follow the first officer. Prior to engine startup the propeller strap was not noticed by the captain or the dispatcher. During the startup sequence there was a delay between the commencement of engine start and the propeller spinning due to the pins securing the strap to the engine cowling. Once these failed, the propeller began turning normally and the aircraft was cleared to depart with the strap still attached to the left propeller but not visible due to the propeller's rotation.

At about the time the aircraft became airborne, the propeller strap was thrown free of the blade and into the fuselage. Passengers recalled hearing an extremely loud bang, and could see that an object had penetrated the cabin. The strap itself became embedded in the fuselage, but the failed cowling pins broke free of the strap and entered the cabin. One fragment struck the leg of a passenger, resulting in a minor injury (bruising).



Part of the left propeller strap that entered the fuselage adjacent to seat 2A

The ATSB found several factors that may have contributed to the propeller strap not being noticed or removed by the first officer, captain or dispatcher. Most importantly:

- The strap extension (between the stairway and the left propeller) was not fitted. Because the cabin door could not be closed with the strap extension in place, its correct fitment would almost certainly have prevented the flight from proceeding with the propeller strap attached. A review of other departures out of Canberra found that some other flights were boarded without the strap extension being attached.
- The propeller strap did not have a visibility aid (streamer) fitted in accordance with the manufacturer's design. The operator conducted an inspection of its Saab 340B fleet and found the condition of propeller straps to be significantly variable.
- Guidance provided by the operator for training of dispatchers did not explain the appearance, function and importance of the propeller straps.

As a result of the ATSB investigation, the operator advised that it had updated the flight crew and cabin crew operating manuals to include additional preflight checks for the presence of the propeller strap and strap extension. Additional clarity was provided to cabin crew regarding contacting the flight deck during emergencies. Propeller strap discrepancies were rectified within the operator's fleet, and regular inspections and maintenance were added to procedures. The operator amended training guidance to the dispatching company, including more details on the use of propeller straps and strap extensions, as well as the dispatcher's role in checking for the strap. The dispatcher also now requires walk-arounds on Saab aircraft.

Rail

Review of level crossing collisions involving trains and heavy road vehicles in Australia (RS2021-001)

This ATSB safety study used qualitative and quantitative methods to analyse data from both Australia and the United States, including a review of all reported level crossing collisions involving heavy vehicles in Australia from July 2014 to August 2022.

The study identified several themes in the 49 level crossing collisions involving heavy vehicles in Australia from July 2014 to August 2022. These included:

- In at least 12 collisions the heavy vehicle driver had regularly used the level crossing prior to the collision with the train.
- In at least 14 collisions, the heavy vehicle driver's view of the track or level crossing protection equipment was obstructed by vegetation, the design of the heavy vehicle cab, poor crossing lighting or sun glare.
- In at least 14 accidents, it was likely the heavy vehicle driver intentionally entered the level crossing in a manner contrary to road rules, however, even in these instances the intention was to proceed through the crossing prior to the arrival of a train.

The study found that in a large majority of accidents at passively controlled crossings (that is, crossings without flashing lights or boom gates), the heavy vehicle driver did not detect the train, or detected the train too late to avoid a collision.

From this safety study, Standards Australia has committed to reviewing the standard AS1742.7 to determine if additional design guidance for the installation of level crossing protection equipment can be provided to manage risks associated with curved road approaches to level crossings.



Figure 2: Percentage of drivers' fixation time per road region for left and right curved rural roads during daytime

Level crossing collision between passenger train and road vehicle, Wynnum West, Queensland, on 26 February 2021 (RO-2021-005)

On the afternoon of 26 February 2021, a Queensland Rail suburban express passenger train was approaching the Kianawah Road level crossing in the Brisbane suburb of Wynnum West. The boom barriers were in the lowered position and other protection devices (flashing lights) were active at the level crossing. At the same time, after stopping to give way to opposing road traffic at the intersection, immediately adjacent to the level crossing, a motor vehicle turned towards the crossing. It then continued through the level crossing, bypassing the lowered boom barrier, colliding with the train. The motor vehicle was destroyed, and the sole occupant was fatally injured. The only 2 occupants of the train, the driver and guard, were not injured.

The ATSB found that there was a 3.1 m gap between the tip of the boom barrier and the median island, which meant that the barrier only partially blocked road traffic that approached the level crossing from Lindum Road. In this instance, it was very likely that the driver of the motor vehicle followed the turn line markings on the road surface, which directed them past the end of the lowered boom barrier onto the level crossing and into the path of the approaching train. Safety concerns raised by local road users and work undertaken by the government also indicated that the road-rail interface at the Kianawah Road level crossing was complex and visually noisy from a road user's perspective.

Queensland Rail had not been managing risk at level crossings in accordance with the requirements of its level crossing safety standard. In particular, the standard stated that public and pedestrian level crossings were to be assessed every 5 years or sooner. However, the Kianawah Road level crossing had not been assessed for 19 years. Some other level crossings with high instances of incidents and accidents had also not been assessed for 20 years.

It was also identified that, between 2016 and 2021, Queensland Rail had just one person qualified to assess all their public, pedestrian, private, maintenance, and construction level crossings, which numbered in the thousands. Of the 1,138 public level crossings that required assessment within the 5-year timeframe, just 52 were completed.

Further, Queensland Rail and the Brisbane City Council did not have a formal road-rail interface agreement in place at the time of the accident, although negotiations were ongoing. This was a missed opportunity to collectively identify any unique risks associated with the level crossing and manage and maintain those risks through an agreed process.



Kianawah Road level crossing showing intersections and general traffic flow (source: Google Earth, annotated by the ATSB)

Following the accident at the Kianawah Road level crossing, Queensland Rail and the Brisbane City Council have formalised an interface agreement encompassing all level crossings where they have a shared responsibility.

Marine

Engine room fire on board *MPV Everest*, Southern Ocean, 5 April 2021 (MO-2021-003)

On 5 April 2021, a fire broke out in the port engine room of the Bahamasregistered, 145 m multipurpose vessel *MPV Everest* while en route from Mawson Station, Antarctica to Hobart, Tasmania, with 37 crew and 72 Australian Antarctic Division staff on board. The ship's crew responded, and the fire was contained and eventually extinguished using the engine room water mist fixed fire-extinguishing system about 2.5 hours later. The port engine room sustained substantial damage with most of the power generation equipment and machinery located within rendered inoperable. There were no reported injuries or pollution of the sea as a result of the fire. Power and propulsion were subsequently restored using the starboard engine room's machinery and the ship diverted to Fremantle, Western Australia, where it arrived without further incident about a week later.

MPV Everest (source: AAD)

The ATSB investigation found that during a routine fuel transfer operation, *MPV Everest's* port fuel oil settling tank overflowed into the port engine room exhaust ventilation casing and the port engine room below. The investigation identified that the chief engineer, who was conducting the manual fuel transfer, was experiencing a level of fatigue known to have an adverse effect on performance and probably experienced a lapse in attention which resulted in the manual fuel transfer not being monitored and in the tank overflowing, undetected. The investigation concluded that the fire was a result of the ignition of the overflowing fuel either contacting a hot surface within the casing or igniting due to electrostatic discharge, with the latter being more likely.

The ATSB found that inappropriate engineering watchkeeping practices and characteristics of the ship's integrated automation system, among other factors, reduced the effectiveness of tank alarm(s) leading up to the overflow and that an error in the pump layout of the ship's engine room water mist fixed fire extinguishing system increased the risk of an ineffective response to a fire in the engine room. Furthermore, a lack of engine room fire drills meant that opportunities to evaluate and ensure the ship's readiness to respond to engine room fires and to identify and remedy areas in need of improvement were lost.

The ATSB also identified that the positioning of the fuel oil settling tank air vent pipe terminations within the engine room ventilation casing was not compliant with international regulations and classification society rules. Bureau Veritas (the classification society responsible) design approval processes had not identified any potential risks associated with the positioning of the air vent pipe termination and consequently approved the design.

The investigation found that the ship's managers, Fox Offshore, had not ensured that *MPV Everest* was adequately prepared for the challenges of operations in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica, nor was the ship's safety management system (SMS) sufficiently mature for these operations or effectively implemented. In addition, AAD pre-charter due diligence arrangements were found to be ineffective at accurately assessing the preparedness of the ship, its crew and SMS for operations in Antarctica. In identifying these factors and considering the events leading up to this accident, the ATSB also acknowledges that the COVID-19 pandemic at the time posed significant and unprecedented challenges to the maritime industry in general and to seafarers in particular.

In response to the fire, *MPV Everest's* settling tank air pipes and other pipes within the engine room exhaust ventilation casings were modified and extended to terminate on an open deck above the casings in compliance with the rules. The ship's new managers implemented a new SMS on board, which required that fire drills be planned and conducted in the various spaces onboard a ship in as realistic a manner as possible and that instruction in the use of safety processes and equipment was included in drills where possible. Additionally, *MPV Everest's* SOLAS fire training manual and fire control plan were amended to accurately reflect all relevant aspects of the water mist fixed fire-extinguishing system's coverage, activation and operation. Bureau Veritas (BV) presented a case study on the fire to managers of local plan approval offices (LPO) to educate and raise awareness of the accident and its associated contributing factors. According to BV, this resulted in proposed ship designs being assessed more closely and BV is working to implement a formal process to disseminate design review-related safety alerts to LPOs. The Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water and the AAD initiated improved processes to augment pre-charter due diligence arrangements and to manage the use of chartered ships.

Section 5 – Formal Safety Issues and Actions

Formal Safety Issues And Actions

ATSB investigations primarily improve transport safety by identifying and addressing safety issues. Safety issues are events or conditions that increase safety risk and:

- can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations
- are characteristics of an organisation or a system, rather than of a specific individual, or operational environment at a specific point in time.

Safety issues will usually refer to an organisation's risk controls, or to a variety of internal and external organisational influences that impact the effectiveness of its risk controls. They are factors for which an organisation has some level of control and responsibility and, if not addressed, will increase the risk of future accidents.

The ATSB prefers to encourage stakeholders to take proactive safety action to address safety issues identified in its reports. Nevertheless, the ATSB may use its powers under the TSI Act to make a formal safety recommendation either during or at the end of an investigation – depending on the level of risk associated with a safety issue and the extent of corrective action already taken.

When safety recommendations are issued, they clearly describe the safety issue of concern, but they do not provide instructions or opinions on a preferred corrective action. Like equivalent overseas organisations, the ATSB has no power to enforce the implementation of its recommendations. It is a matter for the organisation to which an ATSB recommendation is directed to assess the costs and benefits of any means of addressing a safety issue, and act appropriately.

When the ATSB issues a safety recommendation to a person, organisation or agency, they must provide a written response within 90 days. That response must indicate whether they accept the recommendation, any reasons for not accepting part or all of the recommendation, and details of any proposed safety action to give effect to the recommendation.

The ATSB can also issue a SAN suggesting that an organisation, or an industry sector, consider a safety issue and take appropriate action. There is no requirement for a formal response to a SAN.

Safety issues are broadly classified in terms of their level of risk:

- Critical safety issue – associated with an intolerable level of risk and generally leading to the immediate issue of a safety recommendation unless corrective safety action has already been taken.
- Other safety issue – associated with a risk level regarded as unacceptable unless it is kept as low as reasonably practicable. Where there is a reasonable expectation that safety action could be taken in response to reduce risk, the ATSB will issue a safety recommendation to the appropriate agency when proactive safety action is not forthcoming.

All ATSB safety issues and associated safety actions, along with the most recent status, are published on the ATSB website for all investigation reports released since July 2010.

Safety issues identified through ATSB investigations

All safety issues are risk assessed by the ATSB. In 2023–24, the ATSB (and OTSI NSW and OCI Victoria on behalf of the ATSB) identified safety issues as outlined in Table 4.

Table 4: Number of safety issues identified in 2023–24

Safety issue risk	Aviation	Marine	Rail	Total
Critical	0	0	0	0
Other	32	8	30	70
Total	32	8	30	70

Safety action is sought to address any safety issues when proactive safety action is not forthcoming. Once safety action has been undertaken, the ATSB conducts another risk assessment of the safety issue. When the post-action risk assessment results in either an acceptable level of risk or a risk as low as reasonably practicable, the safety issue status is categorised as 'adequately addressed'.

The Portfolio Budget Statements 2023–24 specify, as 2 of the ATSB KPIs, that:

- 65% of safety issues are addressed in the last financial year
- 85% of safety issues are addressed in the previous financial year.

Refer to Table 2 in **Section 3**.

KPI status of safety issues identified in 2023–24

There were no critical safety issues identified through ATSB investigations in 2023–24. The breakdown of other safety issues, by transport mode, is summarised in Table 5.

Table 5: Status of other safety issues identified in 2023–24

Safety issue risk	Aviation	Marine	Rail	Total
Adequately addressed	25	8	19	74%
Partially addressed	3	0	3	9%
Not addressed	0	0	0	0%
No longer relevant	1	0	1	3%
Safety action still pending	3	0	7	14%
Total	**32**	**8**	**30**	**100%**

Responses to safety issues identified in 2023–24

The tables in this section document each safety issue identified in 2023–24 and its current status assigned by the ATSB, along with the justification for that status.

Aviation

Table 6: Aviation – safety issues identified in 2023–24

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2021-018 Loss of control and near collision with terrain involving Leonardo Helicopters AW139, VH-TJH, near Katoomba, New South Wales, on 26 March 2021		
AO-2021-018-SI-01: Regulatory requirements did not ensure that aircraft lighting was adequate to conduct night vision imaging system winching operations safely.	Closed-Adequately addressed	New regulatory guidance regarding the type of external white lighting should significantly reduce the likelihood of an operator using inadequate external lighting. This should reduce the likelihood of a pilot losing visual cues leading to a loss of control and collision with terrain while conducting NVIS operations. The post-safety action risk assessment results in 'acceptable'.
AO-2021-018-SI-02: The external aircraft white lighting was inadequate to illuminate the terrain below and to the side of the aircraft at the required operating height.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The fitment of high-intensity external lighting will ensure that terrain below and to the side of the aircraft will be adequately illuminated at the required operating height.
AO-2021-018-SI-03: TOLL recency for night vision imaging system (NVIS) winching was insufficient to ensure that complex NVIS winching operations, such as in this occurrence, could be conducted safely.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The new requirements introduced by TOLL will ensure that pilots experience a complex NVIS winch every 6 months. This is likely to increase to pilot currency for complex NVIS winch and therefore likely to reduce the likelihood of pilots experiencing excessive workload leading to a loss of control, or reduce the severity of such an occurrence.
AO-2021-018-SI-04: Although the operator's procedures for winching and night vision imaging system operations included the need to have adequate hover references and a method of recovery in the event of a night vision goggle failure, there was limited guidance to ensure these requirements were confirmed by the flight crew on site before commencing precision hover operations.	Closed-Adequately addressed	New operational guidance regarding pre-mission and pre-winch risk assessments emphasises the requirement to confirm that suitable hover references exist in the winch position. This, combined with the addition of Trakka search lights, significantly reduces the likelihood of a loss of visual cues (including in the event of goggle failure) leading to a loss of control and collision with terrain.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2022-028 Collision with terrain involving Kubicek Balloons BB78Z, VH-RJR 15 km north-west of Moorabbin Airport, Victoria, on 20 April 2022		
AO-2022-028-SI-01: The balloon manufacturer did not have an adequate process to verify the accuracy of the temperature recorded during production inflation tests.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The updated production test procedure includes a more comprehensive test for balloons with modified deflation systems, which includes redundant temperature sensors and guidance on correct sensor installation. In addition, all standard balloons no longer use temperature sensors for the test, being replaced by a specific weight to be lifted which will ensure greater consistency in the internal envelope pressure during the test independent of ambient conditions. These changes adequately address the safety issue.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2019-041 Close proximity involving Boeing 737, VH-VZO, and Airbus A330, VH-EBJ, at Sydney Airport, New South Wales, on 5 August 2019		
AO-2019-041-SI-01: Airservices Australia did not have procedural controls to separate aircraft concurrently carrying out the MARUB SIX standard instrument departure and a missed approach from runway 34R at Sydney Airport while below the minimum vector altitude at night.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety actions implemented by Airservices Australia should adequately address the safety issue.
AO-2019-041-SI-02: Although Airservices Australia applied operational risk assessments to high-level threats, it did not formally assess and manage the risk of specific threat scenarios. As a likely result, Airservices Australia did not formally identify and risk manage the threat of separate aircraft concurrently carrying out the MARUB SIX standard instrument departure and a missed approach from runway 34R at Sydney Airport, even though it had been a known issue among controllers generally.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB considers that, ideally, specific threat scenarios would be individually recorded, analysed and tracked on an ongoing basis. However, the inclusion of specific scenarios in periodic risk review activities improves risk record-keeping, and more frequent operational risk reviews now conducted by Airservices Australia are likely to significantly enhance the ongoing identification, assessment and treatment of specific threat scenarios.
AO-2019-041-SI-04: The Airservices Australia MARUB SIX standard instrument departure and the missed approach procedure for runway 34R directed aircraft onto outbound tracks that did not sufficiently assure separation between aircraft following the procedures concurrently.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety action implemented by Airservices Australia is likely to address the safety issue, but the ATSB urges Airservices Australia to monitor the safety outcomes to optimise the procedure design in the long term.
AO-2019-041-SI-05: Airservices Australia's compromised separation recovery training for Sydney tower controllers did not include scenarios involving aircraft below the minimum vector altitude at night.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety actions implemented by Airservices Australia should adequately address the safety issue.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2022-058 Aircraft preparation event involving Saab 340B, VH-ZLJ, Cairns, Queensland, o n 16 November 2022		
AO-2022-058-SI-01: There were no formal procedures for the storage and accountability of horizontal stabiliser bungs after they were removed from the aircraft.	Closed-Adequately addressed	By removing the horizontal stabiliser bungs from operational use, the operator has mitigated the risk of a bung going undetected during pre-flight preparations. This action also eliminates the possibility of adverse consequences following the dispatch of an aircraft with the bungs still installed.
AO-2022-058-SI-02: The design of the horizontal stabiliser bungs did not consider aspects that would ensure the identification of an installed bung, or the safe operation of the aircraft if the bungs were not removed prior to flight.	Closed-Adequately addressed	By removing the horizontal stabiliser bungs from operational use, the operator has mitigated the risk of any adverse consequences attributed to their design or as a result of their use. As such there is no longer a safety issue.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2022-009 Fuel exhaustion and collision with terrain involving Robinson R44 II, VH-IDW, King River, Northern Territory, on 28 February 2022		
AO-2022-009-SI-01: CASA did not have an effective process for assuring an authorisation would be unlikely to have an adverse effect on safety. As a result, CASA delegates did not use the available structured risk management process to identify and assess the risks, ensure appropriate and adequate mitigations were included as conditions of the approval, or assess the effects of changes on the overall risk.	Closed-Adequately addressed	If the revised process is conducted as documented, the safety issue should be addressed.
AO-2022-009-SI-02: Helibrook's approved safety management system was not being used to systematically identify and manage operational hazards. As a result, risks associated with conducting human external cargo operations such as carriage of the egg collector above a survivable fall height were not adequately addressed.	Closed-No longer relevant	As Helibrook has ceased operation, the safety management system is no longer in use.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2023-010 Hard landing involving Boeing 737-8FE, VH-YQR, Sydney Airport, New South Wales, on 10 March 2023		
AO-2023-010-SI-01: The training provider, contracted by the operator to conduct Boeing 737 conversion training, was training pilots to flare at 30 ft rather than the manufacturer's requirement of 20 ft. This increased the risk of unstable and/or hard landings.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety action taken by CAE Inc. adequately addresses the safety issue.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2022-041 VFR into IMC and controlled flight into terrain involving Cessna R182, VH-EHM, 36 km north-west of Archerfield Airport, Queensland, on 29 August 2022		
AO-2022-041-SI-01: The operator's hazard and risk register, which formed part of the organisation's safety management system, did not identify inadvertent entry into IMC as a hazard, which reduced the ability of the organisation to effectively manage the related risk.	Open-Safety action pending	The ATSB acknowledges the safety action taken by Executive Helicopters to reduce the risk of inadvertent entry into IMC. The ATSB considers that, once implemented, the proposed safety action will address the safety issue.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2022-016 VFR into IMC, loss of control and collision with terrain involving Airbus Helicopters EC130 T2, VH-XWD, near Mount Disappointment, Victoria, on 31 March 2022		
AO-2022-016-SI-01: The Microflite Operator Proficiency Checks did not include a mandatory instrument flight component for their day visual flight rules pilots. This would have reduced the risk of a loss of control event following an inadvertent IMC encounter.	Closed-Partially addressed	The ATSB acknowledges that Microflite will include an instrument flight component on their operator proficiency checks, however, training will not be mandated and will only be conducted on a resource availability basis. Therefore, as the instrument flight component is not guaranteed for all the operator's pilots, the safety issue of reducing the risk of loss of control after inadvertent entry into IMC is only partially addressed.

AO-2022-016-SI-02: Microflite had not published an inadvertent IMC recovery procedure for their day visual flight rules pilots and their inadvertent IMC recovery training was not mandatory. The provision of this procedure and training would have reduced the risk of a loss of attitude control following an inadvertent IMC encounter.	Closed-Partially addressed	The ATSB acknowledges Microflite has published an inadvertent IMC recovery procedure for their day visual flight rules pilots but will only conduct the training element of this safety issue on a resource availability basis. However, as the inadvertent IMC training is not guaranteed for all the operator's pilots, the safety issue of reducing the risk of loss of altitude control following an IIMC encounter is only partially addressed.
AO-2022-016-SI-03: Microflite did not provide, nor require, their pilots to complete a pre-flight risk assessment for their taskings. A pre-flight risk assessment would have provided pre-defined criteria to ensure consistent and objective decision-making and reduced the risk of them selecting an inappropriate route.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB acknowledges the introduction of a pre-flight risk assessment tool with an escalation process by Microflite and is satisfied that this change reduces the risk associated with this safety issue.
AO-2022-016-SI-04: The Microflite air transport operations risk assessment for poor weather conditions did not consider the risk controls required for inadvertent IMC. Rather, it relied on their pilots using the actual or forecast conditions to cancel their operations to manage the threat of poor weather.	Closed-Partially addressed	The risk assessment provided by Microflite meets the intent of this safety issue by presenting VFR into IMC as a standalone item in their risk register with their controls for this risk and the status of those controls. However, the risk assessment does not provide assurance of recovery from a VFR into IMC event, but it is acknowledged that Microflite has introduced additional preventive controls, such as their pre-flight risk assessment and task rejection policy to reduce the level of risk.
AO-2022-016-SI-05: The Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Part 133 (air transport – rotorcraft) exposition requirements did not adequately address the risk to passenger safety from a VFR inadvertent IMC event.	Open-Safety action pending	The ATSB will continue to monitor the proposed safety action.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2022-032 Flight preparation event involving an Airbus A350-941, 9V-SHH, at Brisbane Airport, Queensland, on 27 May 2022		
AO-2022-032-SI-01: Heston MRO had not yet implemented a previously proposed and accepted method to account for tooling and equipment (such as pitot probe covers) prior to aircraft pushback.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that when implemented, the safety action taken will adequately address the safety issue.
AO-2022-032-SI-02: Heston MRO did not track the work-related hours of personnel with dual management and operational roles (including the licensed aircraft maintenance engineer) for fatigue calculation purposes. Therefore, there was an increased risk of a fatigue related incident involving those personnel.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB recognises the safety improvements made by Heston MRO with the implementation of a regional manager which does not include the dual role of licensed aircraft maintenance engineer maintenance authority certification requirements. Further, now that Heston MRO is tracking the hours of its entire operational workforce in accordance with its own policies and procedures, the ATSB is satisfied that the safety issue has been adequately addressed.
AO-2022-032-SI-03: The majority of Singapore Airlines flight crews (observed around the time of the incident) did not fully complete the required pre-flight walk-around inspections.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the safety action undertaken has adequately addressed the safety issue.

AO-2022-032-SI-04: Although suitable for use in most situations, the streamers attached to the pitot probe covers supplied and used for A350 operations by Heston MRO at Brisbane Airport provided limited conspicuity due to their overall length, position above eye height, and limited movement in wind. This reduced the likelihood of incidental detection of the covers, which is important during turnarounds.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the increased length of the pitot probe covers used at Brisbane Airport has adequately addressed the safety issue.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2023-026 Flight crew incapacitation involving Boeing 717-200, VH-NXM on approach to Hobart Airport Tasmania, on 6 June 2023		
AO-2023-026-SI-01: National Jet Systems' cabin air quality events procedure focused on the recording/reporting of odours, post-flight care of crew and maintenance actions. However, it did not consider the possible application of the smoke/fumes procedure, or incapacitation procedure. As a result, there was an increased risk of flight crew being adversely affected by such an event during a critical stage of flight.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB acknowledges the changes to the maintenance program to reduce the chance of future cabin air quality events. The additional training components in response to safety issue AO-2023-026-SI-02 also apply to this safety issue and addresses the risk of crews being adversely affected by future cabin air quality events, during a critical stage of flight, by requiring flight crews to demonstrate and practice supplemental oxygen use during landing, in a controlled, simulated environment. Similarly, instruction specific to flight crew incapacitation increases the likelihood of a cohesive, strategic response from flight crews in the event of a crew member becoming incapacitated.
AO-2023-026-SI-02: Although National Jet Systems had procedures for recognition and management of pilot incapacitation, the associated training did not include the identification and response to subtle physical or cognitive incapacitation.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB acknowledges National Jet Systems' safety actions of targeted training and procedures to address the risks of subtle physical or cognitive incapacitation in flight crews. These actions are considered to address the safety issue.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2023-059 Ground strike during a marine pilot transfer, involving an Agusta A109, VH-RUA and ship Tai Keystone, About 240 km north-east from Mackay Airport, Queensland, on 7 December 2023		
AO-2023-059-SI-01: An earlier version of the helicopter operations checklist was used by the crew of the Tai Keystone. That checklist did not include a requirement, present in the version current at the time of the incident, to remove handrails or stanchions from the helicopter landing site.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Taiwan Navigation Co. Ltd. has updated their helicopter/ship operations safety checklist. The checklist now includes the following checklist item: The side rails and, where necessary, awnings, stanchions and other obstructions has been lowered or removed.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2022-055 Aircraft preparation and foreign object damage event involving Saab 340B, VH-VEQ, at Canberra Airport, Australian Capital Territory, on 10 November 2022		
AO-2022-055-SI-01: On one-third of the Link Airways Saab 340B flights for which video surveillance was examined, including the occurrence flight, the flight crews did not fit the strap extension between the propeller strap and the airstairs. As the cabin door could not be closed with the strap extension in place, its correct fitment would almost certainly prevent a flight from proceeding with a propeller strap fitted.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Cabin crew checks should reduce the likelihood of the strap extension not being fitted. Flight crew checks should prevent the flight proceeding in the event the strap extension is not fitted and the propeller strap is left on. This action will ultimately reduce the likelihood of a propeller strap not being removed prior to departure.

AO-2022-055-SI-02: The propeller strap did not have a high-visibility streamer attached, and Link Airways did not effectively manage the condition of propeller straps for its Saab 340B fleet. This affected the visibility of the straps during ground operations.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The Link Airways safety action should improve the visibility of propeller straps used during Saab 340B departures now and into the future. This should reduce both the chance of a propeller strap being inadvertently not removed and not noticed by others before flight.
AO-2022-055-SI-03: Guidance provided by Link Airways for training of Swissport dispatch coordinators did not explain the appearance, function and importance of the propeller straps.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The training information that Link Airways provided to Swissport has been updated with more guidance on the dispatch coordinator's role in ensuring the propeller straps are removed. This should increase the likelihood that a dispatch coordinator will notice a strap that has been inadvertently left on the propeller.
AO-2022-055-SI-04: Swissport did not ensure that the implemented training and audits for Link Airways Saab 340B dispatches incorporated all of the elements required in its Ground operations manual for pre-departure walk-arounds.	Open-Safety action pending	The action taken by Swissport will help to ensure that walk-arounds are always conducted by dispatchers for Saab 340B departures. However, while the audits will check that a walk-around is conducted, in the absence of further guidance, they would not necessarily provide assurance that the different required elements are completed. The use of guidance notes within audit tasks would provide Swissport auditors with the means to check for these elements. The ATSB will monitor Swissport's consideration and implementation of guidance notes within audit tasks, and any other relevant safety action.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
AO-2023-025 Near collision involving a Piper PA-28-161, VH-ENL, and Bombardier DHC-8-315, VH-TQH, at Mildura Aerodrome, Victoria, on 6 June 2023		
AO-2023-025-SI-01: Due to topography and buildings at Mildura Airport, aircraft are not directly visible to each other on the threshold of runway 09, 27 and 36. The lack of a requirement for mandatory rolling calls increased the risk of aircraft not being aware of each other immediately prior to take-off.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Mildura Airport has advised that as of 4 April 2024, a permanent Notice to Air Mission (NOTAM) has been declared for Mildura Airport requiring mandatory rolling calls by all aircraft. This will increase the situational awareness of all pilots in the vicinity of Mildura Airport and alert them to aircraft about to take off and reduce the risk of potential aircraft collision on the airport.

Marine

Table 7: Marine – safety issues identified 2023–24

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
MO-2021-003 Engine room fire on board MPV Everest, Southern Ocean, on 5 April 2021		
MO-2021-003-SI-01: While fire drills conducted on board *MPV Everest* exceeded the minimum number required by regulations, none practised an engine room fire, nor was there any evidence of onboard training and instruction being provided in the use of the engine room water mist fixed fire extinguishing system. Consequently, several crew members were unfamiliar with the operation of the system and opportunities to evaluate the ship's emergency preparedness and remedy areas in need of improvement were lost.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The amendments to the ship's drill procedures, particularly the requirement for the conduct of realistic drills in various spaces on board the ship, and shore oversight of shipboard drills through review of completed drill reports and during internal audits, should adequately address this safety issue.
MO-2021-003-SI-02: Electrical enclosures in *MPV Everest*'s engine rooms allowed the ingress of fuel into the enclosures and did not meet the responsible classification society fluid ingress protection standards intended to reduce the associated risk of harmful effects and damage.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The inspection, identification and rectification of electrical enclosures with inadequate sealing arrangements should adequately address this safety issue.
MO-2021-003-SI-03: The engine room water mist fixed fire-extinguishing system on board *MPV Everest* was incorrectly installed. This increased the risk of an ineffective response in the event of a bilge fire.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The modification of *MPV Everest*'s water mist system to rectify the incorrect pump layout should adequately address this safety issue.
MO-2021-003-SI-04: Inconsistent, incorrect or missing information related to aspects of *MPV Everest*'s water mist fixed fire-extinguishing system, including the spaces covered by the system and its design/operation, in multiple ship's documents increased the risk of the crew incorrectly responding to a fire.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The review and update of *MPV Everest*'s mandatory fire training manual and fire control plan to accurately reflect all relevant aspects of the water mist fixed fire-extinguishing system's coverage, activation and operation should adequately address this safety issue.
MO-2021-003-SI-05: Bureau Veritas' (the classification society responsible) design approval processes had not identified any potential risks associated with the positioning of the fuel oil settling tank air vent pipe termination within *MPV Everest*'s engine room ventilation casing. Consequently, it approved this design and siting of the air vent pipe that, in concert with other contributing factors, resulted in overflowing fuel from the pipe being directly introduced into the ship's machinery spaces.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety action taken by Bureau Veritas to raise awareness of the fire and its contributing factors, in particular the siting of the fuel oil settling tank air pipe, among its LPOs should serve to increase the effectiveness of future risk assessments associated with ship design plan approvals. Additionally, evidence provided to the ATSB of ship's plans with a similar fuel oil tank air pipe design feature, which was assessed and challenged by the LPO, resulting in the design being modified to comply with BV rules, supports the effectiveness of the safety action. Finally, the action taken by Fox Offshore and Maritime Construction Services in modifying the air pipes to terminate externally effectively eliminates the hazard associated with the positioning of the pipes on board *MPV Everest*. Therefore, the ATSB considers that this safety issue has been adequately addressed.

MO-2021-003-SI-06: *MPV Everest*'s managers at the time of the fire, Fox Offshore, had not ensured that the ship was adequately manned, equipped or prepared for the hazards of operations in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety action taken by Maritime Construction Services and the ship's new managers (Northern Marine Ship Management) should adequately address this safety issue as the actions are directed at aspects of the ship's management and operations relevant to the risks identified by the ATSB.
MO-2021-003-SI-07: *MPV Everest*'s SMS was neither sufficiently mature for its operations nor had it been implemented effectively or consistently on board the ship at the time of the fire. Further, safety oversight by Fox Offshore, the ship's managers, had not been effective in monitoring and ensuring compliance with the SMS.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety action taken by Maritime Construction Services and the ship's new managers (Northern Marine Ship Management) should adequately address this safety issue as the actions are directed at aspects of the ship's management and operations relevant to the risks identified by the ATSB.
MO-2021-003-SI-08: The AAD pre-charter due diligence arrangements were ineffective at accurately assessing the suitability and level of preparedness of *MPV Everest*, its crew and its SMS for operations in Antarctica.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety action taken by the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, and by the AAD, to improve the pre-charter due diligence and procurement arrangements should address this safety issue.

Rail

Table 8: Rail – Safety issues identified in 2023–24

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
RO-2020-002 Derailment of XPT at Wallan, Victoria, on 20 February 2020		
RO-2020-002-SI-01: For the routing of trains through Wallan Loop on 20 February, Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) risk management and oversight processes did not result in a documented assessment of the introduced risks and the application of controls necessary to manage those risks.	Closed-Partially addressed	ARTC establishment of a risk tool and associated processes has the potential to reduce risk associated with this safety issue. The status is assessed as partially addressed noting that the effectiveness of the updated risk management systems will depend on their successful implementation and management oversight.
RO-2020-002-SI-02: For the routing of trains through Wallan Loop on 20 February, ARTC processes did not result in its effective engagement with network users that would be affected by this change.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
RO-2020-002-SI-03: For the establishment of train working arrangements that deviated from ARTC network rules, ARTC risk management and oversight processes resulted in a risk management plan that was limited in context, scope and risk identification and risk controls that had significant weaknesses.	Closed-Partially addressed	ARTC introduction of updated management processes should reduce the risk associated with this safety issue. The status is assessed as partially addressed due to there being insufficient evidence to confirm the effectiveness of implementation and oversight of the updated risk management systems.
RO-2020-002-SI-04: For the establishment of train working arrangements that deviated from ARTC network rules, ARTC stakeholder engagement did not support its management of the safety risks to network users and the development of agreed risk controls.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.

RO-2020-002-SI-05: For the establishment of train working arrangements that deviated from ARTC network rules, ActivateRail did not implement processes to ensure its contributions were consistent with the risk management procedures of the accredited rail infrastructure manager (ARTC) and Australian risk management standards.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The introduction of new processes and additional risk management awareness training should reduce the risk associated with this safety issue. The effectiveness of these safety actions will be governed by implementation and oversight.
RO-2020-002-SI-06: ARTC did not specify the qualification and knowledge requirements of persons that were to perform the safety critical role of an accompanying qualified worker.	Closed-Adequately addressed	ARTC review and update of its safeworking roles competency framework to align with industry standards and company requirements should reduce risk associated with this safety issue.
RO-2020-002-SI-07: ARTC distribution of safety information by train notice was probably sub-optimal. There was scope to improve reliability of safety information distribution and to consider opportunities for operators in Victoria (and SA and WA) to receive direct distribution of train notices for their operations on the ARTC network.	Open-Safety action pending	ARTC implementation of improvement in document control processes and visibility of safety critical notices on WebRAMS should reduce risk associated with this safety issue. The status is open pending ARTC consideration of further opportunities for its distribution of safety critical information.
RO-2020-002-SI-08: NSW Trains did not have a functioning process for obtaining safety information from the ARTC web portal for its rolling stock operations within Victoria and did not routinely obtain ARTC train notices.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The described introduction of new procedures for accessing WebRAMS should reduce the risk associated with this safety issue. The effectiveness of the safety action will be governed by implementation and oversight.
RO-2020-002-SI-09: NSW Trains did not have a functioning system to monitor that drivers starting their shift at Junee received and had understood distributed safety information.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The described introduction of new procedures for confirming receipt of safety critical information by train crew should reduce the risk associated with this safety issue. The effectiveness of the safety action will be governed by implementation and oversight.
RO-2020-002-SI-10: Contemporary Australian industry rail standards did not include structural requirements for cab doors, or other performance-based requirements, that addressed the protection of train crew in the case of vehicle overturn.	Open-Safety action pending	The review of rail industry standards addressing structural requirements is considered an appropriate safety action. The safety issue is retained as open to provide for reporting on the outcome of this review on the ATSB website.
RO-2020-002-SI-11: Contemporary Australian industry rail standards did not include requirements for ground-level access to or egress from driver's cabs in the event of a rollover.	Open-Safety action pending	The review of rail industry standards addressing driver's cab access and egress is considered an appropriate safety action. The safety issue is retained as open to provide for reporting on the outcome of this review on the ATSB website.
RO-2020-002-SI-12: NSW Trains' methods of providing safety information to passengers (including verbal safety briefings, onboard guides and signage) did not provide reasonable opportunity for all passengers to have knowledge of what to do in an emergency.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
RO-2020-002-SI-13: NSW Trains' procedures did not provide specific instructions to passenger services crew on when, how and what to communicate to passengers in an emergency.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
RO-2020-002-SI-14: NSW Trains' training of passenger services crew did not include periodic simulated exercises that would allow crew members to demonstrate and maintain the knowledge and skills required in an emergency.	Closed-Partially addressed	NSW Trains training includes simulated emergencies and should reduce risks associated with this safety issue. Training is not conducted in a train context and the safety issue has therefore been assessed as partially addressed.

RO-2020-002-SI-15: NSW Trains did not have systems in place to achieve outcomes in emergency response training consistent with its competency framework for passenger services crew.	Closed-Adequately addressed	NSW Trains has developed procedures for the management of train crew competencies, which cover how and at what frequency training will be undertaken as well as the qualifications of persons responsible for training. In addition, the administrative processes that now form part of the documented procedures, will ensure that crew members will be trained and assessed as per NSW Trains' requirements.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
RO-2021-005 Level crossing collision between a passenger train E820 and road vehicle, Wynnum West, Queensland, on 26 February 2021		
RO-2021-005-SI-01: There was no formal interface agreement between Queensland Rail and the Brisbane City Council to jointly identify and manage ongoing and changing safety risks at the road and rail interfaces.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that, as the level crossing interface agreement between Queensland Rail and the Brisbane City Council has been formalised, this safety issue has been addressed.
RO-2021-005-SI-02: Contrary to the relevant Australian Standard, there was a 3.1 m gap between the tip of the lowered boom barrier and the median island on the northern side of the Kianawah Road level crossing. With the turn line markings directing traffic towards the gap, this increased the risk of road users turning right from Lindum Road and bypassing the boom barrier while it was active.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the installation of a longer boom barrier at the Kianawah Road level crossing, and the rectification of 29 other level crossings, where the boom barrier did not fully extend to the edge of a median island or the dividing line of the roadway, has addressed this safety issue.
RO-2021-005-SI-03: Although Queensland Rail's internal standard required safety assessments of each public level crossing at least every 5 years, there had been no review or assessment of the Kianawah Road and other level crossings since 2001–02.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the assessment (Australian Level Crossing Assessment Model) of the Kianawah Road level crossing, undertaken by Queensland Rail addresses this safety issue. In addition, the ATSB is satisfied that Queensland Rail, through a program, is actively seeking to address safety risk at level crossings in accordance with its level crossing safety standard.
RO-2021-005-SI-04: Queensland Rail had insufficient resources available to assess all 1,138 public level crossings at 5-yearly intervals or sooner as required by its level crossing safety Standard, with only one person qualified to conduct level crossing safety assessments.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that Queensland Rail has addressed this safety issue by training and deploying additional resources and developing a program to assess all public road and pedestrian crossings over the next 5 years.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
RO-2020-003 Safeworking irregularity involving passenger trains 1898 and 18A0 near Thorneside, Queensland, on 7 March 2020		
RO-2020-003-SI-01: The Queensland Network Rules and Procedures did not provide sufficient guidance for rail safety workers to ensure they used standardised rail-specific terminology when communicating safety-critical information.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the enforceable voluntary undertaking initiatives relevant to the improvement of standardised rail-specific terminology when communicating safety-critical information and the additional proactive safety actions taken by Queensland Rail have reduced the risk of this safety issue.

RO-2020-003-SI-02: Network pre-start briefings are a critical control in place to manage the risk of collisions between rail traffic and workers and machinery, and Queensland Rail had undertaken significant work to improve these processes. However, the design of the first-line assurance activities and the limited conduct of second-line and third-line assurance activities provided only limited assurance that the worksite protection aspects of the briefings were being conducted effectively.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the enforceable voluntary undertaking initiatives relevant to the 3 levels of defence assurance model, and the additional proactive safety actions taken by Queensland Rail, have reduced the risk of this safety issue.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
RO-2020-022 Runaway and derailment of loaded grain train 3966 Dombarton, New South Wales, on 15 December 2020		
RO-2020-022-SI-03: The assumptions regarding locomotive configurations that cut-out locomotive dynamic braking during emergency applications was found embedded in other rollingstock operator's procedures with similarly configured locomotives in NSW.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety issue has been found and addressed with Qube. The safety issue was also found with 2 other major rail operators in NSW.
RO-2020-022-SI-04: Qube's operational procedure for train management between Moss Vale and Inner Harbour did not account for locomotive configurations that maintained locomotive dynamic braking during emergency applications. This increased the risk of the train driver avoiding the use of the emergency brake during a runaway event.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety issue was raised with Qube, with initial response to assess what they would need to do to address the safety issue. Qube acknowledged there was an industry lack of knowledge of how particular emergency brake systems operated.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
RO-2019-022 Collision between freight trains 7MP5 and 2K66, at Jumperkine, Western Australia, on 24 December 2019		
RO-2019-022-SI-01: Pacific National's rostering and fatigue management system used the FAID biomathematical model of fatigue to assess the fatigue risks associated with train driver rosters, applying a thresholds FAID score of 80 for driver only operations and 100 for other operations. The operator had not conducted analysis to determine that train drivers working rosters according to these thresholds were sufficiently rested to conduct driving duties.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the actions advised by Pacific National will reduce the risk of this safety issue.
RO-2019-022-SI-02: Pacific National had limited controls for managing the risk of signals passed at danger during driver only operations, including incidents associated with driver fatigue. The safety system relied on a single driver correctly observing and responding to signals at all times, including during the window of the circadian low (when fatigue risk is greatest).	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the action being taken by Pacific National has reduced the risk of this safety issue.
RO-2019-022-SI-03: The Arc Infrastructure practice of pathing a following train up to the same section of track occupied by a stopped train, coupled with no requirement for the network control officer (NCO) to communicate and confirm rail traffic crews were aware when approaching another stopped train, increased risk.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the action being taken by Arc Infrastructure has reduced the risk of this safety issue.

RO-2019-022-SI-04: The Arc Infrastructure processes for the management of rail traffic overrunning its limits of authority were reliant on the immediate actions of the rail traffic crew and did not explicitly require immediate actions from the NCO. This situation increased the risk of driver completely missed signal passed at danger (SPAD) events, particularly in cases where the rail traffic crew's awareness or capacity was potentially compromised.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB welcomes the safety action undertaken by Arc Infrastructure to address aspects related to this safety issue. Although these safety actions have not explicitly required immediate actions by a NCO, the ATSB is satisfied that the action being taken by Arc Infrastructure has reduced the risk of this safety issue.
RO-2019-022-SI-05: Arc Infrastructure's procedures included no requirement for a NCO to make an emergency call and advise potentially 'at risk' trains that another nearby train had overrun its limit of authority.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the action being taken by Arc Infrastructure has reduced the risk of this safety issue.
RO-2019-022-SI-06: Pacific National's fatigue management procedures required train drivers to not work if they felt fatigued. This requirement primarily relied on driver's self-reporting if they felt fatigued, and there was no proactive assurance that drivers had obtained adequate sleep, including for higher fatigue risk situations. Self-reporting mechanisms were very seldom utilised and Pacific National had not conducted surveys or used other audit mechanisms or processes to identify any perceived or actual barriers to driver's self-identifying fatigue.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied that the actions advised by Pacific National will reduce the risk of this safety issue.
Safety issue	**Status**	**Status justification**
RS-2021-001 Review of level crossing collisions involving trains and heavy road vehicles in Australia		
RS-2021-001-SI-01: The methods used in the Australian Standard AS 1742.7:2016 to calculate safe stopping distances, and determine the need and location of advanced warning signs for road approaches to level crossings, did not account for the likelihood of detecting the level crossing ahead based on the normal visual focal points of road drivers negotiating a curved road. While the standards included guidance for the use of active warning signs for curved road approaches to flashing light controlled crossings, this was not mandatory. There were 6 collisions in which a driver of a heavy vehicle did not detect that level crossing flashing light signals were activated until it was too late to stop. In 5 of these collisions, the drivers approached the crossing along a right curved approach road and none of these crossings had active advance flashing light signals.	Open-Safety action pending	Australian Standards have indicated they will conduct a review of AS1742.7. The ATSB will review the status of this safety issue after considering any changes to AS1742.7 resulting from the Australian Standards review.

Safety actions

Table 9: Number of safety actions prompted in 2023–24

Safety issue risk	Aviation	Marine	Rail	Total
Proactive safety action1	19	17	24	60
Safety advisory notice	5	0	0	5
Safety recommendation	3	0	0	3
Total	**27**	**17**	**24**	**68**

Safety recommendations closed in 2023–24

Aviation

Table 10: Aviation – safety recommendations closed in 2023–24

Investigation	AE-2014-054 Assistance to Malaysian Ministry of Transport in support of missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 on 7 March 2014 UTC
Safety issue	There is relatively limited public and official information available about the process and outcomes of some searches. It is not an explicit part of the ICAO Annex 13 guidelines for inclusion in an accident investigation report. Similarly, there is no Annex 12 requirement to publish or analyse search information. This limits the ability for researchers to determine the factors that help or hinder a search.
Number	AE-2014-054-SR-047
Organisation	ICAO Annex 13 investigation bodies
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that ICAO Annex 13 investigation bodies should endeavour to publish relevant information about search, rescue and recovery operations for the benefit of future research.
Released	3 October 2017
Final action date	8 March 2024
Final action	The ATSB will monitor progress of safety action associated with this safety issue via recommendation AE-2014-054-SR-046.
Investigation	**AE-2014-054 Assistance to Malaysian Ministry of Transport in support of missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 on 7 March 2014 UTC**
Safety issue	While there has been significant enhancements in the tracking of commercial aircraft in recent years there are some limitations to the improvements. The ICAO mandated 15-minute position tracking interval for existing aircraft may not reduce a potential search area enough to ensure that survivors and wreckage are located within a reasonable timeframe.
Number	AE-2014-054-SR-048
Organisation	State regulators
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that states ensure that sufficient mechanisms are in place to ensure a rapid detection of, and appropriate response to, the loss of aircraft position or contact throughout all areas of operation.
Released	3 October 2017
Final action date	8 March 2024
Final action	The implementation of safety action associated with this recommendation is a matter for consideration by each respective state.

1 Only includes proactive safety action taken by industry linked to an ATSB-identified safety issue.

Investigation	AE-2014-054 Assistance to Malaysian Ministry of Transport in support of missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 on 7 March 2014 UTC
Safety issue	While there have been significant enhancements in the tracking of commercial aircraft in recent years there are some limitations to the improvements. The ICAO mandated 15-minute position tracking interval for existing aircraft may not reduce a potential search area enough to ensure that survivors and wreckage are located within a reasonable timeframe.
Number	AE-2014-054-SR-049
Organisation	Aircraft operators, aircraft manufacturers, and aircraft equipment manufacturers
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that aircraft operators, aircraft manufacturers, and aircraft equipment manufacturers investigate ways to provide high-rate and/or automatically triggered global position tracking in existing and future fleets.
Released	3 October 2017
Final action date	8 March 2024
Final action	Some operators, including Malaysia Airlines, have implemented aircraft tracking solutions that are capable of almost real-time data to be monitored at ground stations. In addition, aircraft and equipment manufacturers have begun developing and implementing autonomous distress tracking (ADT) systems as a retrofit to existing aircraft in addition to installation in newly built aircraft. The Boeing Company advised in 2024: We continue to work under the oversight of global regulators on the requirement for a Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System [GADSS]. We have developed a GADSS and performed flight and ground testing on our current airplane models. We are in the process of completing required engineering activities with the regulators to certify an in-line production and retrofit solution. In addition, at least one other major manufacturer (Airbus) has made ADT available on various aircraft models since 2023 and is expanding its availability. Further, it has been reported that airlines, including some based in Australia, have started to implement ADT.
Investigation	**AO-2015-114 Runway excursion involving Cessna 550, VH-FGK, Lismore Airport, New South Wales, on 25 September 2015**
Safety issue	The Citation aircraft did not have an annunciator light to show that the parking brake is engaged, and the manufacturer's 'before take-off' checklist did not include a check to ensure the parking brake is disengaged.
Number	AO-2015-114-SR-002
Organisation	Cessna Aircraft Company
Recommendation	The ATSB recommended Textron Aviation (Cessna) take safety action to address the fact that Citation aircraft do not have an annunciator light to show that the parking brake is engaged and the Cessna 'before take-off' checklist does not include a check to ensure the parking brake is disengaged.
Released	25 July 2016
Final action date	25 July 2023
Final action	Your referenced Safety Recommendation (AO-2015-114-SR-002) was tracked in our database as Continual Operational Safety (COS) Report 1569. After submittal of our response to your Safety Recommendation, with concurrence from the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), COS Issue 1569 was closed on February 21, 2018. No further action has been taken in association with COS Report 1569 or in response to the ATSB Safety Recommendation. Since closure of COS Report 1569, as you are aware, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued Safety Recommendation, AIR-22-06, to the FAA on June 1, 2022. Textron Aviation (TAI) provided a response to the FAA on September 1st, 2022, and are awaiting a response. The NTSB investigation into the accident involving aircraft 560-6026 that is currently ongoing (NTSB # ERA21FA346) and, consequently, its final accident report has not been released. TAI, as a NTSB party participant to that investigation, cannot comment or otherwise provide information regarding that pending and ongoing investigation. As part of our response to the NTSB safety recommendation, TAI volunteered to update all Airplane Flight Manuals and/or Pilot Checklists related to the Models listed on Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) A22CE, to create textual harmonization across variants in relation to releasing the parking brake, if set, prior to take-off. Please note that TCDS A22CE includes the Model 550.

Investigation	AO-2018-025 Runway excursion and collision with terrain involving Van's RV-6A, VH-OAJ, Somersby, New South Wales, on 18 March 2018
Safety issue	The Civil Aviation Advisory Publication for Aeroplane Landing Areas (921(1)) did not have guidance for the inclusion of a safe runway overrun area.
Number	AO-2018-025-SR-012
Organisation	CASA
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends CASA include guidance for the inclusion of a safe runway overrun area in their regulatory guidance for Aeroplane Landing Areas.
Released	22 October 2019
Final action date	28 August 2023
Final action	On 28 August 2023, CASA provided the following in response to the ATSB's question dated 25 August 2023: 1. The applicability of Annex 14 Vol I is based on Articles 15 and 68 of the Convention, which is intended for international operations. Contracting States should adopt these for domestic aerodromes if appropriate: Annex 14 Vol I 1.2.2 The specifications, unless otherwise indicated in a particular context, shall apply to all aerodromes open to public use in accordance with the requirements of Article 15 of the Convention. The specifications of Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 3, shall apply only to land aerodromes. The specifications in this volume shall apply, where appropriate, to heliports but shall not apply to stolports. Article 15 of Doc 7300 Every airport in a contracting State which is open to public use by its national aircraft shall likewise, subject to the provisions of Article 68, be open under uniform conditions to the aircraft of all other contracting States. The like uniform conditions shall apply to the use, by aircraft of every contracting state, of all air navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological services, which may be provided for public use for the safety and expedition of air navigation. [Article 15 continues with charges information ....] Article 68 of Doc 7300 Each contracting State may, subject to the provisions of this Convention, designate the route to be followed within its territory by any international air service and the airports which any such service may use. 2. A Recommended Practice is not mandatory but is desirable, if in the interests of safety. 3. ICAO does not require or expect States to apply the international provisions of the Annexes to aerodromes that do not hold an aerodrome certificate issued by a Contracting State.
Investigation	**AO-2022-058 Aircraft preparation event involving Saab 340B, VH-ZLJ, Cairns, Queensland, on 16 November 2022**
Safety issue	There were no formal procedures for the storage and accountability of horizontal stabiliser bungs after they were removed from the aircraft.
Number	AO-2022-058-SR-23
Organisation	Regional Express Pty Ltd
Recommendation	The ATSB recommended that Regional Express Pty Ltd continue reviewing the use of horizontal stabiliser bungs and take action to address the limitations associated with the current procedures around the storage and accountability of equipment removed from an aircraft.
Released	26 October 2023
Final action date	22 January 2024

Final action	While Rex accepts the safety recommendations in part, it is our contention that these recommendations do not comprehensively address the primary safety concern related to the initiation of a take-off roll with bird bungs installed. Specifically, Rex is focused on mitigating the risk associated with an aircraft commencing a take-off roll with bird bungs installed. With this focus, Rex has undertaken a thorough review in response to the safety recommendations, evaluating the risk profile linked to bird nesting at the 3 airports – Cairns, Townsville, and Mt. Isa – where bird bungs were previously in operation. This comprehensive review aimed to assess the feasibility of implementing additional risk controls to minimise the likelihood of unidentified nesting occurrences at these locations. Additional risk controls include, but are not limited to: » engineering support at applicable ports in the event that nests are identified » introduction of a specific Maintenance Item (visual inspection) by engineers at each LC2 inspection (every 8 days) to identify and clear any Foreign Object Damage (FOD), including nesting material, from the elevator alcove area. Following this review, the decision has been made to decommission the bird bungs in all 3 ports. This determination is fully endorsed by the Rex Safety Management Group and the Rex Board Safety and Risk Committee. It is noteworthy that the practical testing of elevator movement with bird bungs installed was not conducted (to our knowledge) by the ATSB as part of their investigation. Rex has consulted SAAB in conjunction with carrying out appropriate testing, results of which further support the outcome of the internal review.
Investigation	**AO-2022-058 Aircraft preparation event involving Saab 340B, VH-ZLJ, Cairns, Queensland, on 16 November 2022**
Safety issue	The design of the horizontal stabiliser bungs did not consider aspects that would ensure the identification of an installed bung, or the safe operation of the aircraft if the bungs were not removed prior to flight.
Number	AO-2022-058-SR-24
Organisation	Regional Express Pty Ltd
Recommendation	The ATSB recommended that Regional Express Pty Ltd further review the horizontal stabiliser bungs design and pre-flight procedures to ensure that installed bungs are readily identifiable and will not adversely affect the continued safe operation of the aircraft if not removed prior to flight.
Released	26 October 2023
Final action date	22 January 2024
Final action	While Rex accepts the safety recommendations in part, it is our contention that these recommendations do not comprehensively address the primary safety concern related to the initiation of a take-off roll with bird bungs installed. Specifically, Rex is focused on mitigating the risk associated with an aircraft commencing a take-off roll with bird bungs installed. With this focus, Rex has undertaken a thorough review in response to the safety recommendations, evaluating the risk profile linked to bird nesting at the 3 airports – Cairns, Townsville, and Mt. Isa – where bird bungs were previously in operation. This comprehensive review aimed to assess the feasibility of implementing additional risk controls to minimise the likelihood of unidentified nesting occurrences at these locations. Additional risk controls include, but are not limited to: » engineering support at applicable ports in the event that nests are identified » introduction of a specific Maintenance Item (visual inspection) by engineers at each LC2 inspection (every 8 days) to identify and clear any FOD, including nesting material, from the elevator alcove area. Following this review, the decision has been made to decommission the bird bungs in all 3 ports. This determination is fully endorsed by the Rex Safety Management Group and the Rex Board Safety and Risk Committee. It is noteworthy that the practical testing of elevator movement with bird bungs installed was not conducted (to our knowledge) by the ATSB as part of their investigation. Rex has consulted SAAB in conjunction with carrying out appropriate testing, results of which further support the outcome of the internal review.

Investigation	AO-2020-007 Collision with terrain involving Lockheed Martin EC130Q, N134CG, 50 km north-east of Cooma-Snowy Mountains Airport (near Peak View), New South Wales, on 23 January 2020
Safety issue	Coulson Aviation fleet of C-130 aircraft were not fitted with a windshear detection system, which increased the risk of a windshear encounter and/or delayed response to a windshear encounter during low-level operations.
Number	AO-2020-007-SR-11
Organisation	Coulson Aviation
Recommendation	The ATSB recommended that Coulson Aviation further consider the fitment of a windshear detection system to their C-130 aircraft to minimise the time taken for crews to recognise and respond to an encounter particularly when operating at low level and low speed.
Released	29 August 2022
Final action date	10 July 2023
Final action	The ATSB was initially advised by the original aircraft manufacturer (Lockheed) that windshear warning systems were available for retrofitting to C-130H aircraft. However, Coulson Aviation has indicated they are not aware of a commercially available system that can be retrofitted to the aircraft in their fire-fighting configuration.
Investigation	**AO-2020-007 Collision with terrain involving Lockheed Martin EC130Q, N134CG, 50 km north-east of Cooma-Snowy Mountains Airport (near Peak View), New South Wales, on 23 January 2020**
Safety issue	Coulson Aviation did not provide a pre-flight risk assessment for their firefighting large air tanker crews. This would provide predefined criteria to ensure consistent and objective decision-making with accepting or rejecting tasks, including factors relating to crew, environment, aircraft and external pressures.
Number	AO-2020-007-SR-12
Organisation	Coulson Aviation
Recommendation	The ATSB recommended that Coulson Aviation take further action to incorporate foreseeable external factors into their pre-flight assessment tool to ensure the overall risk profile of a tasking can be consistently assessed by crews.
Released	29 August 2022
Final action date	10 July 2023
Final action	The ATSB acknowledges that not all factors that lead to a task rejection necessarily increase risk for other aircraft. However, it was noted that the New South Wales Rural Fire Service (NSW RFS) introduced task rejection procedures that now require the rationale for a rejection to be communicated to other aircraft operating in the affected area. It was confirmed by the ATSB in January 2023 that Coulson Aviation were aware of the changes implemented by the NSW RFS, and that the reason for a task rejection will be communicated. Coulson Aviation considered that rejections due to weather was not a factor that could be assigned a specific risk value. However, the consideration of such a foreseeable external factor would ensure it is assessed in combination with any other indicators in a tool that would show the cumulative effects of these factors. This would allow crews to make a more informed decision on the risk profile of the flight. This is particularly important when it is related to adverse weather, which is a known high-risk factor.

Marine

No marine safety recommendations closed in 2023–24.

Rail

Table 11: Rail – safety recommendations closed in 2023–24

Investigation	RO-2019-003 Derailment of freight train 6BM9 at Creighton, Victoria, on 21 January 2019
Safety issue	The ARTC systems for managing track lateral stability did not lead to the location being managed as a location potentially vulnerable to instability.
Number	RO-2019-003-SR-015
Organisation	ARTC
Recommendation	The ATSB recommended that the Australian Rail Track Corporation review its processes and criteria for identifying and managing track locations vulnerable to lateral instability, considering the findings of this investigation report.
Released	30 December 2020
Final action date	23 February 2024
Final action	The ARTC response does not address the systemic issue of why this location was not identified as a location vulnerable to instability. The safety issue has not been addressed.

Safety recommendations released in 2023–24

Aviation

Table 12: Aviation – safety recommendations released in 2023–24

Investigation	AO-2022-016 VFR into IMC, loss of control and collision with terrain involving Airbus Helicopters EC130 T2, VH-XWD, near Mount Disappointment, Victoria, on 31 March 2022
Safety issue	The CASA Part 133 (air transport – rotorcraft) exposition requirements did not adequately address the risk to passenger safety from a VFR inadvertent IMC event.
Number	AO-2022-016-SR-25
Organisation	CASA
Recommendation	The ATSB recommended that CASA take safety action to further address the risk to rotorcraft air transport (Part 133) passenger safety from a VFR inadvertent IMC event.
Released	11 January 2024
Investigation	**AO-2022-058 Aircraft preparation event involving Saab 340B, VH-ZLJ, Cairns, Queensland, on 16 November 2022**
Safety issue	There were no formal procedures for the storage and accountability of horizontal stabiliser bungs after they were removed from the aircraft.
Number	AO-2022-058-SR-23
Organisation	Regional Express Pty Ltd
Recommendation	The ATSB recommended that Regional Express Pty Ltd continue reviewing the use of horizontal stabiliser bungs and take action to address the limitations associated with the current procedures around the storage and accountability of equipment removed from an aircraft.
Released	26 October 2023
Investigation	**AO-2022-058 Aircraft preparation event involving Saab 340B, VH-ZLJ, Cairns, Queensland, on 16 November 2022**
Safety issue	The design of the horizontal stabiliser bungs did not consider aspects that would ensure the identification of an installed bung, or the safe operation of the aircraft if the bungs were not removed prior to flight.
Number	AO-2022-058-SR-24
Organisation	Regional Express Pty Ltd
Recommendation	The ATSB recommended that Regional Express Pty Ltd further review the horizontal stabiliser bungs design and pre-flight procedures to ensure that installed bungs are readily identifiable and will not adversely affect the continued safe operation of the aircraft if not removed prior to flight.
Released	26 October 2023

Marine

No marine safety recommendations released in 2023–24.

Rail

No rail safety recommendations released in 2023–24.

Safety advisory notices released in 2023–24

Aviation

Table 13: Aviation – safety advisory notices released in 2023–24

Investigation	AO-2023-001 Mid-air collision involving Eurocopter EC130B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130B4, VH-XKQ, near Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023
Safety issue	N/A
Number	AO-2023-001-SAN-01
Organisation	Lifejacket manufacturers
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB encourages manufacturers of constant wear lifejackets to provide operating instructions and/or guidance material to operators of aircraft on how to wear and use a constant wear lifejacket with a seatbelt (of any configuration) such that it does not interfere with the performance of the seatbelt during an accident. Further, the ATSB encourages certification authorities to modify lifejacket standards to include the requirement for instructions on how to wear constant wear lifejackets while seated and wearing a seatbelt.
Released	20 September 2023
Investigation	**AD-2022-001 Downwash incidents at hospital helicopter landing sites**
Safety issue	N/A
Number	AD-2022-001-SAN-01
Organisation	To helicopter medical transport operators and hospital helicopter landing site operators
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB strongly encourages operators of hospital helicopter landing sites, and helicopter medical transport operators using those landing sites, work together to review the adequacy of existing risk controls to ensure pedestrians are adequately protected from the increased rotor wash associated with larger helicopters.
Released	27 September 2023
Investigation	**AO-2022-038 Engine failure or malfunction involving a Robinson R22 Beta, registered VH-NKV that occurred 90 km north-east of Karumba, Queensland, on 6 August 2022**
Safety issue	N/A
Number	AO-2022-038-SAN-01
Organisation	To Robinson R22 and R44 maintainers, operators and pilots
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB strongly encourages maintainers, operators and pilots of Robinson R22 and R44 helicopters fitted with Lycoming O-320, O-360 and O-540 series engines to complete a Lycoming cylinder durability investigation group defect report form 1529 any time engine cylinder issues are identified.
Released	23 February 2024

Investigation	AO-2023-051 Loss of control and in-flight break-up involving Robinson R66, VH-KFT near Hawks Nest, New South Wales, on 26 October 2023
Safety issue	N/A
Number	AO-2023-051-SAN-01
Organisation	Robinson helicopter pilots and operators
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB advises all operators of Robinson helicopters to be aware of the possibility of mechanical turbulence and avoid it whenever possible. If it is not possible to avoid flying through an area where mechanical turbulence is anticipated, reduce airspeed to 60–70 kt in accordance with Robinson Safety Notice 32, prior to encountering turbulence.
Released	28 March 2024
Investigation	**AO-2022-049 In-flight fire and collision with terrain involving Mooney M20J, registration VH-UDQ, near Luskintyre Airfield, New South Wales, on 17 October 2022**
Safety issue	N/A
Number	AO-2022-049-SAN-02
Organisation	To registered operators and maintenance organisations of piston engine aircraft
Safety advisory notice	A proactive approach to replacing O-ring seals before they deteriorate to the point of failure, may avoid fluid leakage that on this occasion led to an in-flight, fuel-fed, engine compartment fire. The ATSB advises aircraft owners, registered operators and maintenance personnel to consider replacement of the O-ring seals of fluid carrying components, when examination of aircraft records identify components that have remained undisturbed for significant periods of time. Advisory material published by CASA differentiates between 'on-condition' and 'fit-until-failure' maintenance principles (Airworthiness Bulletin AWB 02-1), however, O-ring seals may not be specifically identified as a sub-set of elastomer type products requiring periodic attention for potential loss of function (AWB 85-004).
Released	7 May 2024

Marine

No marine safety advisory notices released in 2023–24.

Rail

No rail safety advisory notices released in 2023–24.

Section 6 – Financial Statements

Australian Government

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Financial Statements 2023-24

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

CONTENTS

INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT

To the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government

Opinion

In my opinion, the financial statements of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (the Entity) for the year ended 30 June 2024:

(a) comply with Australian Accounting Standards – Simplified Disclosures and the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability (Financial Reporting) Rule 2015*; and

(b) present fairly the financial position of the Entity as at 30 June 2024 and its financial performance and cash flows for the year then ended.

The financial statements of the Entity, which I have audited, comprise the following as at 30 June 2024 and for the year then ended:

- Statement by the Chief Commissioner and Chief Financial Officer;
- Statement of Comprehensive Income;
- Statement of Financial Position;
- Statement of Changes in Equity;
- Cash Flow Statement; and
- Notes to the Financial Statements, comprising material accounting policy information and other explanatory information.

Basis for opinion

I conducted my audit in accordance with the Australian National Audit Office Auditing Standards, which incorporate the Australian Auditing Standards. My responsibilities under those standards are further described in the *Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Financial Statements* section of my report. I am independent of the Entity in accordance with the relevant ethical requirements for financial statement audits conducted by the Auditor-General and their delegates. These include the relevant independence requirements of the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board's APES 110 *Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (including Independence Standards)* (the Code) to the extent that they are not in conflict with the *Auditor-General Act 1997*. I have also fulfilled my other responsibilities in accordance with the Code. I believe that the audit evidence I have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for my opinion.

Accountable Authority's responsibility for the financial statements

As the Accountable Authority of the Entity, the Chief Commissioner is responsible under the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (the Act) for the preparation and fair presentation of annual financial statements that comply with Australian Accounting Standards – Simplified Disclosures and the rules made under the Act. The Chief Commissioner is also responsible for such internal control as the Chief Commissioner determines is necessary to enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

In preparing the financial statements, the Chief Commissioner is responsible for assessing the ability of the Entity to continue as a going concern, taking into account whether the Entity's operations will cease as a result of an administrative restructure or for any other reason. The Chief Commissioner is also responsible for disclosing, as applicable, matters related to going concern and using the going concern basis of accounting, unless the assessment indicates that it is not appropriate.

GPO Box 707, Canberra ACT 2601
38 Sydney Avenue, Forrest ACT 2603
Phone (02) 6203 7300

Auditor's responsibilities for the audit of the financial statements

My objective is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, and to issue an auditor's report that includes my opinion. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an audit conducted in accordance with the Australian National Audit Office Auditing Standards will always detect a material misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can arise from fraud or error and are considered material if, individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements.

As part of an audit in accordance with the Australian National Audit Office Auditing Standards, I exercise professional judgement and maintain professional scepticism throughout the audit. I also:

- identify and assess the risks of material misstatement of the financial statements, whether due to fraud or error, design and perform audit procedures responsive to those risks, and obtain audit evidence that is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for my opinion. The risk of not detecting a material misstatement resulting from fraud is higher than for one resulting from error, as fraud may involve collusion, forgery, intentional omissions, misrepresentations, or the override of internal control;
- obtain an understanding of internal control relevant to the audit in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the Entity's internal control;
- evaluate the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of accounting estimates and related disclosures made by the Accountable Authority;
- conclude on the appropriateness of the Accountable Authority's use of the going concern basis of accounting and, based on the audit evidence obtained, whether a material uncertainty exists related to events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the Entity's ability to continue as a going concern. If I conclude that a material uncertainty exists, I am required to draw attention in my auditor's report to the related disclosures in the financial statements or, if such disclosures are inadequate, to modify my opinion. My conclusions are based on the audit evidence obtained up to the date of my auditor's report. However, future events or conditions may cause the Entity to cease to continue as a going concern; and
- evaluate the overall presentation, structure and content of the financial statements, including the disclosures, and whether the financial statements represent the underlying transactions and events in a manner that achieves fair presentation.

I communicate with the Accountable Authority regarding, among other matters, the planned scope and timing of the audit and significant audit findings, including any significant deficiencies in internal control that I identify during my audit.

Australian National Audit Office

Rahul Tejani
Executive Director
Delegate of the Auditor-General

Canberra
14 October 2024

STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

In our opinion, the attached financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2024 comply with subsection 42(2) of *the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act), and are based on properly maintained financial records as per subsection 41(2) of the PGPA Act.

In our opinion, at the date of this statement, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau will be able to pay its debts as and when they fall due.



Angus Mitchell
Chief Commissioner
11 October 2024



Krishna Kumar
Chief Financial Officer
11 October 2024

Statement of Comprehensive Income

for the period ended 30 June 2024

	Notes	2024 $'000	2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
NET COST OF SERVICES				
Expenses				
Employee benefits	1.1A	**18,673**	16,845	19,653
Suppliers	1.1B	**9,666**	8,093	9,265
Depreciation and amortisation	2.2A	**2,829**	2,536	2,372
Finance costs	1.1C	**70**	79	36
Write-down and impairment of other assets	1.1D	**10**	21	-
Total expenses		**31,248**	27,574	31,326
Own-source income				
Revenue from contracts with customers	1.2A	**1,438**	1,271	1,469
Other revenue	1.2B	**3,243**	2,743	3,732
Total own-source revenue		**4,681**	4,014	5,201
Gains				
Other gains	1.2C	**8**	9	-
Total gains		**8**	9	-
Total own-source income		**4,689**	4,023	5,201
Net cost of services		**(26,559)**	(23,551)	(26,125)
Revenue from government	1.2D	**25,270**	20,710	25,270
(Deficit) before income tax on continuing operations		**(1,289)**	(2,841)	(855)
(Deficit) from continuing operations		**(1,289)**	(2,841)	(855)
OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME				
Items not subject to subsequent reclassification to net cost of services				
Changes in asset revaluation surplus		**-**	632	-
Total comprehensive (loss)		**(1,289)**	(2,209)	(855)

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.
The budget variances commentary has been included before the overview and notes.

Statement of Financial Position

as at 30 June 2024

	Notes	2024 $'000	2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
ASSETS				
Financial assets				
Cash and cash equivalents	2.1A	**386**	240	348
Trade and other receivables	2.1B	**13,704**	7,996	7,557
Accrued revenue		**-**	9	12
Total financial assets		**14,090**	8,245	7,917
Non-financial assets[1]				
Buildings	2.2A	**6,520**	7,690	6,726
Heritage and cultural	2.2A	**16**	16	16
Plant and equipment	2.2A	**2,853**	3,278	2,363
Computer software	2.2A	**1,741**	2,469	2,983
Prepayments		**636**	593	575
Total non-financial assets		**11,766**	14,046	12,663
Total assets		**25,856**	22,291	20,580
LIABILITIES				
Payables				
Suppliers	2.3A	**505**	482	335
Other payables	2.3B	**4,207**	501	57
Total payables		**4,712**	983	392
Interest bearing liabilities				
Leases	2.4A	**7,085**	8,130	6,906
Total interest bearing liabilities		**7,085**	8,130	6,906
Provisions				
Employee provisions	4.1A	**6,160**	5,361	5,167
Total provisions		**6,160**	5,361	5,167
Total liabilities		**17,957**	14,474	12,465
Net assets		**7,899**	7,817	8,115
EQUITY				
Contributed equity		**7,470**	6,099	7,470
Reserves		**1,146**	1,146	514
Retained surplus		**(717)**	572	131
Total equity		**7,899**	7,817	8,115

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

[1] Right-of-use assets are included in the buildings and plant and equipment asset categories.

Cash Flow Statement

for the period ended 30 June 2024

	Notes	2024 $'000	2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
OPERATING ACTIVITIES				
Cash received				
Appropriations		**24,218**	21,159	25,270
Sale of goods and rendering of services		**5,198**	1,433	1,469
Net GST received		**637**	670	-
Other		**269**	163	-
Total cash received		**30,322**	23,425	26,739
Cash used				
Employees		**17,840**	16,157	19,653
Suppliers		**7,211**	6,008	5,533
Interest payments on lease liabilities		**70**	79	36
Other		**3,934**	176	-
Total cash used		**29,055**	22,420	25,222
Net cash from operating activities		**1,267**	1,005	1,517
INVESTING ACTIVITIES				
Cash received				
Proceeds from sales of property, plant and equipment		**-**	-	-
Total cash received		**-**	-	-
Cash used				
Purchase of property, plant and equipment		**425**	400	1,371
Purchase of computer software		**31**	727	-
Total cash used		**456**	1,127	1,371
Net cash used by investing activities		**(456)**	(1,127)	(1,371)
FINANCING ACTIVITIES				
Cash received				
Contributed Equity		**437**	1,127	1,371
Total cash received		**437**	1,127	1,371
Cash used				
Principal payments of lease liabilities		**1,102**	1,113	1,517
Total cash used		**1,102**	1,113	1,517
Net cash from/(used by) financing activities		**(665)**	14	(146)
Net increase/(decrease) in cash held		**146**	(108)	-
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the reporting period		**240**	348	348
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the reporting period	2.1A	**386**	240	348

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

Statement of Changes in Equity

for the period ended 30 June 2024

	Notes	2024 $'000	2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
CONTRIBUTED EQUITY				
Opening balance as at 1 July				
Balance carried forward from previous period		**6,099**	5,517	6,099
Transactions with owners				
Contributions by owners				
Departmental capital budget		**1,371**	582	1,371
Total transactions with owners		**1,371**	582	1,371
Closing balance as at 30 June		**7,470**	6,099	7,470
RETAINED EARNINGS				
Opening balance as at 1 July				
Balance carried forward from previous period		**572**	3,413	986
Adjusted opening balance		**572**	3,413	986
Comprehensive income				
Deficit for the period		**(1,289)**	(2,841)	(855)
Total comprehensive income		**(1,289)**	(2,841)	(855)
Closing balance as at 30 June		**(717)**	572	131
ASSET REVALUATION RESERVE				
Opening balance as at 1 July				
Balance carried forward from previous period		**1,146**	514	514
Closing balance as at 30 June		**1,146**	514	514
Comprehensive income				
Other comprehensive income		**-**	632	-
Total comprehensive income		**-**	632	-
Closing balance as at 30 June		**1,146**	1,146	514
Total Equity as at 30 June		**7,899**	7,817	8,115

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

Budget Variances Commentary

The explanations provide a comparison of the original budget as presented in the 2023-24 Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) to the 2023-24 final outcome as presented in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). The Budget is not audited.

Variances are considered to be 'major' based on the following criteria:
- the variance between budget and actual is greater than 10%: and
- the variance between budget and actual is greater than 2% of total expenses or total own-source revenues: or
- the variance between budget and actual is below this threshold but is considered important for the reader's understanding or is relevant to an assessment of the discharge of accountability and to an analysis of performance of the agency.

In some instances, a budget has not been provided for in the PBS, for example, non-cash items such as asset revaluations and sale of assets adjustments. Unless the variance is considered to be 'major' no explanation has been provided.

Explanations of major variances	Affected line items (and statement)
Expenses The variance between the budget and 2023-24 actual is mainly related to the underspend in staffing due to recruitment delays and a slight overspend in IT related supplier costs.	**Statement of Comprehensive Income** Expenses - Suppliers Expenses - Employee benefits
Income A decrease in funding received in relation to the ATSB's international projects occurred after the original budget was set.	**Statement of Comprehensive Income** Own-source revenue - Revenue from contracts with customers
Financial Assets The variance between the budget and 2023-24 actual is mainly related to the additional receivables from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) for the Pacific Program which was not budgeted for and the delays in improvement to Core Enterprise Management System.	**Statement of Financial Position** Financial assets - Cash and cash equivalents Financial assets - Trade and other receivables
Non-Financial Assets The variance between the budget and 2023-24 actual is mainly related to the delays in improvement to the core enterprise management system.	**Statement of Financial Position** Non-financial assets - Plant and equipment Non-financial assets - Computer software

Budget Variances Commentary (continued)

Explanations of major variances	Affected line items (and statement)
Payables The variance between the budget and the 2023-24 actual is mainly attributable to higher than expected other payables compared to the original budget and due to unspent amount received from DFAT as part of the Pacific Program.	**Statement of Financial Position** Payables - Other payables
Statement of Changes in Equity Total equity is less than projected in the budget mainly due to the differences between the actual and budgeted operating result, with the larger variance identified above. This reduction is offset by prior year revaluation reserve.	**Statement of Changes in Equity**
Cash Flow Statement Variances in the Cash Flow Statement are broadly consistent with the variances explained above for income and expenses.	**Cash Flow Statement**

Overview

The ATSB is an Australian Government controlled not-for-profit entity. The objective of the entity is to improve transport safety in Australia through: independent 'no blame' investigation of transport safety accidents and other safety occurrences; safety data recording, analysis and research; and fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action. ATSB's central office is located at 12, Moore Street, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory. It has field offices in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth.

The Basis of Preparation

The Financial Statements are required by:

a) section 42 of the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013*

The financial statements have been prepared in accordance with:

a) *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability (Financial Reporting) Rule 2015* (FRR); and

b) Australian Accounting Standards and Interpretations – including simplified disclosures for Tier 2 Entities under AASB 1060 issued by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) that apply for the reporting period.

The financial statements have been prepared on an accrual basis and in accordance with the historical cost convention, except for certain assets and liabilities at fair value. Except where stated, no allowance is made for the effect of changing prices on the results or the financial position. The financial statements are presented in Australian dollars.

New Accounting Standards

There was no new accounting standard that was issued prior to the signing of the statement by the Chief Commisioner and Chief Financial Officer, was applicable to the current reporting period and did not have a material effect on the ATSB's financial statements:

Taxation

The entity is exempt from all forms of taxation except Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) and the Goods and Services Tax (GST).

Events After the Reporting Period

There were no events subsequent to 30 June 2024 that had the potential to significantly affect the ongoing structure and financial activities of the ATSB.

Note 1 - Financial Performance

This section analyses the financial performance of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau for the year ended 30 June 2024

1.1 Expenses

	2024 $'000	2023 $'000
1.1A: Employee benefits		
Wages and salaries	**14,011**	12,607
Superannuation		
Defined contribution plans	**1,703**	1,538
Defined benefit plans	**702**	696
Leave and other entitlements	**2,045**	1,701
Separation and redundancies	**-**	84
Other employee expenses	**212**	219
Total employee benefits	**18,673**	16,845

Accounting Policy
Accounting policies for employee related expenses is contained in the People and Relationships section.

1.1B: Suppliers		
Goods and services supplied or rendered		
Investigation services	**3,279**	2,797
Information technology	**3,068**	2,824
Other property services	**456**	327
Contracted services	**431**	146
Travel	**743**	662
Training and conferences	**317**	166
Communications	**179**	180
Audit fees	**158**	144
Office rent - short term leases	**82**	37
Publications and printing	**24**	14
Consultants	**307**	220
Legal	**70**	96
Other	**413**	385
Total goods and services supplied or rendered	**9,527**	7,998
Goods supplied	**1,077**	757
Services rendered	**8,450**	7,241
Total goods and services supplied or rendered	**9,527**	7,998
Other suppliers		
Workers compensation expenses	**139**	95
Total other suppliers	**139**	95
Total suppliers	**9,666**	8,093

The above lease disclosures should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes 1.1C, 1.2C, 2.2A, 2.4A and 3.2.

1.1 Expenses (continued)

Accounting Policy

Short-term leases and leases of low-value assets

The ATSB has elected not to recognise right-of-use assets and lease liabilities for short-term leases of assets that have a lease term of 12 months or less and leases of low-value assets (less than $10,000). The ATSB recognises the lease payments associated with these leases as an expense on a straight-line basis over the lease term.

	2024	2023
	$'000	$'000
1.1C: Finance costs		
Interest on lease liabilities	**70**	79
Total finance costs	**70**	79

The above lease disclosures should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes 1.1B, 1.2C, 2.2A, 2.4A and 3.2.

Accounting Policy

All borrowing costs are expensed as incurred.

1.1D: Write-down and impairment of other assets

Impairment on intangible or tangible assets	**10**	21
Total write-down and impairment of other assets	**10**	21

1.2 Own-Source Revenue and Gains

	2024	2023
	$'000	$'000

Own-Source Revenue

1.2A: Revenue from contracts with customers

Rendering of services	**1,438**	1,271
Total revenue from contracts with customers	**1,438**	1,271

Accounting Policy

Revenue from the sale of goods is recognised when control has been transferred to the buyer.

AASB 15 *Revenue from Contracts with Customers* has been applied to all new and uncompleted contracts from the date of initial application.

The following is a description of principal activities from which the ATSB generates its revenue:

- Government appropriations
- International programmes of work
- Cost recovery rail investigations

The ATSB's revenue in relation to its international programmes and cost recovery activities are agreement based and within scope for AASB 15. There are separate agreements, with separate terms, based on performance over time obligations and point in time obligations.

The transaction price is the total amount of consideration to which the ATSB expects to be entitled in exchange for transferring promised goods or services to a customer. The consideration promised in a contract with a customer may include fixed amounts, variable amounts, or both.

Receivables for goods and services, which have 30 day terms, are recognised at the nominal amounts due less any impairment allowance account. Collectability of debts is reviewed at end of the reporting period.

1.2B: Other revenue

Resources received free of charge		
Remuneration of auditors[1]	**54**	51
Investigation Services	**3,189**	2,692
Total other revenue	**3,243**	2,743

[1] The ANAO does not provide any other services to ATSB.

Accounting Policy

Resources Received Free of Charge

Resources received free of charge are recognised as revenue when, and only when, a fair value can be reliably determined and the services would have been purchased if they had not been donated. Use of those resources is recognised as an expense. Resources received free of charge are recorded as either revenue or gains depending on their nature.

1.2 Own-Source Revenue and gains (continued)

	2024 $'000	2023 $'000
Gains		
1.2C: Other gains		
Gain from sale of leased assets	-	9
Gain from sale of assets	8	-
Total other gains	8	9

Accounting Policy
Sale of Assets
Gains from disposal of assets are recognised when control of the asset has passed to the buyer.

1.2D: Revenue from Government		
Departmental appropriations	25,270	20,710
Total revenue from Government	25,270	20,710

Accounting Policy
Revenue from Government
Amounts appropriated for departmental appropriations for the year (adjusted for any formal additions and reductions) are recognised as Revenue from Government when the ATSB gains control of the appropriation, except for certain amounts relating to activities that are reciprocal in nature, in which case revenue is recognised only when it has been earned. Appropriations receivable are recognised at their nominal amounts.

Note 2 - Financial Position

This section analyses the Australian Transport Safety Bureau's assets used to conduct its operations and the operating liabilities incurred as a result.

2.1 Financial Assets

	2024 $'000	2023 $'000
2.1A: Cash and cash equivalents		
Cash on hand or on deposit	**386**	240
Total cash and cash equivalents	**386**	240

Accounting Policy

Cash is recognised at its nominal amount. Cash and cash equivalents includes:

a) cash on hand; and

b) demand deposits in bank accounts with an original maturity of 3 months or less that are readily convertible to known amounts of cash and subject to insignificant risk of changes in value.

2.1B: Trade and other receivables		
Goods and services receivables		
Goods and services	**58**	24
Total goods and services receivables	**58**	24
Appropriations receivables		
Appropriation receivable	**13,572**	7,917
Total appropriations receivables	**13,572**	7,917
Other receivables		
Statutory receivables	**74**	55
Total other receivables	**74**	55
Total trade and other receivables (gross)	**13,704**	7,996
Total trade and other receivables (net)	**13,704**	7,996

Trade and other receivables have been assessed for impairment and none was identified.

Goods and services receivable were assessed for expected credit loss. It was expected to be $0 (2023: $0)

Credit terms for goods and services were within 20 days (2023: 20 days)

Accounting Policy

Financial assets

Trade receivables and other receivables that are held for the purpose of collecting the contractual cash flows where the cash flows are solely payments of principal and interest, that are not provided at below-market interest rates, are subsequently measured at amortised cost using the effective interest method adjusted for any loss allowance.

2.2 Non-Financial Assets

2.2A: Reconciliation of the Opening and Closing Balances of Property, Plant and Equipment and Intangibles

Reconciliation of the opening and closing balances of property, plant and equipment for 2024

	Buildings	Heritage & Cultural	Plant & Equipment	Computer Software[1]	Total
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
As at 1 July 2023					
Gross book value	**10,452**	**16**	**3,283**	**4,219**	**17,970**
Accumulated depreciation, amortisation and impairment	**(2,762)**	**-**	**(5)**	**(1,750)**	**(4,517)**
Total as at 1 July 2023	**7,690**	**16**	**3,278**	**2,469**	**13,453**
Additions					
Purchase	**-**	**-**	**425**	**-**	**425**
Internally developed	**-**	**-**	**-**	**31**	**31**
Right-of-use assets [2]	**26**	**-**	**67**	**-**	**93**
Write-downs and Impairments recognised in net cost of services [3]	**-**	**-**	**(3)**	**(7)**	**(10)**
Depreciation and amortisation	**-**	**-**	**(869)**	**(752)**	**(1,621)**
Depreciation on right-of-use assets	**(1,196)**	**-**	**(12)**	**-**	**(1,208)**
Other movements of right-of-use assets	**-**	**-**	**(33)**	**-**	**(33)**
Total as at 30 June 2024	**6,520**	**16**	**2,853**	**1,741**	**11,130**

	Buildings	Heritage & Cultural	Plant and Equipment	Computer Software	Total
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
Total as at 30 June 2024 represented by					
Gross book value	**9,317**	**16**	**3,725**	**4,068**	**17,126**
Accumulated depreciation, amortisation and impairment	**(2,797)**	**-**	**(872)**	**(2,327)**	**(5,996)**
Total as at 30 June 2024	**6,520**	**16**	**2,853**	**1,741**	**11,130**
Carrying amount of right-of-use assets	**6,520**	**-**	**122**	**-**	**6,642**

[1] The carrying amount of computer software includes $1,730k internally generated and $10k purchased software.

[2] The carrying amount of buildings ROU assets excludes the value of new Brisbane office lease amounted to 3.16m. Though the Brisbane lease contract was signed during the financial year, the occupation has not commenced due to incompletion of fitout work.

[3] The ATSB Management ensured that the appropriate assessments were made for impairment, useful lives and the valuation of non-financial assets at 30 June 2024.

The above lease disclosures should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes 1.1B, 1.1C, 1.2C, 2.4A and 3.2.

Revaluation of non-financial assets

All revaluations were conducted in accordance with the revaluation policy stated at Note 5.3. The ATSB previously engaged CBRE Pty Ltd to undertake a revaluation of all Plant and Equipment and Computer Equipment assets with effect at 30 June 2023.

Accounting Policy

Assets are recorded at cost on acquisition except as stated below. The cost of acquisition includes the fair value of assets transferred in exchange and liabilities undertaken. Financial assets are initially measured at their fair value plus transaction costs where appropriate.

Assets acquired at no cost, or for nominal consideration, are initially recognised as assets and income at their fair value at the date of acquisition, unless acquired as a consequence of restructuring of administrative arrangements. In the latter case, assets are initially recognised as contributions by owners at the amounts at which they were recognised in the transferor's accounts immediately prior to the restructuring.

Asset Recognition Threshold

Purchases of property, plant and equipment are recognised initially at cost in the statement of financial position, except for purchases costing less than $5,000 excluding GST, which are expensed in the year of acquisition (other than where they form part of a group of similar items which are significant in total).

Leased Right of Use (ROU) Assets

Leased ROU assets are capitalised at the commencement date of the lease and comprise of the initial lease liability amount, initial direct costs incurred when entering into the lease less any lease incentives received. These assets are accounted for by Commonwealth lessees as separate asset classes to corresponding assets owned outright, but included in the same column as where the corresponding underlying assets would be presented if they were owned.

On initial adoption of AASB 16 the ATSB has adjusted the ROU assets at the date of initial application by the amount of any provision for onerous leases recognised immediately before the date of initial application. Following initial application, an impairment review is undertaken for any ROU lease asset that shows indicators of impairment and an impairment loss is recognised against any ROU asset that is impaired. Leased ROU assets continue to be measured at cost after initial recognition in Commonwealth agency, General Government Sector and Whole of Government financial statements.

Revaluations

Following initial recognition at cost, property, plant and equipment **(excluding ROU assets)** are carried at fair value (or an amount not materially different from fair value) less subsequent accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses. Valuations are conducted with sufficient frequency to ensure that the carrying amounts of assets did not differ materially from the assets' fair values as at the reporting date. The regularity of independent valuations depends upon the volatility of movements in market values for the relevant assets.

Revaluation adjustments are made on a class basis. Any revaluation increment is credited to equity under the heading of asset revaluation reserve except to the extent that it reversed a previous revaluation decrement of the same asset class that was previously recognised in the surplus/deficit. Revaluation decrements for a class of assets are recognised directly in the surplus/deficit except to the extent that they reversed a previous revaluation increment for that class.

Any accumulated depreciation as at the revaluation date is eliminated against the gross carrying amount of the asset and the asset restated to the revalued amount.

Depreciation

Depreciable property, plant and equipment assets are written-off to their estimated residual values over their estimated useful lives to the ATSB using, in all cases, the straight-line method of depreciation.

Depreciation rates (useful lives), residual values and methods are reviewed at each reporting date and necessary adjustments are recognised in the current, or current and future reporting periods, as appropriate.

Depreciation rates applying to each class of depreciable asset are based on the following useful lives:

	2024	2023
Plant & Equipment	3-10 years	3-10 years
Computer Equipment	4 years	4 years
Office Equipment	3-10 years	3-10 years
Heritage & Cultural	100 years	100 years

The ATSB has items of property, plant and equipment that are heritage and cultural assets that have limited useful lives and are depreciated.

The depreciation rates for ROU assets are based on the commencement date to the earlier of the end of the useful life of the ROU asset or the end of the lease term.

Impairment

All assets were assessed for impairment at 30 June 2024.

Where indications of impairment exist, the asset's recoverable amount is estimated and an impairment adjustment made if the asset's recoverable amount is less than its carrying amount.

The recoverable amount of an asset is the higher of its fair value less costs of disposal and its value in use. Value in use is the present value of the future cash flows expected to be derived from the asset. Where the future economic benefit of an asset is not primarily dependent on the asset's ability to generate future cash flows, and the asset would be replaced if the ATSB were deprived of the asset, its value in use is taken to be its depreciated replacement cost.

Derecognition

An item of property, plant and equipment is derecognised upon disposal or when no further future economic benefits are expected from its use or disposal.

Heritage and Cultural Assets

The ATSB has a Pegasus Mark II Propellor from a Supermarine Walrus aircraft. The Supermarine Walrus was a British single-engine amphibious biplane reconnaissance aircraft first flown in 1933.

The ATSB has classified this item as a heritage and cultural asset as its primary purpose relates to its heritage and cultural significance.

Intangibles

The ATSB's intangibles comprise of purchased software and internally developed software for internal use. These assets are carried at cost less accumulated amortisation and accumulated impairment losses.

Software is amortised on a straight-line basis over its anticipated useful life. The useful lives of the ATSB's softwares are five years.

All software assets were assessed for indications of impairment as at 30 June 2024.

2.3 Payables

	2024 $'000	2023 $'000
2.3A: Suppliers		
Trade creditors and accruals	**144**	241
Accrued expenses	**361**	241
Total suppliers	**505**	482
2.3B: Other payables		
Salaries and wages	**470**	430
Superannuation	**68**	71
Unearned income	**3,669**	-
Total other payables	**4,207**	501

Accounting Policy

Supplier and other payables are recognised at amortised cost. Liabilities are recognised to the extent that the goods or services have been received (irrespective of having been invoiced). Settlement is usually made within 20 days.

Parental Leave Payments Scheme

Amounts received under the Parental Leave Payments Scheme by the ATSB not yet paid to employees were presented gross as cash and a liability (payable). The total amount received under this scheme was $10,734 (2023: $4,875).

2.4 Interest Bearing Liabilities

	2024 $'000	2023 $'000
2.4A: Leases		
Lease Liabilities		
Buildings	**6,962**	8,030
Plant and equipment	**123**	100
Total leases	**7,085**	8,130
Maturity analysis - contractual undiscounted cash flows		
Within 1 year	**1,275**	1,165
Between 1 to 5 years	**5,020**	3,851
More than 5 years	**4,127**	3,334
Total leases [1]	**10,422**	8,350

The above lease disclosures should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes 1.1B, 1.1C, 1.2C, 2.2A and 3.2.

1 The total contractual undiscounted cash flows include the new Brisbane lease amounted to $3.16m signed during the financial year but not occupied due to incompletion of the fit out of the building.

The ATSB has applied AASB 16 for all leases except short term leases as described in Note 1.1 and the cash outflow for leases for the year ended 30 June 2024 was $1.172m (2023: $1.192m).

Accounting Policy

For all new contracts entered into, the ATSB considers whether the contract is, or contains a lease. A lease is defined as 'a contract, or part of a contract, that conveys the right to use an asset (the underlying asset) for a period of time in exchange for consideration'.

Once it has been determined that a contract is, or contains a lease, the lease liability is initially measured at the present value of the lease payments unpaid at the commencement date, discounted using the interest rate implicit in the lease, if that rate is readily determinable, or the department's incremental borrowing rate.

Subsequent to initial measurement, the liability will be reduced for payments made and increased for interest. It is remeasured to reflect any reassessment or modification to the lease. When the lease liability is remeasured, the corresponding adjustment is reflected in the right-of-use asset or profit and loss depending on the nature of the reassessment or modification.

Note 3 - Funding

This section identifies the Australian Transport Safety Bureau's funding structure.

3.1 Appropriations

3.1A: Annual appropriations ('recoverable GST exclusive')

Annual Appropriations for 2024

	Annual appropriation $'000	Adjustments to appropriation[1] $'000	Total appropriation $'000	Appropriation applied in 2024 (current and prior years) $'000	Variance[2] $'000
Departmental					
Ordinary annual services	**25,270**	**5,091**	**30,361**	**25,475**	**4,886**
Capital budget	**1,371**	**-**	**1,371**	**456**	**915**
Total departmental	**26,641**	**5,091**	**31,732**	**25,931**	**5,801**

[1] PGPA Act Section 74 receipts and also includes a funding amount of $3.669m received from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Pacific Program.

[2] The variance between appropriations and appropriations applied in 2023-24 is due to a combination of underspend on Pacific Program, overspends within supplier expenses, accrued supplier invoices and a delay with the finalisation of capital projects.

Annual Appropriations for 2023

	Annual appropriation $'000	Adjustments to appropriation[1] $'000	Total appropriation $'000	Appropriation applied in 2023 (current and prior years) $'000	Variance[2] $'000
Departmental					
Ordinary annual services	21,047	1,596	22,643	22,863	(220)
Capital Budget	582	-	582	1,127	(545)
Total departmental	21,629	1,596	23,225	23,990	(765)

[1] PGPA Act Section 74 receipts.

[2.] The variance between appropriations and appropriations applied in 2022-23 is due to a combination of underspends within supplier expenses, accrued supplier invoices and a delay with the finalisation of capital projects.

3.1B: Unspent annual appropriations ('recoverable GST exclusive')

	2024 $'000	2023 $'000
Departmental		
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2022-23	**-**	7,663
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2022-23 [1]	**-**	337
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2022-23 (DCB)	**-**	254
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2022-23 (Cash at Bank - 30 June)	**-**	240
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2023-24	**12,384**	**-**
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2023-24 (DCB)	**1,189**	-
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2023-24 (Cash at Bank - 30 June)	**386**	-
Total departmental	**13,959**	8,494

[1] An amount of $0.337m related to the savings initiative was quarantined under Section 51 during 2022-23.

3.2 Net Cash Appropriation Arrangements

	2024	2023
	$'000	$'000
Total comprehensive loss as per the Statement of Comprehensive Income	**(1,289)**	(2,209)
Plus: depreciation/amortisation expenses funded through Appropriations	**1,621**	1,272
Plus: depreciation of right-of-use assets	**1,208**	1,264
Less: principal repayments - leased assets	**(1,102)**	(1,113)
Net Cash Operating Surplus/(Deficit)	**438**	(786)
Changes in Asset Revaluation Reserve	**-**	(632)
Operating Surplus/(Deficit)	**438**	(1,418)

From 2010-11, the Government introduced net cash appropriation arrangements where revenue appropriations for depreciation/amortisation expenses ceased. Entities now receive a separate capital budget provided through equity appropriations. Capital budgets are to be appropriated in the period when cash payment for capital expenditure is required.

The inclusion of depreciation/amortisation expenses related to ROU leased assets and the lease liability principal repayment amount reflects the cash impact on implementation of AASB 16, it does not directly reflect a change in appropriation arrangements.

Note 4 - People and Relationship

This section describes a range of employment and post-employment benefits provided to our people and our relationships with other key people.

4.1 Employee Provisions

	2024 $'000	2023 $'000
4.1A: Employee provisions		
Leave	**6,160**	5,361
Total employee provisions	**6,160**	5,361

Accounting policy

Liabilities for 'short-term employee benefits' (as defined in AASB 119 *Employee Benefits*) and termination benefits expected within twelve months of the end of reporting period are measured at their nominal amounts.

Other long-term employee benefits are measured as net total of the present value of the defined benefit obligation at the end of the reporting period minus the fair value at the end of the reporting period of plan assets (if any) out of which the obligations are to be settled directly.

Leave

The liability for employee benefits includes provisions for annual leave and long service leave.
The leave liabilities are calculated on the basis of employees' remuneration at the estimated salary rates that will be applied at the time the leave is taken, including the entity's employer superannuation contribution rates to the extent that the leave is likely to be taken during service rather than paid out on termination.

The liability for long service leave has been determined by reference to the Australian Government Shorthand Method outlined in the FRR as at 30 June 2024. The estimate of the present value of the liability takes into account attrition rates and pay increases through promotion and inflation.

Separation and Redundancy

A provision is made for separation and redundancy benefit payments. The entity recognises a provision for termination when it has developed a detailed formal plan for the terminations and has informed those employees affected that it will carry out the terminations.

Superannuation

The ATSB's staff are members of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (CSS), the Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (PSS), the PSS accumulation plan (PSSap), or other superannuation funds held outside the Australian Government.

The CSS and PSS are defined benefit schemes for the Australian Government. The PSSap is a defined contribution scheme.

The liability for defined benefits is recognised in the financial statements of the Australian Government and is settled by the Australian Government in due course. This liability is reported in the Department of Finance's administered schedules and notes.

The ATSB makes employer contributions to the employees' defined benefit superannuation scheme at rates determined by an actuary to be sufficient to meet the current cost to the Government. The ATSB accounts for the contributions as if they were contributions to defined contribution plans.

4.2 Key Management Personnel Remuneration

Key management personnel (KMP) are those persons having authority and responsibility for planning, directing and controlling the activities of the ATSB, directly or indirectly, including any director (whether executive or otherwise) of that entity.

The ATSB has determined the KMP to be the Chief Commissioner and Chief Operating Officer who the Chief Commissioner considers to be KMP because of their responsibilities and the nature of their work. KMP is reported in the table below:

	2024	2023
	$'000	$'000
Short-term employee benefits	**752**	716
Post-employment benefits	**82**	78
Other long-term employee benefits	**18**	18
Total key management personnel remuneration expenses[1]	**852**	812

The total number of KMP that are included in the above table is 2 individuals (2023: 2 individuals).

1. The above key management personnel remuneration excludes the remuneration and other benefits of the Portfolio Minister. The Portfolio Minister's remuneration and other benefits are set by the Remuneration Tribunal and are not paid by the ATSB.

4.3 Related Party Disclosures

Related party relationships:

The ATSB is an Australian Government controlled entity. Related parties to this entity are KMP including the Portfolio Minister and Executive, their close family members, and other Australian Government entities.

Transactions with related parties:

Given the breadth of Government activities, related parties may transact with the government sector in the same capacity as ordinary citizens. Such transactions include the payment or refund of taxes, receipt of a Medicare rebate or higher education loans. These transactions have not been separately disclosed in this note.

Significant transactions with related parties can include:

- the payments of grants or loans;
- purchases of goods and services;
- asset purchases, sales transfers or leases;
- debts forgiven; and
- guarantees.

Giving consideration to relationships with related entities, and transactions entered into during the reporting period by the ATSB, it has been determined that there are no related party transactions to be separately disclosed (2023: Nil).

Note 5 - Managing Uncertainties

This section analyses how the Australian Transport Safety Bureau manages financial risks within its operating environment.

5.1 Contingent Assets and Liabilities

Quantifiable contingencies

At 30 June 2024, the ATSB had no quantifiable contingencies (2023: Nil).

Unquantifiable contingencies

At 30 June 2024, the ATSB had no unquantifiable contingencies (2023: Nil).

Accounting Policy

Contingent liabilities and contingent assets are not recognised in the statement of financial position but are reported in the notes. They may arise from uncertainty as to the existence of a liability or asset or represent an asset or liability in respect of which the amount cannot be reliably measured. Contingent assets are disclosed when settlement is probable but not virtually certain and contingent liabilities are disclosed when settlement is greater than remote.

5.2 Financial Instruments

	2024	2023
	$'000	$'000
5.2A: Categories of financial instruments		
Financial assets at amortised cost		
Cash and cash equivalents	**386**	240
Trade and other receivables	**58**	24
Total financial assets at amortised cost	**444**	264
Total financial assets	**444**	264
Financial liabilities		
Financial liabilities measured at amortised cost		
Trade creditors	**144**	241
Accrued expenses	**361**	241
Total financial liabilities measured at amortised cost	**505**	482
Total financial liabilities	**505**	482

5.2 Financial Instruments (continued)

Accounting Policy

Financial assets

In accordance with AASB 9 *Financial Instruments*, the ATSB classifies its financial assets in the following categories:

a) financial assets at fair value through profit or loss;
b) financial assets at fair value through other comprehensive income; and
c) financial assets measured at amortised cost.

The classification depends on both the ATSB's business model for managing the financial assets and contractual cash flow characteristics at the time of initial recognition. Financial assets are recognised when the ATSB becomes a party to the contract and, as a consequence, has a legal right to receive or a legal obligation to pay cash and derecognised when the contractual rights to the cash flows from the financial asset expire or are transferred upon trade date.

Financial Assets at Amortised Cost

Financial assets included in this category need to meet two criteria:

1. the financial asset is held in order to collect the contractual cash flows; and
2. the cash flows are solely payments of principal and interest (SPPI) on the principal outstanding amount.

Amortised cost is determined using the effective interest method.

Effective Interest Method

Income is recognised on an effective interest rate basis for financial assets that are recognised at amortised cost.

Impairment of Financial Assets

Financial assets are assessed for impairment at the end of each reporting period based on Expected Credit Losses, using the general approach which measures the loss allowance based on an amount equal to lifetime expected credit losses where risk has significantly increased, or an amount equal to 12-month expected credit losses if risk has not increased.

The simplified approach for trade, contract and lease receivables is used. This approach always measures the loss allowance as the amount equal to the lifetime expected credit losses.

A write-off constitutes a derecognition event where the write-off directly reduces the gross carrying amount of the financial asset.

Financial liabilities

Financial liabilities are classified as either financial liabilities 'at fair value through profit or loss' or other financial liabilities. Financial liabilities are recognised and derecognised upon 'trade date'.

Financial Liabilities at Amortised Cost

Financial liabilities, including borrowings, are initially measured at fair value, net of transaction costs. These liabilities are subsequently measured at amortised cost using the effective interest method, with interest expense recognised on an effective interest basis.

Supplier and other payables are recognised at amortised cost. Liabilities are recognised to the extent that the goods or services have been received (and irrespective of having been invoiced).

5.3 Fair Value Measurement

	2024	2023
	$'000	$'000
5.3 Fair value measurement		
Non-financial assets		
Heritage and cultural	**16**	16
Property, plant and equipment	**2,731**	3,180
	2,747	3,196

Accounting Policy
The ATSB has Heritage and Cultural, and Property, Plant and Equipment assets and the fair value for each asset is measured at market selling price, or depreciated replacement cost in isolated instances where no market prices or indicators are available for specialised, diagnostic equipment.

Following initial recognition at cost, property, plant and equipment are carried at fair value. Valuations are conducted with sufficient frequency to ensure that the carrying amounts of assets do not differ materially from the asset's fair value as at the reporting date. The regularity of independent valuations depends on the volatility of movements in market values for the relevant assets.

The ATSB previously engaged CBRE Pty Ltd to undertake a revaluation of all plant and equipment assets with effect at 30 June 2023 and confirm that the models developed comply with AASB 13 *Fair Value Measurement*.

Revaluation adjustments were made on a class basis. Any revaluation increment was credited to equity under the heading of asset revaluation reserve except to the extent that it reversed a previous revaluation decrement of the same asset class that was previously recognised in the surplus/deficit. Revaluation decrements for a class of assets were recognised directly in the surplus/deficit except to the extent that they reversed a previous revaluation increment for that class.

Any accumulated depreciation as at the revaluation date was eliminated against the gross carrying amount of the asset and the asset was restated to the revalued amount.

The ATSB's property, plant and equipment assets under the fair value hierarchy, are valued at Level 3. The ATSB Management ensured that the appropriate assessments were made for impairment, useful lives and the valuation of non-financial assets at 30 June 2024.

Note 6 - Other information

6.1 Current/non-current distinction for assets and liabilities

6.1A: Current/non-current distinction for assets and liabilities

	2024	2023
	$'000	$'000
Assets expected to be recovered in:		
No more than 12 months		
Cash and cash equivalents	386	240
Trade and other receivables	13,705	7,996
Accrued Revenue	-	9
Prepayments	618	548
Total no more than 12 months	**14,709**	8,793
More than 12 months		
Land & Building	6,520	7,690
Heritage and cultural	16	16
Plant and equipment	2,853	3,278
Computer software	1,741	2,469
Prepayments	18	45
Total more than 12 months	**11,148**	13,498
Total assets	**25,857**	22,291
Liabilities expected to be settled in:		
No more than 12 months		
Suppliers	505	482
Other payables	4,207	501
Leases	1,275	1,096
Employee provisions	2,030	1,835
Total no more than 12 months	**8,017**	3,914
More than 12 months		
Leases	5,811	7,034
Employee provisions	4,131	3,526
Total more than 12 months	**9,942**	10,560
Total liabilities	**17,959**	14,474

Section 7 – Management and Accountability

Management And Accountability

The Commission

The ATSB is governed by a Commission, comprising a Chief Commissioner and 3 part-time Commissioners.

The Commission provides guidance on the selection of accidents and other safety incidents to be investigated. The Commission is responsible for exercising the power to publish reports of accident investigations. It also supports the ATSB in encouraging safety action ahead of final reports, thus reducing the need to issue safety recommendations.

The Commission operates within the corporate governance framework of the ATSB Commission Governance Manual. The manual sets out the Commission's legislative requirements, parliamentary and ministerial accountability, membership and functions, administrative policies and procedures, and reporting obligations.

The Commission meets at least 4 times a year and manages ATSB business through regular teleconferences and electronic communications in accordance with its obligations under the TSI Act and its agreed policies.

Senior Leadership Team

During 2023–24, the ATSB Senior Leadership Team (SLT) met fortnightly to discuss strategic management issues and priorities. The SLT consisted of the Chief Commissioner, the Chief Operating Officer, the Directors Transport Safety and the Heads of each Corporate Services functional areas.

Audit and Risk Committee

The Audit and Risk Committee provides independent assurance and advice to the Chief Commissioner (and to the Commission and SLT) on ATSB financial and performance reporting responsibilities, risk oversight and management, and system of internal control. The Audit and Risk Committee consists of an independent chair and 2 independent members. The committee held 4 meetings throughout the financial year, in September and December 2023, and March and June 2024.

In 2023–24, the committee advised and provided assurance on a range of matters, including the ATSB:

- Internal Audit Annual Program
- enterprise risk management, fraud control, corruption, and business continuity frameworks
- performance reporting
- financial statement preparations
- work health and safety management
- compliance with the PGPA Act and the associated Rule
- internal audit governance framework – including the Internal Audit Charter.

The internal audit program for 2023–24 focused on assuring ATSB legislative compliance and performance against its core functions, for example, a review of ATSB payroll functions.

The Audit and Risk Committee Charter is available on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

Business planning and reporting

ATSB's Strategic Plan was published in July 2023. The strategic plan clearly articulates ATSB goals and strategies that will enable and enhance the effectiveness of our operations as Australia's national transport safety investigator.

The strategic plan is now the pinnacle of the ATSB planning governance framework. The plan provides a response to the Minister's Statement of Expectations 2023–2025. A condensed format of the strategic plan in a 'placemat format' can be found on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au/about_atsb/strategic_plan. The strategic plan is reviewed annually with the first review point being in July 2024.

The ATSB Corporate Plan is revised yearly. The plan gives further context to strategic initiatives being pursued as part of the strategic plan and the agency outcomes expected as defined in the Portfolio Budget Statement for the agency.

Each year, the ATSB develops an annual plan to set business objectives for the financial year. The annual plan is consistent with the strategic direction provided through the strategic plan and corporate plan. The annual plan incorporates the operational priorities, activities, deliverables and KPIs for the financial year.

The ATSB Annual Plan 2023–24 gave priority to:

- independent investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences, and research
- implementing systems and programs enabling greater efficiency and effectiveness for investigations to improve timeliness of published reports.
- further embedding governance and assurance processes
- implementing a holistic and inclusive health and wellbeing strategy
- enhancing stakeholder engagement through increased use of various media channels for targeted safety messaging.

Risk management

Consistent with the PGPA Act, the ATSB maintains a risk management framework. The framework includes a Risk Management Policy, Statement of Risk Appetite and Tolerance and Enterprise Risk Register. The framework is an integral element of the broader ATSB governance, planning and management framework. The ATSB has integrated risk assessment and mitigation into business practices, planning and performance reporting – at both corporate and business unit levels.

The ATSB is committed to a comprehensive, coordinated and systematic approach to the management of risk – directed towards supporting managers at all levels to anticipate and plan for risk, and to respond appropriately. For 2023–24, the ATSB focused on risks related to delivery of outcomes, financial sustainability, reputation, injury (physical and psychological), and security.

Business continuity plan

The ATSB business continuity management framework details the policies and procedures for the agency to respond to a business disruption. The framework ensures the ATSB is well placed to implement recovery processes and return to business as usual as quickly as possible while preserving the safety of staff and limiting the damage and disruption to business operations.

Fraud control and corruption

In accordance with the PGPA Act and the *National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022*, the ATSB maintains a fraud and corruption management framework which includes a Fraud Control and Corruption Policy and a Fraud Control and Corruption Plan.

The ATSB manages a fraud risk register to identify potential fraud risks and subsequently minimise the incidence of fraud. This process is accompanied by development, implementation and regular assessment of fraud prevention, detection and response strategies.

The ATSB mandates a staff awareness program which incorporates activities for existing and new staff. Refresher training is undertaken on an annual basis.

The Audit and Risk Committee and the Commission receive reports on fraud and corruption risks and the implementation of controls and treatments.

Ethical standards

The ATSB expects our staff to conduct activities ethically and with integrity. Our staff work in accordance with the APS Code of Conduct, which sets out the standard of behaviour we expect of our people and others working in, or alongside, our organisation. All new employees joining the ATSB undertake training to ensure they understand the APS values, APS Code of Conduct, as well as the ATSB vision, mission and values.

People and culture

ATSB is committed to creating a culture that supports collaboration and inclusive behaviours, provides opportunity for individual growth, and provides a safe working environment for our people.

In 2023–24, key priorities were:

- implementing our Health and Wellbeing Strategy 2023–26, and our Diversity and Inclusion Action Plan 2023–26
- increasing our organisational capability by investing in and developing technical and leadership capability
- promoting a collaborative, inclusive and positive workplace culture.

In 2023–24, ATSB made significant progress in implementing the first phase of the health and wellbeing strategy, and our diversity and inclusion action plan, with our initial actions targeted at building resilience at the individual level. These actions focused on inclusion, enhanced support resources, and minimising exposure to, and the impact of, psychosocial hazards.

ATSB's focus on health, wellbeing and inclusion has had a significant positive impact on staff satisfaction and performance, as demonstrated by consistent, and significant improvements in the ATSB APS Census results.

In 2023–24, the ATSB continued to expand and embed its training and development programs. The key focus areas were training to support compliance with regulatory, policy and international obligations, and supporting our transport safety partner organisations.

Key initiatives over the period were:

- the delivery of training to a number of partner organisations, both in Australia and overseas
- the successful completion of over 1,000 training and development activities by ATSB staff
- a complete refresh of recurring training obligations, and the development and implementation of a one-stop-shop annual refresher training course
- the delivery of regular online and face-to-face all-staff awareness sessions
- enhancement, standardisation and recognition of vital on-the-job training activities.

Staffing profile

The ATSB staffing profile has shifted slightly, from 112 at the end of June 2023 to 118 at the end of June 2024. The associated staff turnover rate was approximately 8%, an increase from 4% in 2022–23. Table 14 displays the ATSB staff numbers, by classification, as at 30 June 2024.

Table 14: ATSB staffing profile at 30 June 2024

Substantive Classification	Gender x (full-time)	Female (full-time)	Female (part-time)	Male (full-time)	Male (part- time)	*Non-ongoing	Total
Statutory office holders	-	-	1	1	2	-	4
Senior Executive Service (SES)	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
EL 2	-	9	4	33	3	4	49
EL 1	-	5	1	20	-	-	26
APS 6	-	13	3	10	-	1	27
APS 5	-	5	-	3	2	1	10
APS 4	-	2	-	-	-	1	2
Total	-	34	9	68	7	7	118

**The figures outlined in Table 14 include 3 casual employees, employed by the ATSB on irregular and intermittent non-ongoing contracts as at 30 June 2024. Non-ongoing employees are not counted in the total column.*

This total is comprised of the following employment arrangements:

- 113 staff (representing all non-SES employees) covered by the enterprise agreement
- one SES employee covered by section 24(1) determinations, established in accordance with the ATSB SES remuneration policy
- 4 statutory office holders (representing the Commissioners) determined by the remuneration tribunal.

There are no other employment arrangements in place and there is no provision for performance pay.

Of the 114 SES and non-SES employees, 77 employees were based in Canberra, 23 based in Brisbane, 2 based in Adelaide, 2 based in Perth, 7 based in Melbourne and 3 based in Sydney.

Non-salary benefits provided to employees under the enterprise agreement include:

- flexible working arrangements, including part-time and working from home
- access to various leave, supporting work/life balance
- influenza vaccinations and annual health checks
- access to the Employee Assistance Program.

First Nations People

The development of the ATSB Reconciliation Action Plan enables meaningful action to attract and recruit Aboriginal and Torris Strait Islander people.

Salary rates

Table 15 displays the salary rates supporting the above employment arrangements as at 30 June 2024.

Table 15: ATSB salary rates at 30 June 2024

Substantive classification	Lower($)	Upper($)
Statutory office holders	As determined by the remuneration tribunal	
EL 2	137,558	169,066
EL 1	115,755	140,279
APS 6	90,328	107,448
APS 5	83,308	89,954
APS 4	74,623	81,088

Note: Maximums include transport safety investigator and legal broadbands, representing an increase on standard administrative APS 6–EL 2 rates.

Senior executive remuneration for 2023–24 is presented in **Appendix C**.

Purchasing

The ATSB purchases goods and services in accordance with the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs). These rules are applied through the accountable authority instructions. The ATSB procurement policies and processes have been developed to ensure that:

- it undertakes competitive, non-discriminatory procurements
- it uses resources efficiently, effectively, economically and ethically
- it makes all procurement decisions in an accountable and transparent manner.

Consultants

The ATSB engages consultants when it lacks specialist expertise, or when independent research, review or assessment is required. Consultants are typically engaged to:

- investigate or diagnose a defined issue or problem
- carry out defined reviews or evaluations
- provide independent advice, information or creative solutions to assist ATSB decision-making.

The ATSB policies on selection and engagement of consultants are in accordance with the CPRs. Before engaging consultants, the ATSB considers the skills and resources required for the task, the skills available internally and the cost effectiveness of engaging an external contractor.

During 2023–24, 5 new reportable consultancy contracts were entered into involving total actual expenditure of $274,159 (GST inclusive). There were 5 ongoing consultancy contracts totalling $138,344 carried over from 2022–23.

During 2023–24, 21 new reportable non-consultancy contracts were entered into involving total actual expenditure of $732,688 (GST inclusive). There were 31 ongoing non-consultancy contracts totalling $5,072,383 (GST inclusive) carried over from 2022–23.

Annual reports contain information about actual expenditure on reportable contracts for consultancies and non-consultancies. Information on the value of contracts and consultancies is available from the AusTender website at tenders.gov.au.

Australian National Audit Office access clauses

There were no contracts during 2023–24 that did not provide for the Auditor-General to have access to the contractors' premises.

Exempt contracts

No contracts were exempted on public interest grounds from publication on AusTender during 2023–24.

Procurement initiatives to support small business

The ATSB supports small business participation in the Commonwealth Government procurement market. Small and medium enterprises (SME) and small enterprise participation statistics are available on the Department of Finance website at finance.gov.au.

The ATSB seeks to support SMEs, consistent with paragraph 5.4 of the CPRs. It ensures that its communications are expressed in clear and simple language. Its finance system is set up to ensure prompt payments to all contractors and suppliers, and it makes use of credit cards.

Legal services and expenditure

Paragraph 11.1(a) of the Legal Services Directions 2017, issued by the Attorney-General under the J*udiciary Act 1903*, requires chief executives of departments and agencies to ensure that legal services expenditure is appropriately recorded and monitored. Chief executives must also ensure that their agencies make records of their legal services expenditure for the previous financial year, available by 30 October in the following financial year. The following amounts are exclusive of GST.

ATSB expenditure on legal services for 2023–24 was $342,828 comprising:

- $290,276 on internal legal services
- $52,552 on external legal services.

External scrutiny and participation

Review of Australian Transport Safety and Investigation Bodies Financial Sustainability

The review was announced as part of the 2023–24 Federal Budget. The review considered the operations, potential efficiencies and options for cost recovery of the following bodies:

- CASA
- ATSB
- AMSA.

The review was undertaken over 6 months.

A report was provided to The Hon Catherine King MP, Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government following the conclusion of the review on 27 February 2024.

The ATSB participated in all aspects of the review related to the ATSB and undertook to have an assessment of the efficiency of its processes for short investigations. This assessment found ATSB processes to be highly efficient.

International Civil Aviation Organization audit of the Civil Aviation System of Australia

During September 2023, the ATSB participated in ICAO's audit of Australia's compliance with international civil aviation protocols. Audit questions for the ATSB focused on compliance with Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The ICAO audit team submitted its final report in February 2024. The results are available on the ICAO website at icao.int/safety/Pages/USOAP-Results.aspx.

Coronial inquests

The ATSB is required to participate in coronial investigations and inquests. The ATSB participated in or assisted inquiries for 4 coronial matters during 2023–24 relating to ATSB investigations:

- Fatal collision with terrain involving US-registered C130 air tanker near Peak View, New South Wales, on 23 January 2020.
- Fatal mid-air collision between Beech Travel Air twin-engine aircraft and Piper Seminole twin-engine aircraft south of Mangalore Airport, Victoria, on 19 February 2020.
- Loss of control and collision with terrain involving Eurocopter AS350BA helicopter at Hobart Airport, Tasmania, on 7 November 2017.
- Controlled flight into terrain involving Cessna 404 near Lockhart River, Queensland, on 11 March 2020.

Findings for the matters involving the C130 air tanker, AS350BA helicopter and Cessna 404 have been completed by coroners. Other matters above are yet to be completed by the responsible coroners.

Section 8 – Appendices

Appendix A: Other mandatory information

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act)

The ATSB is committed to maintaining a safe and healthy work environment and promoting strategies to enhance personal wellbeing.

In 2023–24, our key focus was improving our online work health and safety (WHS) management system and reporting capabilities.

The ATSB WHS and Wellbeing Committee held a meeting on average every 6 weeks throughout 2023–24, inspiring cooperation, risk identification and mitigation activities, and the maintenance of standards and procedures relating to the health and safety of all workers.

Notifiable incidents

In 2023–24, no notifiable incidents occurred under Part 3 or Part 5 of the WHS Act.

Work health and safety investigations

No investigations were conducted, and no notices were given in relation to incidents at ATSB workplaces during 2023–24.

Advertising and market research

During 2023–24, the ATSB spent $4,074 (GST inclusive) on advertising for recruitment. There were no further payments for advertising or market research.

Ecologically sustainable development and environmental performance reporting

(Section 516A of the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999*)

The ATSB is fully committed to the principles of ecologically sustainable development. The nature of its work as Australia's national transport safety investigator – with a focus on the investigation of transport accidents, research into transport safety and dissemination of safety information – means that the ATSB commitment is expressed through its day-to-day activities within its offices.

The ATSB operates under the Energy Efficiency in Government Operations (EEGO) Policy, and through its office accommodation leasing arrangements, the ATSB environmental management system complies with ISO 14001:2004 – the international standard for environmental management systems. The system is focused on ATSB office-based activities in Canberra. Initiatives are applied at regional office premises, where appropriate.

The ATSB has contracted out its data centres to private providers, with the result that servers and information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure are located outside the ATSB premises. This produced a significant saving in energy use. The ATSB has limited its energy use through various initiatives that focus on improving the energy efficiency of the property portfolio, for example:

- operating a virtualised and cloud IT infrastructure environment
- using 7% green energy
- ensuring that desktop IT equipment uses energy-saving policies, such as automatic turn-off for monitors and hard drives after periods of inactivity
- reducing the number of printers in the network
- setting each printer default to mono (black) and double-sided printing
- using photocopy paper containing 60% recycled paper for internal use
- conserving energy, water, paper and other natural resources while still maintaining a comfortable work environment
- actively recycling paper waste
- promoting the separation of general waste into recyclable and non-recyclable items before disposal
- promoting video conferencing as an alternative to travel, where practicable
- using motion-sensor lighting in offices
- reducing the effect of direct sunlight on air conditioning systems by installing blinds or tinting, where appropriate.

Read more in **Appendix U.**

Grant programs

The ATSB did not administer any grant programs during 2023–24.

Disability reporting mechanism

Australia's National Disability Strategy 2021–31 is a national framework that all governments in Australia have signed up to. It sets out a plan for continuing to improve the lives of people with disability in Australia over 10 years.

In 2023–24, we implemented our Diversity and Inclusion Action Plan 2023–26. By implementing this plan, working collaboratively and removing barriers we can create a workplace where everyone feels valued, respected and are contributing to our community.

The *Australian Public Service Disability Employment Strategy 2020–25* sets out a comprehensive plan to improve employment outcomes for people with disability. This strategy aligns with the National Disability Strategy and reinforces the Australian Government's commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Disability reporting is included in the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) State of the Service Reports and the APS Statistical Bulletin.

Freedom of Information

The following information explains how to request access to documents held by the ATSB under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (FOI Act). It also explains what records the ATSB holds, and what arrangements the ATSB has in place for outside participation.

Entities subject to the FOI Act are required, under Part II of the Act, to publish information as part of the Information Publication Scheme. Information including an Agency Plan showing what information it published, is available on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

Detailed information about the FOI Act is available via the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) website at oaic.gov.au and the Federal Register of Legislation website at legislation.gov.au.

How to lodge a request for information

Information about how to make an application under the FOI Act can be found on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

A request under the FOI Act for access to documents must:

- be in writing
- state that the request is an application for the purposes of the FOI Act
- provide enough information to enable the documents sought to be identified
- give details of how notices under the FOI Act may be sent.

Submission of FOI requests, or enquiries about access, should be directed to:

Freedom of Information Coordinator
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
GPO Box 21
CANBERRA ACT 2601
Email: FOI-ATSB@atsb.gov.au

Charges

There are no application fees payable to lodge an FOI request.

The ATSB may impose a charge for the work involved in providing access to documents required through a request under the FOI Act. These charges are imposed in accordance with the FOI Act and the Freedom of Information (Charges) Regulations 2019. These charges may relate to the time spent searching for and retrieving relevant documents, decision-making time, photocopying and other costs. The FOI Act also provides that the first 5 hours of decision-making time is waived. The applicant will be notified as soon as possible with an estimate of the charges associated with the processing of the request. The request will not be processed until the applicant responds to such notification.

In some circumstances, charges associated with the processing of the request may be remitted. Should the applicant wish to seek remission of the charges, the criteria considered by the ATSB include whether:

- payment of the charges, or part of the charges, would cause financial hardship to the applicant or a person on whose behalf the application was made, and/or
- giving access to documents is in the general public interest, or in the interest of a substantial section of the public.

The applicant would need to contact the ATSB in writing, or by email, to explain why they meet the criteria, or to inform the agency of overall circumstances which justify non-payment of charges. Requests for the remission of the charges should be forwarded to the Freedom of Information Coordinator.

It may not be possible to obtain access to all the documents sought in an FOI request. Access is limited by exemptions, such as section 38 – secrecy provisions of the FOI Act.

The ATSB is required to perform its functions under section 12AA of the TSI Act. A significant amount of information gathered by the ATSB during the course of its investigations is defined as restricted information under section 3 of the TSI Act, and access to such information is exempt from release in accordance with subparagraph 38(1)(b)(i) of the FOI Act.

Freedom of information requests

In 2023–24, the ATSB received 33 FOI requests.

Table 16: Freedom of information activity

2023–24	Numbers
Requests	
On hand at 1 July 2023 (A)	3
New requests received (B)	33
Requests withdrawn (C)	16
Requests transferred in full to another agency (D)	0
Requests on hand at 30 June 2024 (E)	1
Total requests completed at 30 June 2024 (A+B-C-D-E)	19
Action on requests	
Access in full	5
Access in part	5
Access refused	9
Access transferred in full	0
Request withdrawn	16
Response times (excluding withdrawn)[1]	
0–30 days	6
31–60 days	8
61–90 days	3
90+ days	2
Internal review	
Requests received	1
Decision affirmed	1
Decision amended	0
Request withdrawn	0
Information Commissioner review	
Applications received	1
Decision affirmed	0
Decision amended	0
Application withdrawn	0
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) review	
Applications received	0

1 These statistics cannot be compared directly with the deadlines set in the FOI Act, as the FOI Act provides for extension of time to allow for consultation with third parties, negotiation of charges and other issues.

Records the ATSB holds

The ATSB holds records such as:

- human and financial resource management records
- briefing papers and submissions prepared for ministers, parliamentary secretaries, parliamentary committees, the Cabinet and the Executive Council (most of these are classified documents)
- business papers, briefing notes and meeting records for committees, and conferences in which the ATSB services or participates
- documents prepared by international agencies
- documents relating to the development of legislation
- internal administration documents
- memoranda of understanding and international conventions
- legal documents, including legislation, contracts, leases and court documents
- maps and other geographical information
- ministerial responses to parliamentary questions, interdepartmental and general correspondence and papers
- policy documents, recommendations and decisions
- registers of documents, agreements and approvals
- statistics and databases
- technical standards, guidelines, specifications, charts, photographs, drawings and manuals
- accident and incident investigation and notification records.

To view a list of manuals and other documents the ATSB uses when making decisions or recommendations that affect the public, visit the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

Under section 8C of the FOI Act, an exempt matter is not required to be published. The ATSB reserves the right to delete exempt matter from its information prior to providing access.

To find out more about the types of personal information the ATSB holds, please refer to the ATSB Privacy Policy on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

For further information, please contact the ATSB either by telephone on 1800 020 616 or by email at atsbinfo@atsb.gov.au.

Functions and decision-making powers

The ATSB functions are detailed in section 12AA of the TSI Act and are further described throughout this report.

Certain officers exercise decision-making powers under portfolio legislation and other matters. These responsibilities are set out in the Administrative Arrangements Order (AAO) for the Commonwealth of Australia and relate to transport safety, including investigations.

For a complete and up-to-date copy of the AAO, visit the Federal Register of Legislation website at legislation.gov.au.

To assist ATSB employees in exercising their powers appropriately and enable access to their decision-making authorities, the ATSB uses an intranet site which allows employees to view delegations online. It also allows employees to check information about the powers and authorities assigned under the legislation set out in the AAO and by-laws, such as the PGPA Act and the *Public Service Act 1999* (PS Act). Powers delegated under the TSI Act are recorded on the back of identity cards for all investigators.

Arrangements for outside participation

The ATSB consults widely to gain the views of its stakeholders and clients about future policy directions and program delivery. This includes consulting with other Australian state and territory government departments and agencies, as appropriate, and with foreign governments – particularly in the context of transport safety investigations. The ATSB may also contact a very broad range of stakeholders for particular policy issues.

Correction of material errors

Page in 2022–23 Annual Report	Error
149, Table 52	Emission source for fleet vehicles was listed as 81,300 (Scope 3 Kg CO_2-e); the correct figure should have been zero. Emission source for domestic flights was listed as zero. The figure should have been 81,300 (Scope 3 Kg CO_2-e).

Appendix B: Entity resource statement 2023–24

Table 17: Entity resource statement 2023–24

	Actual available appropriation 2023–24 $'000 (a)	Payments made 2023–24 $'000 (b)	Balance remaining 2023–24 $'000 (a) - (b)
Ordinary Annual Services1			
Departmental appropriation[2]	39,986	25,931	14,055
Total	**39,986**	**25,931**	**14,055**
Total ordinary annual services A	**39,986**	**25,931**	**14,055**
Other services			
Departmental non-operating			
Equity injections	0	0	0
Total	**0**	**0**	**0**
Total other services B	**0**	**0**	**0**
Total net resourcing and payments for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau	**39,986**	**25,931**	**14,055**

1 Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2023–24 and includes prior year departmental appropriation and section 74 Retained Revenue Receipts.
2 It also includes an amount of $1.371 million in 2023–24 for the Departmental Capital Budget. For accounting purposes, this amount has been designated as 'contributions by owners'.

Expenses for Outcome 1

Outcome 1: Improved transport safety in Australia including through independent 'no-blame' investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences; safety data recording, analysis and research; and influencing safety action.

Table 18: Expenses for outcome

	Budget* 2023–24 $'000 (a)	Actual Expenses 2023–24 $'000 (b)	Variation 2023–24 $'000 (a) - (b)
Program 1.1: Australian Transport Safety Bureau			
Departmental expense			
Departmental appropriation[3]	26,739	26,692	47
Expenses not requiring appropriation in the Budget year	4,587	4,556	31
Total for Program 1.1	31,326	31,248	78
Total expenses for Outcome 1	**31,326**	**31,248**	**78**

* Full year budget, including any subsequent adjustment made to the 2023–24 Budget at Additional Estimates

3 Departmental Appropriation combines Ordinary annual services (Appropriation Act No. 1) and Retained Revenue Receipts under section 74 of the PGPA Act

	2023–24	2022–23
Average Staffing Level (number)	111	102

Appendix C: Executive remuneration

Table 19: Information about remuneration for key management personnel

Short-term benefits					Post employment benefits	Other long-term benefits		Termination benefits	Total remuneration
Name	Position title	Base salary	Bonuses	Other benefits and allowances	Superannuation contributions	Long service leave	Other long-term benefits		
A Mitchell	Chief Commis-sioner	441,500	0	0	27,436	10,857	0	0	479,793
C McNamara	Chief Operating Officer	292,286	0	17,511	54,800	7,187	0	0	371,784

Table 20: Information about remuneration for other highly paid staff

Short-term benefits					Post employment benefits	Other long-term benefits		Termination benefits	Total remuneration
Total remuneration bands	Number of other highly paid staff	Average base salary	Average bonuses	Average other benefits and allowances	Average superannuation contributions	Average long service leave	Average other long-term benefits	Average termination benefits	Average total remuneration
$250,000–$270,000	3	169,066	-	43,120	37,383	5,141	0	-	254,710
$270,001–$295,000	1	169,066	-	68,876	42,033	5,800	0	-	285,775
$295,001–$320,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
$320,001–$345,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
$345,001–$370,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
$370,001–$395,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
$395,001–$420,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
$420,001–$445,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
$445,001–$470,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
$470,001–$495,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
$495,001–….	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Appendix D: Management of human resources

Table 21: All ongoing employees current report period (2023–24)

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Non-binary			Prefers not to answer			Uses a different term			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
NSW	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Qld	16	1	17	5	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22
SA	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Tas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vic	3	1	4	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
WA	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
ACT	39	2	41	26	5	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	72
NT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
External	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Overseas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**65**	**4**	**69**	**32**	**6**	**38**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**107**

Table 22: All non-ongoing employees current report period (2023–24)

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Non-binary			Prefers not to answer			Uses a different term			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
NSW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Qld	-	-		1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
SA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vic	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
WA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ACT	2	1	3	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
NT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
External	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Overseas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**2**	**3**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**7**

Table 23: All ongoing employees previous report period (2022–23)

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Non-binary			Prefers not to answer			Uses a different term			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
NSW	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Qld	14	-	14	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
SA	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Tas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vic	4	1	5	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
WA	5	-	5	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
ACT	37	-	37	25	4	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	66
NT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
External	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Overseas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**64**	**1**	**65**	**30**	**6**	**36**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**101**

Table 24: All non-ongoing employees previous report period (2022–23)

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Non-binary			Prefers not to answer			Uses a different term			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
NSW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-
Qld	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	1
SA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-
Tas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-
Vic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-
WA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-
ACT	4	-	4	2	1	3	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	7
NT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-
External	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-
Overseas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-
Total	**4**		**4**	**2**	**2**	**4**										**8**

Appendix E: Australian Public Sector (APS) classification and gender

Table 25: Australian Public Service Act ongoing employees current report period (2023–24)

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Non-binary			Prefers not to answer			Uses a different term			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
SES 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SES 2	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
SES 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EL 2	31	2	33	9	3	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45
EL 1	20	-	20	5	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26
APS 6	10	-	10	13	2	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25
APS 5	3	2	5	4		4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
APS 4	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
APS 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**65**	**4**	**69**	**32**	**6**	**38**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**107**

Table 26: Australian Public Service Act non-ongoing employees current report period (2023–24)

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Non-binary			Prefers not to answer			Uses a different term			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
SES 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SES 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SES 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EL 2	2	1	3	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
EL 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 6	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
APS 5	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
APS 4	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
APS 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**2**	**1**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**7**

Table 27: Australian Public Service Act ongoing employees previous report period (2022–23)

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Non-binary			Prefers not to answer			Uses a different term			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
SES 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SES 2	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
SES 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EL 2	29	1	30	8	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
EL 1	19	-	19	5	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27
APS 6	10	-	10	12	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23
APS 5	4	-	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
APS 4	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
APS 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**64**	**1**	**65**	**30**	**6**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**101**

Table 28: Australian Public Service Act non-ongoing employees previous report period (2022–23)

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Non-binary			Prefers not to answer			Uses a different term			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
SES 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
SES 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
SES 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
EL 2	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		2
EL 1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		1
APS 6	1	-	1	3	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		5
APS 5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
APS 4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
APS 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
APS 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
APS 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
Total	**4**	**-**	**4**	**3**	**1**	**4**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**		**8**

Appendix F: Employment type by full-time and part-time

Table 29: Australian Public Service Act employees by full-time and part-time status current report period (2023–24)

	Ongoing			Non-Ongoing			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
SES 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SES 2	1	-	1	-	-	-	1
SES 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EL 2	40	5	45	2	2	4	49
EL 1	25	1	26	-	-	-	26
APS 6	23	2	25	-	1	1	26
APS 5	7	2	9	1	-	1	10
APS 4	1	-	1	1	-	1	2
APS 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**97**	**10**	**107**	**4**	**-**	**4**	**114**

Table 30: Australian Public Service Act employees by full-time and part-time status previous report period (2022–23)

	Ongoing			Non-Ongoing			Total
	Full time	Part time	Total	Full time	Part time	Total	
SES 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SES 2	1	-	1	-	-	-	1
SES 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EL 2	37	3	40	2	-	2	42
EL 1	24	3	27	1	-	1	28
APS 6	22	1	23	3	1	4	27
APS 5	9	-	9	-	1	1	10
APS 4	1	-	1	-	-	-	1
APS 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APS 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**94**	**7**	**101**	**6**	**2**	**8**	**109**

Appendix G: Employment type by location

Table 31: Australian Public Service Act employment type by location current report period (2023–24)

	Ongoing	Non-Ongoing	Total
NSW	3	-	3
Qld	22	1	23
SA	2	-	2
Tas	-	-	0
Vic	6	1	7
WA	2	-	2
ACT	72	5	77
NT	-	-	0
External	-	-	0
Overseas	-	-	0
Total	**107**	**7**	**114**

Table 32: Australian Public Service Act employment type by location previous report period (2022–23)

	Ongoing	Non-Ongoing	Total
NSW	2	-	2
Qld	17	1	18
SA	2	-	2
Tas	-	-	-
Vic	7	-	7
WA	6	-	6
ACT	67	7	74
NT	-	-	-
External	-	-	-
Overseas	-	-	-
Total	**101**	**8**	**109**

Appendix H: Indigenous employment

Table 33: Australian Public Service Act Indigenous employment current report period (2023–24)

	Total
Ongoing	0
Non-Ongoing	0
Total	0

Table 34: Australian Public Service Act Indigenous employment previous report period (2022–23)

	Total
Ongoing	1
Non-Ongoing	-
Total	1

Appendix I: Employment arrangements of SES and non-SES employees

Table 35: Australian Public Service Act employment arrangements current report period (2023–24)

Arrangement Title	SES	Non-SES	Total
Enterprise Agreement	-	114	114
S.24.1 Determination	1	-	1
Total	**1**	**114**	**115**

Appendix J: Salary ranges by classification level

Table 36: Australian Public Service Act employment salary ranges by classification level (minimum/maximum) current report period (2023–24)

	Minimum Salary ($)	Maximum Salary ($)
SES 3	-	-
SES 2	302,058	302,058
SES 1	-	-
EL 2	128,415	169,066
EL 1	108,020	140,279
APS 6	84,324	107,448
APS 5	77,771	89,954
APS 4	69,663	81,088
APS 3	62,872	72,722
APS 2	55,107	65,171
APS 1	48,659	57,412
Other	-	-
Minimum/Maximum range	48,659	302,058

Appendix K: Performance pay by classification level

A table detailing performance pay by classification level for the reporting period (2023–24) has been removed as it is not applicable for the ATSB.

Appendix L: Accountable Authority

Table 37: Australian Public Service Act employment arrangements current report period (2023–24)

		Period as the accountable authority or member within the reporting period	
Name	**Position Title/Position held**	**Start Date (1 July 2023 or after)**	**End Date (30 June 2024 or before)**
Angus Mitchell	Chief Commissioner/Chief Executive Officer	1 July 2023	30 June 2024

Appendix M: Significant non-compliance with the finance law

Table 38: Significant non-compliance with the finance law

Description of non-compliance	Remedial Action
Nil	0

Appendix N: Audit committee 2023–24

Table 39: Audit committee (2023–24)

Member name	Qualifications, knowledge, skills or experience (include formal and informal as relevant)	Number of meetings attended/ total number of meetings	Total annual remuneration $ (GST inc)
Clare Kitcher (Chair)	» GAICD » CPRM » BSc (Hons) Dunelm » Experienced public sector executive and non-executive director specialising in risk management and business transformation » Prequalified independent member of Audit and Risk Committees in NSW	4	22,000
Ken Kanofski	» Bachelor of Business » MBA » GAICD » FCPA » Experienced company director and chair » More than 20 years' CEO experience in the public sector » Extensive experience in transport and safety	4	17,325
Cheryl-Anne Navarro	» FCPA with over 24 years of public sector finance experience, and 7 years in senior executive positions » MBA, Deakin University » Bachelor of Commerce, Australian National University	4	0

Appendix O: Reportable consultancy contracts

Table 40: Expenditure on reportable consultancy contracts current report period (2023–24)

	Number	Expenditure $ (GST inc.)
New consultant contracts entered into during the period	5	274,159
Ongoing consultant contracts entered into during the previous period	5	138,344
Total Consultancy Expenditure 2023–24	**10**	**412,503**

Appendix P: Reportable non-consultancy contracts

Table 41: Expenditure on reportable non-consultancy contracts current report period (2023–24)

Reportable Non-Consultancy Contracts	Number	Expenditure (GST inc.)
New non-consultancy contracts entered into during the reporting period	21	732,688
Ongoing non-consultancy contracts entered into during a previous reporting period	31	5,072,383
Total	**52**	**5,805,071**

Appendix Q: Additional information about organisations receiving amounts under reportable consultancy contracts or reportable non-consultancy contracts

Table 42: Organisations receiving a share of reportable consultancy contract expenditure current report period (2023–24)

Name of Organisation (ABN)	Expenditure $ (GST inc.)
Ken Kanofski Advisory Pty Ltd (49634100753)	13,025
Kitcher Risk Solutions (85983112392)	22,062
Puzzle Partners Consulting Pty Ltd (69107246926)	17,408
Sententia Consulting Pty Ltd (85639580662)	79,992
Taradel Consulting Pty Ltd (28145327224)	81,194
ChartSmart Consulting Pty Ltd (88133375112)	41,627
Human Synergistics Pty Ltd (11093428098)	50,297
ProAllied Australia Pty Ltd (50631285651)	106,898
Total Consultancy Contract Expenditure 2023–24	**412,503**

Table 43: Organisations receiving a share of reportable non-consultancy contract expenditure current report period (2023–24)

Name of Organisation (ABN)	Expenditure $ (GST inc.)
AcronymIT Pty Ltd (68096077422)	134,123
Aurion Corporation Pty Ltd (63050431868)	83,683
Data3 Ltd (31010545267)	475,759
Donesafe (31165144767)	11,088
Edge Integration Pty Ltd (89074677311)	43,478
Investa Asset Management (QLD) Pty Ltd (35098527167)	312,340
NTT Australia Digital Pty Ltd (31100103268)	683,279
NTT Australia Pty Ltd (65003371239)	718,666
Roy Weston Corporate Pty Ltd (81075243006)	44,135
Sliced Tech Pty Ltd (53165997008)	545,451
The Trustee For Dexus Wholesale Property Trust 1 (75942337384)	192,344
Ventia Property Pty Ltd (16618028676)	251,519
SG Fleet Australia Pty Limited (15003429356)	9,742
Showtime Consulting Ptd Ltd (78152096672)	387,695
Telstra Limited (64086174781)	117,817
AMP Capital Office and Industrial Pty Ltd (44099105094)	1,068,813
Canon Business Services Australia Pty Ltd (42063577739)	90,461
Pro AV Solutions (ACT) Pty Ltd (16636895602)	33,556
Unify Solutions Pty Ltd (46109584947)	33,000
Struers Australia (82557994775)	25,656
Action Maintenance Service (77047842027)	34,297
Fulcrum Management Pty Ltd (70050334257)	20,100
Apollo Law Pty Ltd (36635631622)	6,862
Oxford Instruments Australia Pty Ltd (48665763762)	93,020
Dell Australia Pty Ltd (46003855561)	97,955
Evident Australia Pty Ltd (16655909158)	75,790
xAmplify Ptd Ltd (53628342567)	49,280
Ionize Pty Ltd (62132569941)	39,600
Maddocks (63478951337)	34,264
Konica Minolta Business Solutions Australia Pty Ltd (50001065096)	5,114
Acorn PLMS Pty Ltd (47600787139)	11,946
Kennards Self Storage (87109442917)	10,170
Workplace Mental Health Institute (90297259370)	18,532
MasterDocs Pty Ltd (33164120861)	13,200
Clayton Utz (35740217343)	11,000
Workin' Gear Pty Ltd (81093909990)	10,935
JB Hi-Fi Group Pty Ltd (37093114286)	10,400
Total Non-Consultancy Contract Expenditure 2023–24	**5,805,071**

Appendix R: Aids to access

Table 44: Aids to access details current report period (2023–24)

Annual report Contact Officer (Title/Position held)	Annual Report Coordinator
Contact Phone Number	1800 020 616
Contact Email	atsbinfo@atsb.gov.au
Entity website (URL)	www.atsb.gov.au

Appendix S: Report on financial performance summary

Table 45: Entity resource statement subset summary current report period (2023–24)

	Current available appropriation (a) $'000	Payments made (b) $'000	Balance remaining (a)-(b) $'000
Departmental			
Annual appropriations – ordinary annual services	39,986	25,931	14,055
Annual appropriations – other services – non-operating	-	-	-
Total departmental annual appropriations	**39,986**	**25,931**	**14,055**
Departmental special appropriations	-	-	-
Total special appropriations	**-**	**-**	**-**
Special accounts	-	-	-
less departmental appropriations drawn from annual/ special appropriations and credited to special accounts	-	-	-
Total departmental resourcing (A)	**39,986**	**25,931**	**14,055**
Administered			
Annual appropriations – ordinary annual services	-	-	-
Annual appropriations – other services – non-operating	-	-	-
Annual appropriations – other services – specific payments to states, ACT, NT and local government	-	-	-
Annual appropriations – other services – new administered expenses	-	-	-
Total administered annual appropriations	-	-	-
Administered special appropriations	-	-	-
Total administered special appropriations	**-**	**-**	**-**
Special accounts	-	-	-
Total special accounts receipts	-	-	-
less administered appropriations drawn from annual/ special appropriations and credited to special accounts	-	-	-
less payments to corporate entities from annual/ special appropriations	-	-	-
Total administered resourcing (B)	**-**	**-**	**-**
Total resourcing and payments for entity (A + B)	**39,986**	**25,931**	**14,055**

Appendix T: Financial statements summary

The below financial statements summary data templates are a subset of the full audited financial statements contained in the annual report. These individual line items should be read in isolation of each other. In many cases the "total" lines will not equal the sum of the previous line items above. The presentation of expenses and liabilities are consistent with the ATSB's audited annual financial statements.

Table 46: Statement of Comprehensive income for the period ended 30 June 2024

	30 June 2024 $'000	30 June 2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
NET COST OF SERVICES			
Expenses			
Employee Benefits Expense	18,673	16,845	19,653
Suppliers Expense	9,666	8,093	9,265
Depreciation and Amortisation Expense	2,829	2,536	2,372
Total Expenses	31,248	27,574	31,326
Income			
Total Own-Source Income	4,689	4,023	5,201
Net cost of services			
Net cost of services	-26,559	-23,551	-26,125
Revenue from Government			
Revenue from Government	25,270	20,710	25,270
Surplus/(Deficit) after Tax			
Surplus/(Deficit) after Tax	-1,289	-2,841	-855
OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME			
Total comprehensive Income/(Loss)	-1,289	-2,209	-855

Table 47: Statement of financial position as at 30 June 2024

	30 June 2024 $'000	30 June 2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
ASSETS			
Total Financial Assets	14,090	8,245	7,917
Total Non-Financial Assets	11,766	14,046	12,663
Total Assets	25,856	22,291	20,580
LIABILITIES			
Total Payables	4,712	983	392
Total Interest Bearing Liabilities	7,085	8,130	6,906
Total Provisions	6,160	5,361	5,167
Total Liabilities	17,957	14,474	12,465
Net Assets	7,899	7,817	8,115
EQUITY			
Total Equity	7,899	7,817	8,115

Table 48: Statement of changes in equity (for the current report period 2023–24)

	30 June 2024 $'000	30 June 2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
Opening balance			
Balance Carried Forward from Previous Period	7,817	9,444	7,817
Adjusted Opening Balance	7,817	9,444	7,817
Comprehensive income			
Total Comprehensive Income	-1,289	-2,209	-855
Closing Balance as at 30 June	7,899	7,817	8,115

Table 49: Cash flow statement for period (2023–24)

	30 June 2024 $'000	30 June 2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
OPERATING ACTIVITIES			
Total Cash Received (OPERATING ACTIVITIES)	30,322	23,425	26,739
Total Cash Used for (OPERATING ACTIVITIES)	29,055	22,420	25,222
Net Cash from OPERATING ACTIVITIES	1,267	1,005	1,517
INVESTING ACTIVITIES			
Total Cash Received (INVESTING ACTIVITIES)	-	-	-
Total Cash Used (INVESTING ACTIVITIES)	456	1,127	1,371
Net Cash from INVESTING ACTIVITIES	-456	-1,127	-1,371
Purchase of Property, Plant and Equipment	425	400	1,371
Purchase of Intangibles	31	727	-
FINANCING ACTIVITIES			
Total Cash Received (FINANCING ACTIVITIES)	437	1,127	1,371
Total Cash Used (FINANCING ACTIVITIES)	1,102	1,113	1,517
Net Cash from FINANCING ACTIVITIES	-665	14	-146
Cash at the End of the Reporting Period			
Cash at the End of the Reporting Period	386	240	348

Table 50: Current assets and liabilities

	30 June 2024 $'000	30 June 2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
Assets – No more than 12 months	14,709	8,793	8,492
Liabilities – No more than 12 months	8,017	3,914	3,450

Table 51: Commonwealth lessees – Departmental leases under AASB 16 (2023–24)

	30 June 2024 $'000	30 June 2023 $'000	Original Budget $'000
Note to Depreciation – Depreciation on right-of-use assets	1,208	1,264	1,438
Cash Flow – Operating Activities – Interest Payments on Lease Liabilities	70	79	36
Cash Flow – Financing Activities – Principal Payments of Lease Liabilities	1,102	1,113	1,517

Table 52: Regulatory charging summary note

	30 June 2024 $'000	30 June 2023 $'000
Expenses		
Total expenses	0	0
External Revenue		
Total external revenue	0	0

Appendix U: APS Net Zero 2030 emissions reporting

APS Net Zero 2030 is the Government's policy for the APS to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2030, and transparently report on its emissions. As part of the Net Zero in Government Operations Strategy, non-corporate Commonwealth entities, corporate Commonwealth entities and Commonwealth companies are required to report on their operational greenhouse gas emissions.

The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory presents greenhouse gas emissions over the 2023–24 period. Results are presented based on Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CO_2-e) emissions. Greenhouse gas emissions have been calculated in line with the APS Net Zero Emissions Reporting Framework, consistent with the whole-of-Australian Government approach as part of the APS Net Zero 2030 policy. Not all data sources were available at the time of the report and amendments to data may be required in future reports.

Table 53: APS Net Zero 2030 emissions reporting

Emission Source	Scope 1 t CO_2-e	Scope 2 t CO_2-e	Scope 3 t CO_2-e	Total t CO_2-e
Electricity (Location Based Approach)	N/A	64.768	6.453	71.221
Natural Gas	0.000	N/A	0.000	0.000
Solid Waste*	N/A	N/A	0.031	0.031
Refrigerants*†	0.000	N/A	N/A	0.000
Fleet and Other Vehicles	3.185	N/A	0.782	3.967
Domestic Commercial Flights	N/A	N/A	70.568	70.568
Domestic Hire Car*	N/A	N/A	1.188	1.188
Domestic Travel Accommodation*	N/A	N/A	43.448	43.448
Other Energy	0.000	N/A	0.000	0.000
Total t CO_2-e	**3.185**	**64.768**	**122.470**	**190.423**

Note: the table presents emissions related to electricity usage using the location-based accounting method. CO_2-e = Carbon Dioxide Equivalent.
* Indicates emission sources collected for the first time in 2023–24. The quality of data is expected to improve over time as emissions reporting matures.
† Indicates optional emission source for 2023–24 emissions reporting.

Table 54: Electricity greenhouse gas emissions (2023–24)

Emission Source	Scope 2 t CO_2-e	Scope 3 t CO_2-e	Total t CO_2-e	Percentage of electricity use
Electricity (Location Based Approach)	64.768	6.453	71.221	100.00%
Market-based electricity emissions	16.896	2.086	18.982	22.28%
Total renewable electricity	-	-	-	77.72%
Mandatory renewables[1]	-	-	-	18.72%
Voluntary renewables[2]	-	-	-	59.00%

Note: the table presents emissions related to electricity usage using both the location-based and the market-based accounting methods. CO_2-e = Carbon Dioxide Equivalent.
[1] Mandatory renewables are the portion of electricity consumed from the grid that is generated by renewable sources. This includes the renewable power percentage.
[2] Voluntary renewables reflect the eligible carbon credit units surrendered by the entity. This may include purchased large-scale generation certificates, power purchasing agreements, GreenPower and the jurisdictional renewable power percentage (ACT only).

Appendix V: Glossary

Term	Description
AAD	Australian Antarctic Division
AAO	Administrative Arrangements Order
Accident	An investigable matter involving a transport vehicle occurs when: » a person dies, or suffers serious injury, as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the vehicle » the vehicle is destroyed, or seriously damaged, as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the vehicle » any property is destroyed, or seriously damaged, as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the vehicle.
ADS-B	Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
ADT	Autonomous distress tracking system.
Aerial work	Aircraft operations – including ambulance and emergency medical services, agriculture, mustering, search and rescue, fire control, surveying and photography.
Agricultural operations	Operations involving the carriage and/or spreading of chemicals, seed, fertiliser or other substances for agricultural purposes – including the purposes of pest and disease control.
AIC	Accident Investigation Commission. The Papua New Guinea Government institution responsible for the investigation of safety deficiencies in aviation transport.
AIGP	ICAO Accident Investigation Panel
AIG	Accident Investigation Group
AIMS	ATSB Investigation Management System
Air Transport Operation	A passenger transport operation, a cargo transport operation or a medical transport operation that is conducted for hire or reward.
AMC	Australian Maritime College
AMSA	Australian Maritime Safety Authority
ANAO	Australian National Audit Office
APAC	ICAO Asia Pacific
APS	Australian Public Service
APSC	Australian Public Service Commission
ARA	Australian Railways Association
ARTC	Australian Rail Track Corporation
ASL	Average Staffing Level
ATSB	Australian Transport Safety Bureau
ATSB safety action	Formal activities conducted by the ATSB to initiate safety action by relevant organisations to address a safety issue. Includes safety recommendations and safety advisory notices.
BV	Bureau Veritas
CASA	Civil Aviation Safety Authority
CASR	Civil Aviation Safety Regulations
Charter	A non-scheduled air transport operation.
CITS	Chief Investigator Transport Safety (Victoria)
Collective	The collective pitch control, or collective lever, in a helicopter changes the pitch angle of all the main rotor blades at the same time, independent of their position. Therefore, if a collective input is made, all the blades change equally. The result is that the helicopter increases or decreases its total lift derived from the rotor.
Complex investigations	Investigations rated at level 1, level 2 or level 3 in accordance with the ATSB's rating system.

Term	Description
Contributing safety factor	A safety factor that, if it had not occurred or existed at the relevant time, then: » the occurrence would probably not have occurred » adverse consequences associated with the occurrence would probably not have occurred or have been as serious » another contributing safety factor would probably not have occurred or existed.
CPRs	Commonwealth Procurement Rules
Critical safety issue	Associated with an intolerable level of risk and generally leading to the immediate issue of a safety recommendation, unless corrective safety action has already been taken.
CVR (black box)	Cockpit voice recorder
DCV	Domestic Commercial Vessel as defined by the *Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012*.
DFSB	Defence Flight Safety Bureau
EEGO	Energy Efficiency in Government Operations
EL	Executive Level
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration (United States)
FAID	FAID software utilises validated biomathematical models to estimate fatigue exposure of an 'average' individual associated with hours of work.
Fatal accident	A transport accident in which at least one fatality results within 30 days of the accident.
Fatality/Fatal injury	Any injury acquired by a person involved in a transport accident which results in death within 30 days of the accident.
Flight data recorder (FDR) (black box)	A recorder placed in an aircraft for the purpose of facilitating the investigation of an aircraft accident or incident.
Flying training	Flying under instruction for the issue or renewal of a licence, rating, aircraft type endorsement or any other type of flying aimed at upgrading an individual's flight qualification – including solo navigation exercises conducted as part of a course of applied flying training, or check and training operations conducted by RPT operators.
FOD	Foreign Object Damage
FOI Act	*Freedom of Information Act 1982*
General aviation	General aviation covers: » aerial work operations (including aerial agriculture, aerial mustering, search and rescue, and aerial survey) » flying training » private aviation » business and sports (including gliding) aviation – Australian-registered (VH), or foreign-registered.
GovCMS	Content management system platform.
GPS	Global Positioning System
Hours flown	Calculated from the time the wheels start, with the intention of flight, to the time the wheels stop after completion of the flight.
Human factors	Human factors is the multidisciplinary science that applies knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of human performance to all aspects of the design operation and maintenance of products and systems. It considers the effect of physical, psychological and environmental factors on human performance in different task environments – including the role of human operators in complex systems.
IALA	International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICASS	International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems

Term	Description
Immediately reportable matter	A serious transport safety matter that covers occurrences such as: » accidents involving death » serious injury » destruction or serious damage of vehicles or property » when an accident nearly occurs.
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IMC	Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IMO	International Maritime Organization
Incident	An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of transport vehicle that affects, or could affect, the safety of the operation.
ITCP	IMO's International Technical Co-operation Programme.
ITSA	International Transportation Safety Association
ITSAP	The Australian Government's Indonesia Transport Safety Assistance Package.
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LPOs	Local plan approval offices
Less complex investigations	Those rated at level 4 or level 5 under the ATSB rating scheme.
MAIFA	Marine Accident Investigators Forum in Asia.
Minor injury	An injury sustained by a person, in an accident, that was not fatal or serious and does not require hospitalisation.
MIPP	Major Investigation Preparedness Plan
Multi-modal	Across the three 3 modes of transport covered by the ATSB: aviation, marine and rail.
NCO	Network control officer
National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC)	An Indonesian Government institution responsible for the investigation of safety deficiencies in aviation, maritime and land transport.
NM	Nautical miles
NVIS	Night vision imaging system
Occurrences accidents and incidents	Occurrences are reportable matters – either an immediately reportable matter (IRM) or a routine reportable matter (RRM). They comprise accidents, serious incidents and incidents.
OCI	Office of the Chief Investigator Victoria
ONRSR	Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator
Other aerial work	Other aerial work includes: » operations conducted for the purposes of serial work other than 'flying training' and » 'agricultural operations' » operations classified as other aerial work – including aerial surveying and photography, spotting, aerial stock mustering, search and rescue, ambulance, towing (including glider, target and banner towing), advertising, cloud seeding, firefighting, parachute dropping and coastal surveillance.
Other safety issue	Associated with a risk level regarded as unacceptable unless it is kept as low as reasonably practicable. Where there is a reasonable expectation that safety action could be taken in response to reduce risk, the ATSB will issue a safety recommendation to the appropriate agency when proactive safety action is not forthcoming.
OTSI	Office of Transport Safety Investigations (New South Wales)
PGPA Act	*Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013*
PNG	Papua New Guinea

Term	Description
Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS)	These statements explain the provisions of the appropriation bills (budget bills); that is, where the appropriate funds are going to be spent.
Private/business	Private flying is conducted for recreational or personal transport without revenue. Business flying refers to the use of aircraft as a means of transport to support a business or profession.
PS Act	*Public Service Act 1999*
Recreational aviation	Aircraft being used for recreational flying that are registered by a recreational aviation administration organisation.
Regular public transport (RPT)	A scheduled air transport operation, which the ATSB further categorises as: » low-capacity RPT – an RPT aircraft that provides a maximum of 38 passenger seats, or a maximum payload no greater than 4,200 kilograms » high-capacity RPT – an RPT aircraft that provides more than 38 passenger seats, or a maximum payload greater than 4,200 kilograms.
ReOC	A remotely piloted aircraft operator's certificate.
REPCON	The aviation confidential reporting scheme.
Reportable safety concern	Any matter that endangers or could endanger a transport vehicle.
RFS	Rural Fire Service
RISSB	Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board
RMIT	Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
RPAS	Remotely piloted aircraft systems.
Safety action	The things that organisations and individuals do in response to the identification of safety issues, in order to prevent accidents and incidents. There are 2 main types: ATSB safety action non-ATSB safety action.
Safety advisory notice (SAN)	Formal advice by the ATSB to an organisation, or relevant parts of the aviation industry, that it should consider the safety issue and take action where it believes it is appropriate. A safety advisory notice is a 'softer' output than a safety recommendation and is used for less significant safety issues – when the available evidence is more limited or when the target audience is not a specific organisation.
Safety factor	An event or condition that increases safety risk – something that increases the likelihood of an occurrence and/or the severity of the adverse consequences associated with an occurrence.
Safety issues	A safety factor which can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations and: » is a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or » is characteristic of an operational environment at a specific point in time.
Safety recommendation	ATSB safety recommendations are formal recommendations from the ATSB to an organisation for it to address a specific safety issue. They focus on stating the problem (i.e. the description of the safety issue). They do not identify specific solutions for reducing risk.
Serious incident	An incident involving circumstances indicating an accident nearly occurred.
Serious injury	An injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and involves one or more of the following: » requires hospitalisation for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received » results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes or nose) » involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or tendon damage » involves injury to any internal organ » involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5% of the body surface » involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious radiation.

Term	Description
SES	Senior Executive Service
Short investigation	Short, factual, office-based investigations of less complex safety occurrences rated at level 5 under the ATSB rating scheme.
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SME	Small and medium enterprises.
SMS	Safety management system
SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea Convention
SPAD	Signal passed at danger.
Sports aviation	Aircraft excluded from the RPT, GA or military aircraft categories – including ultralights, gliders, hang gliders, rotorcraft and balloon aviation. Most, if not all sport aviation craft are registered with various sporting bodies rather than with the CASA, although exceptions to this rule occur. Sports aviation also includes parachute operations and acrobatics. Sports aviation in this report does not include Australian non-VH registered aircraft.
Statutory agency	A body or group of persons declared by an Act to be a statutory agency for the purposes of the *Public Service Act 1999*.
Systemic failure	A breakdown in the system as a whole.
TCAD	Tonga Civil Aviation Division
Transport safety matter	As defined by the *Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003*, these matters consist of occurrences in which: » the transport vehicle is destroyed » the transport vehicle is damaged » the transport vehicle is abandoned, disabled, stranded or missing in operation » a person dies as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the transport vehicle » a person is injured or incapacitated as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the transport vehicle » any property is damaged as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the transport vehicle » the transport vehicle is involved in a near accident » the transport vehicle is involved in an occurrence that affected, or could have affected, the safety of the operation of the transport vehicle » something occurred that affected, is affecting, or might affect transport safety.
TSI Act	*Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003*
TSI Regulations	Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2021
VDR	Voyage Data Recorder
VFR	Visual Flight Rules
VMC	Visual meteorological conditions.
WebRAMS	System used by the ARTC to publish train notices and speed restrictions for the Western Australian, South Australian and Victorian sections of the network track.
WHS	Work Health and Safety
WHS Act	*Work Health and Safety Act 2011*

List of requirements

Below is the table set out in Schedule 2 of the PGPA Rule. Section 17AJ(d) requires this table be included in entities' annual reports as an aid of access.

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement	Page
17AD(g)	**Letter of transmittal**			
17AI		A copy of the letter of transmittal signed and dated by accountable authority on date final text approved, with statement that the report has been prepared in accordance with section 46 of the Act and any enabling legislation that specifies additional requirements in relation to the annual report.	Mandatory	iii
17AD(h)	**Aids to access**			
17AJ(a)		Table of contents (print only).	Mandatory	iv-vii
17AJ(b)		Alphabetical index (print only).	Mandatory	162-
17AJ(c)		Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms.	Mandatory	152-56
17AJ(d)		List of requirements.	Mandatory	157-61
17AJ(e)		Details of contact officer.	Mandatory	147
17AJ(f)		Entity's website address.	Mandatory	ii
17AJ(g)		Electronic address of report.	Mandatory	ii
17AD(a)	**Review by accountable authority**			
17AD(a)		A review by the accountable authority of the entity.	Mandatory	2-4
17AD(b)	**Overview of the entity**			
17AE(1)(a)(i)		A description of the role and functions of the entity.	Mandatory	133
17AE(1)(a)(ii)		A description of the organisational structure of the entity.	Mandatory	15
17AE(1)(a)(iii)		A description of the outcomes and programmes administered by the entity.	Mandatory	19
17AE(1)(a)(iv)		A description of the purposes of the entity as included in corporate plan.	Mandatory	6
17AE(1)(aa)(i)		Name of the accountable authority or each member of the accountable authority	Mandatory	143
17AE(1)(aa)(ii)		Position title of the accountable authority or each member of the accountable authority	Mandatory	143
17AE(1)(aa)(iii)		Period as the accountable authority or member of the accountable authority within the reporting period	Mandatory	143
17AE(1)(b)		An outline of the structure of the portfolio of the entity.	Portfolio departments mandatory	7
17AE(2)		Where the outcomes and programs administered by the entity differ from any Portfolio Budget Statement, Portfolio Additional Estimates Statement or other portfolio estimates statement that was prepared for the entity for the period, include details of variation and reasons for change.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
17AD(c)	**Report on the Performance of the entity**			
	Annual performance Statements			
17AD(c)(i); 16F		Annual performance statement in accordance with paragraph 39(1)(b) of the Act and section 16F of the Rule.	Mandatory	24-53
17AD(c)(ii)	**Report on Financial Performance**			

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement	Page
17AF(1)(a)		A discussion and analysis of the entity's financial performance.	Mandatory	53-54
17AF(1)(b)		A table summarising the total resources and total payments of the entity.	Mandatory	147
17AF(2)		If there may be significant changes in the financial results during or after the previous or current reporting period, information on those changes, including: the cause of any operating loss of the entity; how the entity has responded to the loss and the actions that have been taken in relation to the loss; and any matter or circumstances that it can reasonably be anticipated will have a significant impact on the entity's future operation or financial results.	If applicable, Mandatory.	NA
17AD(d)	**Management and Accountability**			
	Corporate Governance			
17AG(2)(a)		Information on compliance with section 10 (fraud systems)	Mandatory	122
17AG(2)(b)(i)		A certification by accountable authority that fraud risk assessments and fraud control plans have been prepared.	Mandatory	iii
17AG(2)(b)(ii)		A certification by accountable authority that appropriate mechanisms for preventing, detecting incidents of, investigating or otherwise dealing with, and recording or reporting fraud that meet the specific needs of the entity are in place.	Mandatory	iii
17AG(2)(b)(iii)		A certification by accountable authority that all reasonable measures have been taken to deal appropriately with fraud relating to the entity.	Mandatory	iii
17AG(2)(c)		An outline of structures and processes in place for the entity to implement principles and objectives of corporate governance.	Mandatory	120-26
17AG(2)(d) – (e)		A statement of significant issues reported to Minister under paragraph 19(1)(e) of the Act that relates to noncompliance with Finance law and action taken to remedy noncompliance.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
	Audit Committee			
17AG(2A)(a)		A direct electronic address of the charter determining the functions of the entity's audit committee.	Mandatory	120
17AG(2A)(b)		The name of each member of the entity's audit committee.	Mandatory	144
17AG(2A)(c)		The qualifications, knowledge, skills or experience of each member of the entity's audit committee.	Mandatory	144
17AG(2A)(d)		Information about the attendance of each member of the entity's audit committee at committee meetings.	Mandatory	144
17AG(2A)(e)		The remuneration of each member of the entity's audit committee.	Mandatory	144
	External Scrutiny			
17AG(3)		Information on the most significant developments in external scrutiny and the entity's response to the scrutiny.	Mandatory	125
17AG(3)(a)		Information on judicial decisions and decisions of administrative tribunals and by the Australian Information Commissioner that may have a significant effect on the operations of the entity.	If applicable, Mandatory	131

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement	Page
17AG(3)(b)		Information on any reports on operations of the entity by the AuditorGeneral (other than report under section 43 of the Act), a Parliamentary Committee, or the Commonwealth Ombudsman.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
17AG(3)(c)		Information on any capability reviews on the entity that were released during the period.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
	Management of Human Resources			
17AG(4)(a)		An assessment of the entity's effectiveness in managing and developing employees to achieve entity objectives.	Mandatory	122
17AG(4)(aa)		Statistics on the entity's employees on an ongoing and nonongoing basis, including the following: (a) statistics on fulltime employees; (b) statistics on parttime employees; (c) statistics on gender; (d) statistics on staff location.	Mandatory	136-42
17AG(4)(b)		Statistics on the entity's APS employees on an ongoing and nonongoing basis; including the following: » Statistics on staffing classification level; » Statistics on fulltime employees; » Statistics on parttime employees; » Statistics on gender; » Statistics on staff location; » Statistics on employees who identify as Indigenous.	Mandatory	136-42
17AG(4)(c)		Information on any enterprise agreements, individual flexibility arrangements, Australian workplace agreements, common law contracts and determinations under subsection 24(1) of the *Public Service Act 1999.*	Mandatory	142
17AG(4)(c)(i)		Information on the number of SES and nonSES employees covered by agreements etc identified in paragraph 17AG(4)(c).	Mandatory	142
17AG(4)(c)(ii)		The salary ranges available for APS employees by classification level.	Mandatory	143
17AG(4)(c)(iii)		A description of nonsalary benefits provided to employees.	Mandatory	123
17AG(4)(d)(i)		Information on the number of employees at each classification level who received performance pay.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
17AG(4)(d)(ii)		Information on aggregate amounts of performance pay at each classification level.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
17AG(4)(d)(iii)		Information on the average amount of performance payment, and range of such payments, at each classification level.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
17AG(4)(d)(iv)		Information on aggregate amount of performance payments.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
	Assets Management			
17AG(5)		An assessment of effectiveness of assets management where asset management is a significant part of the entity's activities	If applicable, mandatory	NA
	Purchasing			
17AG(6)		An assessment of entity performance against the Commonwealth Procurement Rules.	Mandatory	124

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement	Page
	Reportable consultancy contracts			
17AG(7)(a)		A summary statement detailing the number of new reportable consultancy contracts entered into during the period; the total actual expenditure on all such contracts (inclusive of GST); the number of ongoing reportable consultancy contracts that were entered into during a previous reporting period; and the total actual expenditure in the reporting period on those ongoing contracts (inclusive of GST).	Mandatory	145
17AG(7)(b)		A statement that "During [reporting period], [specified number] new reportable consultancy contracts were entered into involving total actual expenditure of $[specified million]. In addition, [specified number] ongoing reportable consultancy contracts were active during the period, involving total actual expenditure of $[specified million]".	Mandatory	124
17AG(7)(c)		A summary of the policies and procedures for selecting and engaging consultants and the main categories of purposes for which consultants were selected and engaged.	Mandatory	124
17AG(7)(d)		A statement that "Annual reports contain information about actual expenditure on reportable consultancy contracts. Information on the value of reportable consultancy contracts is available on the AusTender website."	Mandatory	124
	Reportable non-consultancy contracts			
17AG(7A)(a)		A summary statement detailing the number of new reportable non-consultancy contracts entered into during the period; the total actual expenditure on such contracts (inclusive of GST); the number of ongoing reportable non-consultancy contracts that were entered into during a previous reporting period; and the total actual expenditure in the reporting period on those ongoing contracts (inclusive of GST).	Mandatory	124
17AG(7A)(b)		A statement that "Annual reports contain information about actual expenditure on reportable non-consultancy contracts. Information on the value of reportable non-consultancy contracts is available on the AusTender website."	Mandatory	124
17AD(daa)	**Additional information about organisations receiving amounts under reportable consultancy contracts or reportable non-consultancy contracts**			
17AGA		Additional information, in accordance with section 17AGA, about organisations receiving amounts under reportable consultancy contracts or reportable non-consultancy contracts.	Mandatory	145
	Australian National Audit Office Access Clauses			
17AG(8)		If an entity entered into a contract with a value of more than $100 000 (inclusive of GST) and the contract did not provide the AuditorGeneral with access to the contractor's premises, the report must include the name of the contractor, purpose and value of the contract, and the reason why a clause allowing access was not included in the contract.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement	Page
	Exempt contracts			
17AG(9)		If an entity entered into a contract or there is a standing offer with a value greater than $10 000 (inclusive of GST) which has been exempted from being published in AusTender because it would disclose exempt matters under the FOI Act, the annual report must include a statement that the contract or standing offer has been exempted, and the value of the contract or standing offer, to the extent that doing so does not disclose the exempt matters.	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
	Small business			
17AG(10)(a)		A statement that "[Name of entity] supports small business participation in the Commonwealth Government procurement market. Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) and Small Enterprise participation statistics are available on the Department of Finance's website."	Mandatory	125
17AG(10)(b)		An outline of the ways in which the procurement practices of the entity support small and medium enterprises.	Mandatory	125
17AG(10)(c)		If the entity is considered by the Department administered by the Finance Minister as material in nature—a statement that "[Name of entity] recognises the importance of ensuring that small businesses are paid on time. The results of the Survey of Australian Government Payments to Small Business are available on the Treasury's website."	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
	Financial Statements			
17AD(e)		Inclusion of the annual financial statements in accordance with subsection 43(4) of the Act.	Mandatory	89-126
	Executive Remuneration			
17AD(da)		Information about executive remuneration in accordance with Subdivision C of Division 3A of Part 23 of the Rule.	Mandatory	135
17AD(f)	**Other Mandatory Information**			
17AH(1)(a)(i)		If the entity conducted advertising campaigns, a statement that "During [reporting period], the [name of entity] conducted the following advertising campaigns: [name of advertising campaigns undertaken]. Further information on those advertising campaigns is available at [address of entity's website] and in the reports on Australian Government advertising prepared by the Department of Finance. Those reports are available on the Department of Finance's website."	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
17AH(1)(a)(ii)		If the entity did not conduct advertising campaigns, a statement to that effect.	If applicable, Mandatory	128
17AH(1)(b)		A statement that "Information on grants awarded by [name of entity] during [reporting period] is available at [address of entity's website]."	If applicable, Mandatory	NA
17AH(1)(c)		Outline of mechanisms of disability reporting, including reference to website for further information.	Mandatory	129
17AH(1)(d)		Website reference to where the entity's Information Publication Scheme statement pursuant to Part II of FOI Act can be found.	Mandatory	130
17AH(1)(e)		Correction of material errors in previous annual report	If applicable, mandatory	133
17AH(2)		**Information required by other legislation**	**Mandatory**	

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